2016 ANNUAL POLICE EXPERTS MEETING

DRAFT INTERNAL PAPER

Status of Intelligence-Led Policing Concepts in International Security and Law Enforcement Organizations
# Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH FOR THE OSCE 3

ACRONYMS 4

INTRODUCTION AND MANDATE 5

OSCE 7
- Secretariat 7
- Border Management Staff College (BMSC) 9

UNITED NATIONS 11
- UN Secretariat’s DPKO and DFS 11
  - Police Operations in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2016) 11
- UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 13
  - Criminal Intelligence Manuals (2010–2011) 13
  - SOCTA Handbook (2010) 16
  - Policing – Police Information and Intelligence Systems (2006) 19

EUROPEAN UNION 23
- Europol 23
  - Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) 26
- FRONTEX 29
  - Case – APIM: A Police Intelligence Model adjusted to Afghan conditions 30

INTERPOL 32
- DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) 34
- CARICC (Central Asian Regional Information Coordination Centre) 36
- SELEC (Southeast European Law Enforcement Center) 37

LIST OF REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING 38
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH FOR THE OSCE

Within the security sector, intelligence-led policing (ILP) has far reaching applications: After terrorist attacks at cities, such as Beirut, Brussels, Istanbul and Paris, world leaders have stressed the need for more intelligence-sharing among law enforcement entities in the fight against terrorism. INTERPOL has noted that intelligence-led policing should be utilized more in monitoring transit hubs and bottlenecks of drug traffic. The world has seen numerous new vehicles of crime, such as the social media and the dark net, where analysis of intelligence is paramount. FRONTEX is utilizing intelligence-led operations to counter cross-border crimes and to analyse the border security situation.

The security sector is facing asymmetric and unknown threats. The division between different threats is blurring: internal and external, conventional and non-conventional, military and non-military. The security sector needs, inter alia, more adaptability, flexibility, interoperability and sustainability.

The main finding on this paper is that there are numerous different origin points and concepts of ILP based on the material covered here. All of the concepts studied here are de facto based on using information and intelligence optimally for proactive and effective policing. The formulations and terms might differ, but this is the final purpose. Nevertheless, many organizations have slightly differing views of intelligence-led policing and it is also being implemented at different stages throughout the OSCE region by the field operations and by numerous international organizations.

However, some similarities between the different ILP concepts that were noticed during this desk research are below:

1) Most of the concepts treat intelligence-led policing as an integral component or a strategic counterpart of community policing.
2) The criminal intelligence cycle is almost the same in all the concepts.
3) SOCTAs are a widely accepted model for threat assessments.

For example, the EU policy cycle and SOCTAs provide a holistic and currently active concept of intelligence-led policing. Practically the same concept can be seen in UNODC’s guidebooks when you view them all supporting each other.

Intelligence-led policing overlaps into other OSCE’s dimensions besides politico-military: For example, the end state of all policing activities is a society where human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed. DPKO’s and DFS’s Guidelines note that criminal intelligence is vital in protecting civilians and addressing other security-related issues in post-conflict contexts. Recently, a derivation called intelligence-led conservation has been introduced as an enhancement in safeguarding wildlife and the world’s protected areas.
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATU</td>
<td>TNTD’s Action against Terrorism Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMSC</td>
<td>Border Management Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSMU</td>
<td>TNTD’s Border Security and Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICCC</td>
<td>Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRAM</td>
<td>Common Integrated Risk Assessment Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTHB</td>
<td>Combating Trafficking in Human Beings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>UN Secretariat’s Department for Field Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Secretariat’s Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europol</td>
<td>European Police Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROSUR</td>
<td>European Border Surveillance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>Frontières extérieures – EU Agency on border security and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCNM</td>
<td>OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILP</td>
<td>Intelligence-Led Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>EU’s Internal Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC.DEC</td>
<td>OSCE Ministerial Council Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Intelligence Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCG</td>
<td>Organized Crime Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSR-CTHB</td>
<td>OSCE Secretariat’s Office of the Special Representative on Combating THB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC.DEC</td>
<td>OSCE Permanent Council Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police Convention Cooperation for Southeast Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELEC</td>
<td>Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCTA</td>
<td>Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPMU</td>
<td>TNTD’s Strategic Police Matters Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNDT</td>
<td>OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCAC</td>
<td>Convention against Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTOC</td>
<td>Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERLTT</td>
<td>Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION AND MANDATE

Intelligence-led policing will be the focus of the Annual Police Experts Meeting of 2016 – an event organized by the German OSCE Chairmanship with the support of the OSCE’s Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) of the Transnational Threats Department (TNTD).

The introduction of the concept comes at an apt time regarding past decisions and emerging global events: The OSCE Ministerial Council recommended ten years ago in 2006, *inter alia*, as part of policy planning in preventing and fighting organized crime the following steps in its Decision on Organized Crime (MC.DEC/5/06, 2006): the improvement of data collection and analysis as well as national development and use of risk and threat assessments. During the same year, participants of the OSCE Chiefs of Police Meeting acknowledged the importance of gathering and producing quality and actionable data for producing reliable and effective risk analyses and threat assessments – and recognized the need to continue to move towards intelligence-led policing.¹

Additionally, OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier noted at the Vienna UN Conference in January 2016 that “in the face of growing transnational and global threats, regional organizations must step up their efforts to co-operate more effectively to maintain peace and security”². Similar high-level statements have been given on different security concerns.³

Intelligence-led policing is commonly defined as a proactive decision-making framework for all organizational levels that facilitates crime prevention, reduction, disruption and dismantling. It focuses on analysing, utilizing and disseminating intelligence, i.e. processed information, as well as managing problems and risks. This paradigm shift demands that intelligence is gathered and used comprehensively without letting it bottle up in silos where it is not needed. The issue of more efficient intelligence sharing among authorities has been raised numerous times during recent incidents – for example in flagging terrorists from feeds of information. In layman terms, intelligence-led policing could be described as using processed information as rationally and optimally as possible.

Practically speaking, an intelligence-led approach could constitute, *inter alia*, the following scenario: A local police officer stops a vehicle on the road for a broken taillight and checks the driver’s passport details by contacting the joint situation centre. At the same time, a specialized counter-terrorism unit has received information of a possible terrorist attack about to be conducted by the same driver. A desk officer at the joint situation centre checks the individual’s passport details on a centralized information system that combines multiple databases (e.g. border control, pre-emptive intelligence and INTERPOL search warrants). Thus, the centralized information system connects the two different observations and authorities are able to conduct suitable proactive action against the terrorist plan – without intelligence bottling up at the different units. Other practical examples of intelligence-led policing are:

---

¹ OSCE Chiefs of Police Meeting, Brussels Statement, 24 November 2006.
² http://www.osce.org/sg/215646
policing are strategic analysis of organized crime, high-level policy assessments, resource allocation and better evaluations of community problems.

Intelligence-led policing is not a new subject within the OSCE – for example field operations are conducting trainings on it and guidebooks on parallel issues have defined it to some extent. Nevertheless, there is currently a lack of a holistic OSCE-wide model on intelligence-led policing that would further advance police capabilities in the OSCE region.

The OSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the *Charter of the United Nations*. Thus, the UN holds general responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. This is evident for example in the OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities (*PC.DEC/1049*, 2012). According to it, the primary guiding principles of OSCE’s police-related activities are UN documents such as the Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime (*UNTOC*) and against Corruption (*UNCAC*). The UNTOC, also known as the Palermo Convention, has been described in regards to the fight against transnational organized crime as the legal instrument par excellence.

Thus, pursuant to the above, the OSCE’s formulation of intelligence-led policing should conform to UN guidance. Articles 26–30 of UNTOC, Chapter IV of UNCAC, MC.DEC/5/06 and PC.DEC/1049 also encourage, *inter alia*, different measures of co-operation and synchronization within and between law enforcement activities. Thus, intelligence-led policing approaches of other stakeholders should also be taken into consideration. These include, *inter alia*, INTERPOL, the EU, SELEC, CARICC and DCAF.

The purpose of this paper is to help identify areas of importance in intelligence-led policing concepts where replication is not needed, to contribute background material for the Annual Police Experts Meeting and to conceptualize the OSCE’s possible model on intelligence-led policing.

This internal desk-based background research is limited in information and is by no means exhaustive. It is meant to display a general overview of the latest observations in a straightforward manner. It does not go into detail about ILP.

---

OSCE

Secretariat

For organizational consistency purposes, OSCE documentation should be taken into account.
The OSCE’s definition of ILP in the guidebook Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach (2014):

An approach to policing that is clearly based on the collection, analysis and dissemination of police intelligence to inform and direct the deployment of police resources and police interventions. This contrasts with police approaches that rely heavily upon individual officers’ suspicions or hunches about unlawful or suspect behaviour to influence police interventions.

Chapter 4.2.2 ‘The Interplay between Community Policing and Intelligence-led Policing’ of the guidebook is as follows:

Intelligence-led policing and community policing are complementary but distinct approaches. Intelligence may emerge as a by-product of effective community policing, where the public has developed trust and confidence in the police. Community policing, however, is not, and should not be, about purposeful intelligence-gathering for counterterrorism.

The effective use of intelligence is critical to effective policing. A number of states have adopted intelligence-led approaches to policing, with a view to more successfully preventing and combating crime. In these approaches, data analysis and crime-related intelligence are pivotal to informing objective decision-making, both at a tactical level in individual cases (e.g., to identify and target suspected offenders on the basis of evidence) and more broadly in establishing strategic police priorities and allocating resources (e.g., to prioritize police action against a particular type of crime).

Crime-related intelligence results from a process of collecting, evaluating, assessing and analysing raw information from a variety of sources. These sources concern the nature of crimes, the way criminals operate and are organized, the time and location where crimes are committed and the profile and identity of victims. Much information can be derived from open sources, while other types of information may be confidential or obtained in a covert manner (e.g., through the use of SITs). To be lawful, intelligence has to be gathered, stored, processed, disseminated and used in strict compliance with national laws and international human rights standards.

The term “intelligence” may have negative connotations in society or among certain communities. This is more likely to be the case where police are believed to have acted inappropriately in the past. It is important to remember that the majority of intelligence is not obtained by covert means, but is developed from open-source information. Providing explanations to the public in this regard, and possibly publishing policies governing how the police and intelligence agencies obtain and use intelligence may assist in dispelling rumours and misunderstandings.

Interaction between the police and the public can provide an important source of information for the intelligence process and thereby guide the actions of the police, both at the local and national level. Members of the public can be encouraged to share with the police their concerns in terms of personal and community safety, to exchange their perceptions of a specific crime issue, and to report any suspicious activity. Confidential mechanisms, such as
anonymous telephone lines, should be provided so that people may remain anonymous. However, efforts in this regard should not exaggerate the nature of the danger or associate it with particular groups, as it may be counterproductive and result in excessive reporting about individuals belonging to certain groups and create distrust among communities.

Intelligence-led policing and community policing are complementary, mutually supportive but, at the same time, distinct approaches:

- Community policing can facilitate the sharing of information by the public with the police by building public trust and confidence in the police and increasing the number of opportunities for interaction between the public and the police;

- Intelligence-led policing can help police identify, prioritize and more effectively tackle issues of concern to the public in general and specific communities in particular;

- Community police officers will often receive crime-related intelligence from national or regional briefings and can channel back to relevant services important information on crime and security issues affecting the community they serve.

Community policing is not primarily concerned with recruiting and/or cultivating informants from within the community. Gathering relevant information should only come as a by-product of community policing. Community police officers should not be tasked with gathering terrorist-related intelligence. This responsibility should remain the distinct role of counterterrorism officers or other specialized agencies.

Intelligence may emerge as a by-product of effective community policing in situations where the public has developed trust and confidence in the police. Community policing is not, and should not be, about gathering intelligence for counterterrorism.

Despite efforts to effectively and lawfully develop intelligence, the police often have to make decisions on the basis of out-of-context, incomplete and potentially inaccurate information. In particular, there will be occasions where the police are faced with a dilemma: either to take action, and risk antagonizing and alienating the community they serve; or not to act at all, and risk a major incident with consequent loss of life and/or damage to property. Robust risk assessment and decision-making procedures within the police will assist in making proportionate and defensible decisions. The police should also endeavour, without compromising operational capabilities, to be open with the public about the practical difficulties of relying on intelligence to inform police action.

Human rights can provide a useful framework to guide decisions, as well as a reference for explaining these decisions to the public. For example, in deciding to act upon information that premises located near a school are being used to manufacture chemicals for use in explosive devices, the police will need to ensure that its surveillance techniques respect the right to privacy of the individuals within and around the premises, while aiming to protect the right to life.

SPMU’s internal research has shown that there is some lack of harmony about ILP among OSCE field operations:

6 out of 14 FOs replied. On a general note, ILP seems to be more established in South-Eastern Europe as opposed to Central Asia. Yet, there seems to be discrepancy even inside the
regions. The OSCE FOs in Albania, Kosovo and Kyrgyzstan are involved directly in training and implementing ILP concepts according to the replies. The Office in Tajikistan is also conducting training on intelligence.

The ILP models and subsequent build-ups can be seen to originate from numerous different sources (EU, organized crime advisers from Northern Ireland, SIDA, Swedish Police, PAMECA III, ICITAP, DCAF, German Federal Criminal Police, Lithuanian Police Bureau). In South-Eastern Europe, the assessment of organized crime seems to be concentrating on SOCTA standards and the SOCTA model is also being brought into Kyrgyzstan.

On a linguistic note, the translation of the ILP concept from English to Russian seems to cause some unhappiness. The word ‘intelligence’ is understood in Russian as the information attained before a criminal case is established (so called secret intelligence), whereas in English ‘intelligence’ means processed and analysed information. Thus, for example Tajikistan law enforcement seems to be using intelligence to enhance police activities, but it is not entirely clear if we are talking about the same issue and concept. The same could be true of e.g. Kyrgyzstan, but the office replied that “ILP is not implemented as it is understood in the SOCTA framework”.

**Border Management Staff College (BMSC)**

BMSC is providing, among others, a one year blended learning course on Border Security and Management for Senior Leadership (BSMSL). Module content of the course is below:

2. Risk analysis
   2.1. Threat, risk and risk analysis
   2.2. Risk analysis models
   2.3. Risk analysis methods
   2.4. Risk management process
   2.5. Risk analysis indicators and warnings
   2.6. Cross border risk analysis practices

3. Crime intelligence
   3.1. Intelligence-led policing
   3.2. The intelligence cycle
   3.3. Sources of intelligence
   3.5. Financial intelligence
   3.6. Intelligence analysis
   3.7. Intelligence products
   3.8. Intelligence sharing

4. Investigations
   4.1. Investigating transnational crime
   4.2. Key elements of border investigations
   4.3. Practicalities of cross border investigations
   4.4. Organising a joint investigation
   4.6. Cross border surveillance and hot pursuit
   4.7. Investigations: Legal basis and procedural arrangements

5. Intelligence model
   5.1. What is an intelligence model?

---

5 All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text should be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.

6 SPMU. Compilation of FOs’ Replies on ILP Questionnaire. Interoffice Memorandum. 2 February 2016.
5.2. Different intelligence models
5.3. Creating an intelligence model
5.4. Data collection planning
5.5. Standard intelligence model products
5.6. Intelligence exchange and dissemination
 UNITED NATIONS

The UN’s police-related activities are divided among two different approaches:

1) the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and
2) the UN Secretariat’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS).

The focuses of the two sides are entirely different: UNODC concentrates on countering international crime in general, while DPKO and DFS assets operate in fragile settings such as post-conflict environments.

UN Secretariat’s DPKO and DFS

Police Operations in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2016)

DPKO and DFS recently released Guidelines on Police Operations (2016) which entail UN’s view of intelligence-led policing. The guidelines iterate that intelligence-led policing is an overarching strategy that works in tandem with community policing. This approach is similar to the UNODC’s Handbook on the Crime Prevention Guidelines and the OSCE’s guidebook on Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach. Community policing is a philosophy that promotes a partnership-based effort between the police and the community to more effectively address problems of crime. In addition, it is an integral area of OSCE’s general police development and reform efforts.

The guidelines contain principles of intelligence-led policing and some detailed guidance on the use of intelligence i.e. the criminal intelligence cycle. The definition of ILP in the guidelines:

Intelligence-led policing is the second overarching policing strategy. It works in tandem with community-oriented policing. Where community-oriented policing emphasizes policing to the needs and the desires of the local community, intelligence-led policing uses processed information, i.e. data analysis and criminal intelligence, as the fundamental basis for an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime prevention, reduction, disruption and dismantling through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies targeting serious crimes and/or prolific offenders. Intelligence informs and influences the police by helping them more effectively decide on priorities, the allocation of resources and strategies to reduce crime.

---

8 OSCE Guidebook on Community Policing and VERLT p. 13–14.
The guidelines’ definition of the criminal intelligence cycle:

Significant information flows shall be available as a result of regular exercise of police duties, enabling the United Nations police to obtain, store and catalogue information on crime patterns and prolific offenders. Once acquired, information shall be analyzed focussing on patterns in the crime data and on connecting events or evidence to potential offenders and groups. This analysis should be disseminated to relevant decision-makers and form the basis for prioritizing the criminal events that should be addressed most immediately. In the next stages, decisions are acted on, e.g., more patrols directed to hotspots of criminal activity or the proactive arrest of serious repeat offenders. Evaluation seeks to identify ways in which any stage of the cycle can be improved and should occur throughout the process, not just at the last stage.  

The subtopics of the guidelines on ILP:

What is intelligence-led policing?
When is criminal intelligence important for UN police?
Who should gather criminal information?
What type of information should be gathered for criminal intelligence analysis?
Training
How– Criminal intelligence is sensitive: put procedures in place
Binding principles
Criminal intelligence cycle: general principles
Collecting criminal intelligence
Analysis and prioritization
Receipt/Evaluation of information
File status

---

Classification of criminal intelligence

**UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)**

UNODC, on the other hand, does not have a similar concise framework of intelligence-led policing as DPKO and DFS, although their literature develops a lot more on specific parts of it. For example, UNODC has produced Criminal Intelligence Manuals (2010–2011), a Handbook on SOCTAs or Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessments (2010), and a Police Information and Intelligence Systems guidebook as a part of the Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit (2006).

One of the guiding documents of the OSCE’s police-related activities is the UN’s Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) resolution on Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (2002/13). UNODC’s Handbook on the aforementioned Guidelines (2010) presents intelligence-led policing as one of many various terms for a community-oriented policing approach with three core characteristics: community involvement, a problem-solving orientation and decentralization.

**Criminal Intelligence Manuals (2010–2011)**

Three separate manuals from three viewpoints. Introductions are similar although the more insightful parts diverge.


These manuals go into far more depth on actually performing analysis on information, gathering it and managing it.

For example, the chapters of the Manual for Analysts covers aspects like evaluation of source and data, analysis and analytical process and different basic analysis techniques (link analysis, event charting, flow analysis, telephone analysis). The Manual of Analysts also contains an example of the United Kingdom’s national intelligence model and a sample of criminal information and intelligence guidelines.

The introduction on all of the manuals:

> Before we can properly discuss and explore information, intelligence and analysis in theoretical and practical terms, we need to have some common understanding as to what these terms mean. Some definitions of these three key terms are as follows:

- **Information**

- Knowledge in raw form

- **Intelligence**

---

- Information that is capable of being understood
- Information with added value
- Information that has been evaluated in context to its source and reliability

Analysis (of either information or intelligence)

- The resolving or separating of a thing into its component parts
- Ascertainment of those parts
- The tracing of things to their source to discover the general principles behind them
- A table or statement of the results of this process

Understanding properly the difference between these terms and how they interact is important, however even at this early stage, these definitions point to key differences. Information is quite simply raw data of any type, whilst in contrast intelligence is data which has been worked on, given added value or significance.

The way in which this transformation is made is through evaluation, a process of considering the information with regard to its context through its source and reliability.

In its simplest form, intelligence analysis is about collecting and utilizing information, evaluating it to process it into intelligence, and then analysing that intelligence to produce products to support informed decision-making.\(^\text{13}\)

The manuals differentiate between strategic and operational intelligence in a similar way as INTERPOL and the EU:

**Strategic intelligence:** Focuses on the long-term aims of law enforcement agencies. It typically reviews current and emerging trends changes in the crime environment, threats to public safety and order, opportunities for controlling action and the development of counter programmes and likely avenues for change to policies, programmes and legislation.

**Operational intelligence:** Typically provides an investigative team with hypotheses and inferences concerning specific elements of illegal operations of any sort. These will include

\(^{13}\) UNODC. Criminal Intelligence – Manuals for Analysts, Front-line Law Enforcement and Managers p. 1.
\(^{14}\) UNODC. Criminal Intelligence – Manuals for Analysts, Front-line Law Enforcement and Managers p. 10.
hypotheses and inferences about specific criminal networks, individuals or groups involved in unlawful activities, discussing their methods, capabilities, vulnerabilities, limitations and intentions that could be used for effective law enforcement action.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Figure 5-1. The analytical process}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{analytical_process.png}
\caption{The analytical process\textsuperscript{16}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{15} UNODC. Criminal Intelligence – Manuals for Analysts, Front-line Law Enforcement and Managers p. 9.

\textsuperscript{16} UNODC. Criminal Intelligence – Manuals for Analysts, Front-line Law Enforcement and Managers p. 29.

The UNODC Handbook on the Crime Prevention Guidelines (ECOSOC resolution 2002/13) is the broadest of all the UNODC manuals mentioned. It approaches intelligence-led policing as one of the possible strategies in knowledge-based prevention of crimes:

The present Handbook was written for a number of audiences. The primary one is Governments, since, as the Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime emphasize, Governments have a key role in developing overall policies, and in promoting, coordinating and supporting crime prevention. The principles on which the Guidelines are based are relevant for all countries, and all levels of government, regardless of their political or administrative structures or stage of economic development. Thus national Governments, regional governments and local governments all have significant opportunities and roles to play. The present Handbook provides examples of strategy and programme development that will be of value to policymakers and practitioners at all levels of government, and in high-, low- and middle-income contexts. One of the most important aspects of investing in crime prevention policies is that they can result in significant reductions in the costs of criminal justice and other public services, and bring considerable benefits to society.

The handbook’s chapters cover issues like the key role of governments, knowledge-based crime prevention, planning, monitoring and evaluation, a multidisciplinary approach and working in partnerships, and working with communities and civil society. The handbook mentions ILP as a part of community policing among numerous other similar models such as problem-oriented policing, broken-windows approach, pulling-levers policing and hot-spots policing:

Intelligence-led policing: a model of policing developed in England and Wales which aims to provide an effective strategy to respond to all enforcement needs such as organized crime and road safety, not local crime alone. It uses problem solving based on good information and cooperation with other agencies and bodies.

SOCTA Handbook (2010)

UNODC’s SOCTA Handbook provides a comprehensive overview of SOCTAs from defining them to preparing them. The handbook goes into detail on different phases of preparing a SOCTA e.g. planning and tasking, information collection, processing and evaluation, analysis and the dissemination.

The SOCTA Handbook defines ILP as follows (originally from Ratcliffe):

A business model where data analysis and crime intelligence are central to an objective, decision making process that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention.

The SOCTA Handbook defines intelligence as follows:

---

17 UNODC. Criminal Intelligence – Manual for Managers p. 35.
18 UNODC. Handbook on the Crime Prevention Guidelines p. 3.
20 UNODC. SOCTA Handbook p. 3.
Information that has been assessed for a given purpose.\(^{21}\)

The definition of the intelligence cycle:

A model detailing the phases that drive analytical output including: *Planning and tasking*—sets the objectives and scope of the task; *Collection*—gathers information relevant to the task; *Processing*—organizes material in a logical, useable form; *Analysis*—evaluates and analyses information to develop inferences, identify intelligence gaps and provide recommendations; *Dissemination*—effectively communicates the outcomes of analysis based on the initial task.\(^{22}\)

The link between SOCTAs and intelligence-led policing:

Additionally, a national SOCTA is an extremely valuable tool for law enforcement (and other public and private sector organizations) leaders and managers because it informs them about the latest trends, and how they may develop. This assists in defining their selection of priorities and identifies the best means of operating (what works, and what does not work). In some countries this has contributed to the development of what is known as “intelligence-led policing” where the importance and value of timely and accurate criminal information and intelligence is recognized as essential to effectively tackling serious and organized crime. A key element of intelligence-led policing is about improving the understanding of how criminals operate to enable the most effective means of prevention and investigation to be adopted. Thus the importance of threat assessments is central to making these choices.\(^{23}\)

The SOCTA—by fulfilling the tasking set and agreed by those commissioning the document—delivers the right information to allow for intelligence-led decisions to be taken by the appropriate policymakers. The key findings, intelligence gaps and recommendations from the SOCTA also help form the next cycle of planning, direction and tasking. This

\(^{21}\) UNODC. SOCTA Handbook p. 2.
\(^{22}\) UNODC. SOCTA Handbook p. 13.
\(^{23}\) UNODC. SOCTA Handbook p. 2.
\(^{24}\) UNODC. SOCTA Handbook p. 10.
The handbook notes down numerous different analytical approaches in its Annex II such as crime pattern analysis, network analysis, demographic and social-trend analysis (DSTA), market analysis and crime business analysis. DSTA is below as an example:

Demographic and social-trend analysis (DSTA) examines how demographic and social changes within an area or within a demographic group can affect levels and types of crime and disorder. These changes may be an individual occurrence, such as a live music event, or may be, for example, a long-term change in either the ethnic make-up or age profile of a geographical area.

Demographic and social-trend analysis:

- Can be used to make decisions about resources at a strategic level;
- Highlights where future pressures on resources are likely to arise;
- Identifies current or emerging problems;
- Can be used to improve knowledge in relation to partnership working;
- Aids the planning process for seasonal or tactical operations in response to emerging social phenomena or movements of people;
- Highlights preventive, reduction or diversion opportunities;
- Helps to focus intelligence gathering;\(^\text{27}\)

Additionally, the Handbook discusses indicators as a strategic level tool:

Indicators—and the warnings that they inform—are the key predictive elements within analysis. They provide a method for monitoring the current situation for changes that may

---

\(^{25}\) UNODC. SOCTA Handbook p. 44.  
\(^{26}\) UNODC. SOCTA Handbook p. 44.  
\(^{27}\) UNODC. SOCTA Handbook p. 63–64.
have a future impact upon the subject of the analysis. In terms of a national SOCTA they provide a “watchtower” from which the analyst can survey the environment for changes that may have an adverse impact on society from serious and organized crime.

[-]

The development of indicators allow for the monitoring of changes that may have an impact on future threats and vulnerabilities. Scenario writing use indicators to “predict” which particular scenario is unfolding, thus giving the decision maker an early opportunity to react to the developing future. It is this technique that allows for the time element highlighted during risk analysis to be accounted for (paragraph 93). “You don’t need to know the future. You just have to be prepared for it” (Pericles 55 BC).²⁸


This guidebook has a holistic and broad approach to using intelligence in various fashions. The guidebook covers elements such as legal and regulatory framework, infrastructure, criminal intelligence as a process, local use of information and intelligence, partnerships and coordination.

The guidebook’s definitions on intelligence-led policing and criminal intelligence:

Intelligence-led policing is a strategy or tactic by which information and intelligence is used to inform the allocation of resources against those threats that have been shown, through analysis, to cause the greatest harm²⁹.

²⁸ UNODC. SOCTA Handbook p. 64-65.
²⁹ UNODC. Policing – Police Information and Intelligence Systems p. 6.
The concept of “criminal intelligence” is neither easy to explain nor to translate. A direct translation can have negative political and historical associations in some parts of the world that make the word inappropriate in many international settings. As a result, it is often easier instead to use the word “information” and, indeed, the terms “information” and “intelligence” are often used interchangeably.30

On the added values of an optimal criminal intelligence system:

In recent years there have been some important developments concerning the use of criminal intelligence by law enforcement agencies in many parts of the world and these have resulted in an increasing recognition amongst practitioners that:

- timely and actionable criminal intelligence is essential to make an impact on the prevention, reduction and investigation of serious and organised crime, particularly when it is of a trans-national nature. (“Timely” means that it is provided in good time and “actionable” means that its detail and reliability supports the taking of action.);

- criminal intelligence can play a significant role in helping with the directing and prioritising of resources in the prevention, reduction and detection of all forms of crime – through the identification and analysis of trends, modus operandi, “hotspots” and criminals – both at the national and transnational level; and

- intelligence can form the bedrock of an effective policing model – often termed “Intelligence Led Policing” – where intelligence is essential to providing strategic direction and central to the deployment of staff for all forms of tactical policing activity, including community policing and routine patrols.31

31 UNODC. Policing – Police Information and Intelligence Systems p. 2.
The guidebook lists other outcomes of an optimal ILP system besides operative intelligence products:

In addition to developing an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of a state’s approach to police information and intelligence, the assessor should be able to identify opportunities for reform and development. Technical assistance in the area of police information and intelligence systems in the context of a broader strategic framework may include work that will enhance the following:

- Drafting (or amendment) and implementation of legal instruments that provide responsible police powers related to the collection and use of information and intelligence together with appropriate safeguards;
- Drafting (or revision) of relevant guidelines and manuals;
- Development of an integrated system for managing and exchanging police information and intelligence;
- Creation of a national or central coordinating body for criminal intelligence and information;
- Development of independent safeguards and oversight mechanisms;
- Improvement in the technical infrastructure for the handling and integration of data (including enhancement of data security);
- Professional development of specialist staff (especially with respect to the skills of analytical staff and intelligence managers);
- Enhancing technical facilities available to staff working with information and intelligence (including support for the creation and development of key police databases and access to them);

---

• Facilitation and promotion of mechanisms (legal, institutional and technical) for sharing information between national agencies and international partners;
• Development of a methodology and structures for compiling a national organised crime threat assessment.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33} UNODC. Policing – Police Information and Intelligence Systems p. 2.
EUROPEAN UNION

The EU plays a vital role in the work of the OSCE. For example, EULEX and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo\textsuperscript{34} both conduct similar law enforcement capacity-building activities in the same geographical area. The EU’s police-related activities are structured in a similar way to the UN – internal and external. These activities are set forth in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the Internal Security Strategy (ISS), respectively.

The CSDP is based on Articles 42–46 of the Treaty on the European Union. The policing arm of the CSDP is maintained by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The policing aspect of the ISS is handled by Europol. The ISS was recently renewed for 2015–2020 as the European Agenda on Security in a communication by the European Commission (COM(2015) 185 final).

The EU has been developing its intelligence-led policing since 2004. The division of criminal intelligence into strategic and operational intelligence converges with UNODC’s and INTERPOL’s concepts:

Criminal intelligence assists the competent authorities in the performance of their strategic or operational tasks, in order to prevent and combat terrorism and other serious or organised crime, as well as the threats caused by them. The introduction of a European Criminal Intelligence Model would render intelligence-led law enforcement effective and allow for enhanced cooperative action. It would comprise issues such as the synchronisation of threat assessment based on a common methodology, systematic underpinning of threat assessment by sectoral vulnerability studies and the required financial and human resource allocation.

Criminal intelligence is divided into strategic and operational (or tactical) intelligence. Strategic intelligence provides insight into the question of what the threats and crimes are that must be addressed and operational intelligence provides tactical guidance on how best to tackle and prioritise them.\textsuperscript{35}

The EU heritage of ILP can also be tied to the principle of an informed decision-making model:

The Hague Programme highlighted the need to develop an EU intelligence-led law enforcement mechanism to enable decision makers to define European law enforcement strategies based on thorough assessments. Availability of and access to information, production of European criminal intelligence and enhanced trust between law enforcement authorities at European and international level are its core elements.\textsuperscript{36}

Europol

The EU’s law enforcement agency, Europol, is based upon a model of an intelligence-led approach to internal security. At the model’s core is the methodology provided by the SOCTAs and the EU Policy Cycle for serious and organised crime. Other similar functions of

\textsuperscript{34} All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text should be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.

\textsuperscript{35} European Commission. Towards enhancing access to information by law enforcement agencies (EU information policy). COM/2004/0429 final.

\textsuperscript{36} European Commission. Developing a strategic concept on tackling organised crime. COM/2005/0232 final.
the EU’s Internal Security Strategy are, *inter alia*, police and customs cooperation centres, disaster risk assessments, and coordination hubs for crisis and emergency response. The first OCTA (a forerunner for SOCTAs) was produced in 2006\(^{37}\). The following Council of the European Union paper of 2010 marks the beginning of the multi-annual cycle:

The Council of the European Union concludes to establish and implement a multi-annual policy cycle with regard to serious international and organised crime in order to tackle the most important criminal threats in a coherent and methodological manner through optimum cooperation between the relevant services of the Member States, EU Institutions and EU Agencies as well as relevant third countries and organisations.

The policy cycle for serious international and organised crime consists of four steps:

i. Policy development on the basis of a European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU SOCTA) that must provide for a complete and thorough picture of criminal threats impacting the European Union.

ii. Policy setting and decision-making through the identification by the Council of a limited number of priorities, both regional and pan-European. For each of the priorities a Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) needs to be developed in order to achieve a multidisciplinary, integrated and integral (covering preventive as well repressive measures) approach to effectively address the prioritised threats.

iii. Implementation and monitoring of annual Operational Action Plans (OAP) that need to be aligned to the strategic goals which have been determined in the MASP, building upon the COSPOL framework as the multilateral cooperation platform to address the prioritised threats.

iv. At the end of the policy cycle a thorough evaluation needs to be conducted and will serve as an input for the next policy cycle.\(^{38}\)

---


\(^{38}\) Council of the European Union. Conclusions on the creation and implementation of an EU policy cycle for organized and serious international crime. Doc 15358/10.

\(^{39}\) EU Policy Cycle - EMPACT
Step 1: EU SOCTA

The Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, developed by Europol, delivered a set of recommendations based on an in-depth analysis of the major crime threats facing the EU. The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers used these recommendations to define its priorities for the next four years (2014-2017).

Step 2: Strategic Plans

Multi-Annual Strategic Action Plans will be developed from the priorities in order to define the strategic goals for combating each priority threat.

Step 3: EMPACT (European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats) – These projects will set out operational action plans (OAPs) to combat the priority threats.

Step 3: Operational Actions

These projects will set out operational action plans (OAPs) to combat the priority threats.

Step 4: Evaluation

The effectiveness of the OAPs and their impact on the priority threat will be reviewed by COSI (Standing committee for the EU internal security). In 2015, an interim threat assessment (SOCTA) will be prepared by Europol to evaluate, monitor and adjust (if required) the effort in tackling the priority threats.

The SOCTA methodology links the SOCTAs to the multi-annual policy cycle:

The starting point of this EU policy cycle is the SOCTA in which Europol will deliver analytical findings that can be translated into political priorities, strategic goals and operational action plans in order to implement EU policy. The link between the SOCTA conclusions and the definition of priorities is very important. Taking this step in an intelligence-led way ensures that analysis directly informs political decision-making, and that the most relevant threats in the EU are addressed.

---

40 EU Policy Cycle - EMPACT
41 SOCTA – Methodology. 9992/2/12 REV 2. P. 3.
The SOCTA methodology stresses the importance of a clearly defined terminology:

The concepts of risk, threat, serious and organised crime and intelligence-led policing need clear and univocal definitions to avoid controversial and contested interpretations. Special focus has therefore been given to the use of clearly defined terminology in this document.43

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

CPCC handles similar assignments as DPKO. According to CPCC, the EU policing missions (EUPOL Afghanistan, EULEX Kosovo44, EUPM BiH etc.) did not have a common approach to implementing ILP at the beginning of 2010s even though they were developing ILP in host countries. This coupled with the need to professionalize the handling of information and intelligence within UN peacekeeping and EU civilian crisis management missions led to CPCC creating their handbook on ILP.45

The handbook contains very detailed information on building an ILP-based system and it even references the Belgian 2006 OSCE Chairmanship’s Chiefs of Police Meeting. But mostly the handbook has been built on the heritage of both DPKO and Europol.

42 SOCTA – Methodology. 9992/2/12 REV 2. P. 7.
43 SOCTA – Methodology. 9992/2/12 REV 2. P. 6.
44 All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text should be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.
45 Handbook on Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) for civilian CSDP Missions, p. 9–10.
The handbook’s concept on ILP:

Information or data is the principal element of knowledge and as such a critical input for rational decision making. It can be used to create awareness and provide direction for ongoing and future activities and it refers simply to the raw information that is collected but has not been analysed.

Intelligence is the synthesis of known information and analytical reasoning to create a determination about the overall operating environment. Intelligence of the product of careful evaluation and analysis of all the collected information.

To keep it simple: Information + Analysis = Intelligence

The formula above clarifies the distinction between collected information and produced intelligence.

ILP is a strategic and tactical future-oriented and targeted approach to crime control and policing service provision to the wider community of the host nation. It focuses upon the identification, analysis and ‘management’ of persisting and developing ‘problems’ and ‘risks’, and facilitates a managerial process for prioritizing issues and allocating human and logistical resources consistent with a proactive policing approach.

The ILP process is informed by the intelligence cycle of direction, collection, evaluation, collation, analysis and dissemination.\(^\text{46}\)

---

\(^\text{46}\) Handbook on Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) for civilian CSDP Missions, p. 7.

\(^\text{47}\) Handbook on Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) for civilian CSDP Missions, p. 7.
The added value of ILP in the handbook:

The need to introduce ILP should not be questioned. In times of budgetary and resource restrictions every responsible individual and each organisation has to identify priorities to tackle major problems. To assist in prioritisation, decisions have to be made based on facts and intelligence, the basis of all of which is information. ILP will help to optimise the allocation of resources and concentrate efforts in a more structured manner. This helps to cope with increased sophistication and operational agility of criminals to subvert law and order. In relation to CSDP Missions, all of this would be carried out with local ownership as an underpinning principle.48

The definition of the intelligence cycle:

Intelligence is critical for decision making, planning, strategic targeting and crime prevention. Law enforcement agencies depend on intelligence operations at all levels. They cannot function effectively without collecting, processing and using intelligence.

Without going into detail at that stage, the so called Intelligence Cycle has to be mentioned, which is the process for the identification of intelligence gaps, where relevant information are tasked and collected, and converted into finished intelligence for dissemination to recipients at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. That intelligence will be used by the recipients to make better informed decisions. All recipients with the right to know and the need to know, from the police officer on patrol, analysts, detectives, commanders, up to policymakers will be included in the process.

The usage of a national intelligence model (NIM) within CSDP missions:

If there is already capacity in the host country, the NIM should be designed by the host country's authorities together with the civilian CSDP Mission. This guarantees local ownership from the beginning. The development of a NIM should be defined in the OPLAN of each Mission where Intelligence Led Policing is to be part of the mandate.

In a country without a reliable policing structure, the civilian CSDP Mission will have the responsibility to design the NIM based on available information in the host country. This will mainly apply for substitution Missions. It goes without saying that in such cases local ownership should be reached as soon as possible.

The NIM is a business model used by Police Services to ensure that policing is delivered in a targeted manner through the development of information and intelligence. It is used to prioritise issues and allocate resources to deal with them. It operates on three levels: local (crime, incidents and neighbourhood priorities), regional (‘cross-border’/force boundaries issues), and national or international (serious and organised crime).

The NIM is based on proactive policing which involves identifying, understanding and addressing underlying problems and trends. This broader perspective allows for prioritisation of police activities which makes it easier to respond to the increasing demands. Elements of the NIM, may also be used in reactive investigations, e.g., to direct resources and establish a full picture of an issue under investigation.

48 Handbook on Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) for civilian CSDP Missions, p. 12.
FRONTEX

Involving FRONTEX is more important now than ever when taking into account the required joint-operability of police and border units. FRONTEX employs a Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) to perform risk analysis:

Based on a common integrated risk analysis model, the Agency should carry out risk analyses in order to provide the Community and the Member States with adequate information to allow for appropriate measures to be taken or to tackle identified threats and risks with a view to improving the integrated management of external borders.\(^{49}\)

\[\text{Figure. CIRAM diagram}^{50}\]

The purpose of risk analysis and its link to decision-making within the CIRAM:

The purpose of risk analysis is to provide information and analysis that will enable decision-making on how to reduce and mitigate risk where resources and capabilities are limited. While it will never be possible to completely eliminate risk, by enabling decision-makers to take informed decisions, risk analysis will contribute to closing the largest gaps between risk and capabilities.\(^{51}\)

---


One task of FRONTEX is to upkeep situational awareness. Situational awareness is defined as follows in FRONTEX’s context:

‘situational awareness’ means the ability to monitor, detect, identify, track and understand illegal cross-border activities in order to find reasoned grounds for reaction measures on the basis of combining new information with existing knowledge, and to be better able to reduce loss of lives of migrants at, along or in the proximity of, the external borders;

For example, one component of EUROSUR’s situational awareness are the situational pictures:

1. The national situational pictures, the European situational picture and the common pre-frontier intelligence picture shall be produced through the collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, interpretation, generation, visualisation and dissemination of information.
2. The pictures referred to in paragraph 1 shall consist of the following layers:
   a. an events layer;
   b. an operational layer;
   c. an analysis layer.

Case – APIM: A Police Intelligence Model adjusted to Afghan conditions

An October 2015 example of EUPOL Afghanistan developing an intelligence model for Afghanistan:

Fighting organized crime, corruption and terrorism is a major challenge for the Afghan National Police and the approach to that fight needs to be both it effective and contemporary. Key factors in this approach are the gathering, analysis, evaluation and sharing of information, a model for policing also known as Intelligence-led Policing. In Afghanistan this

---

model has been adjusted to local conditions and is functioning within ANP under the name of Afghan Police Intelligence Model (APIM).

In order to manage the potentially extensive amount of data for further processing, there is a clear need for a suitable database. This database, which is already accessible in 33 of 34 provinces in Afghanistan, is the National Information Database System (NIMS). When used properly, the analysis of information fed into NIMS can help to not only identify patterns and trends to assist in solving crimes and predict future crime, but also help to better understand the coexistence between crime and community. Overall this should build ground for a better and more targeted use of resources within ANP.

The basic structure of the Afghan Police Intelligence Model can be described as a cycle of events. Data is collected and made available through the NIMS for evaluation and analysis. The resulting analysis is then disseminated to relevant police pillars, who will use this to allocate resources in order to counter or uncover crimes and criminal networks. The knowledge gained throughout this cycle is to be considered as new data, potentially suitable to form the basis of new analysis.

The core responsibility in the ANP for the complete implementation of APIM and NIMS lies within Directorate of Police Intelligence and National Targeting and Exploitation Center, both of which EUPOL in close cooperation with Resolute Support Mission are advising on the matter.

The work lying immediately ahead of us is the expansion of the APIM and giving more police pillars in all provinces access to the NIMS. This process has been initiated for 119 Call Centers in Kabul and efforts are being made to have Interpol’s National Central Bureau (NCB) Kabul included as well. Another important issue towards making the APIM as efficient as possible is training of more NIMS operators.55

---

55 APIM: A Police Intelligence Model adjusted to Afghan conditions
INTERPOL

INTERPOL does not have public files on its ILP concept. Nevertheless, INTERPOL has focused on developing ILP since 2007:

The need to develop intelligence-led policing strategies and practical policing models with full agency integration was a key message of experts at the INTERPOL Analytical Symposium that began today at the General Secretariat.

Intelligence-led policing is an effective means for law enforcement to move beyond the traditional reactive method of policing towards a more proactive approach focused on serious offenders.  

INTERPOL divides criminal intelligence into operational and strategic levels:

Criminal intelligence analysis is divided into operational (or tactical) and strategic analysis.

While the basic skills required are similar, the two categories differ with regard to the level of detail and the type of client for whom the products are designed.

Operational analysis aims to achieve a specific law enforcement outcome. This might be an arrest, seizure, forfeiture of assets or money gained from criminal activities, or the disruption of a criminal group.

Operational analytical support includes:

- Identifying links between suspects, and their involvement in crimes and criminal activity;
- Identifying key investigative or information gaps;
- Preparing profiles of known or suspected criminals.

Strategic analysis is intended to inform higher level decision makers, and the benefits are realized over the long term.

The intention is to provide early warning of threats and to support senior decision makers in preparing their organizations to deal with emerging criminal issues. This might include allocating resources to different types of crime, or increasing training in a particular crime-fighting technique.

Strategic analysis includes the identification of:

- Modus operandi;
- Crime trends and patterns;
- Emerging threats;
- The potential impact of external factors such as technology, demographics or economics on crime.  

INTERPOL has utilized ILP in combating environmental crime:

56 INTERPOL symposium promotes intelligence-led policing to prevent crime
57 Criminal Intelligence Analysis Fact Sheet.
Intelligence-led policing is emerging in INTERPOL member countries as a new and targeted approach to environmental crime.

Within this model, sensitive information is collected, recorded, evaluated and also researched via INTERPOL's unique resources. This enables both INTERPOL and national decision-makers to proactively identify high-risk areas and persons and to devise tailored activities and operations in response. 58

INTERPOL also recommended ILP-based procedures in fighting drug trafficking for the UN General Assembly Special Session 2016:

Focusing on Transit Hubs and Bottlenecks: Greater understanding is needed around the main hubs and points of entry being used move drugs. These must be catalogued and monitored overtime. As an example of intelligence-led policing, this information needs to be translated into outcomes on the ground, either via national police forces or support through INTERPOL, and should guide international law enforcement strategies in this respect. 59

58 INTERPOL / Ecomessage
59 INTERPOL contribution to UNGASS 2016, p. 7.
DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces)

The layout of DCAF’s paper on intelligence-led operations:

This paper (1) sketches the main threats currently confronting all states. Part (2) elaborates what intelligence is and explains why intelligence is key to counter the expanding array of threats more effectively. Part (3) shows the application of intelligence and the contributions of intelligence-led operations to the fight against the pre-eminent threats. Part (4) explores patterns and problems of intelligence cooperation. In part (5) some of the implications which intelligence-led operations may have for democratic control, supervision, oversight and accountability are indicated. The paper ends with a list of key recommendations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Easily defined?</th>
<th>Standard model of policing</th>
<th>Community policing</th>
<th>Problem-oriented policing</th>
<th>CompStat</th>
<th>Intelligence-led policing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Fairly easy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Fairly easy, but evolving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy adopted?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Superficially</td>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td>Managerially challenging</td>
<td>Managerially challenging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation?</td>
<td>Police admin. Units</td>
<td>Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Problems</td>
<td>Police admin. Units</td>
<td>Criminal groups, prolific &amp; serious offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical focus?</td>
<td>Top down</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
<td>As appropriate for problem</td>
<td>Top down</td>
<td>Top down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who determines priorities?</td>
<td>Police management</td>
<td>Community concerns/ demands</td>
<td>Sometimes crime analysts, but varies from problem to problem</td>
<td>Police management from crime analysis</td>
<td>Police management from crime intelligence and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target?</td>
<td>Offence detection</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Crime &amp; disorder problems &amp; other concerns for police</td>
<td>Crime and disorder hotspots</td>
<td>Prolific offenders &amp; crime problems and other areas of concern for police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for success?</td>
<td>Increased detections &amp; arrests</td>
<td>Satisfied community</td>
<td>Reduction of problems</td>
<td>Lower crime rates</td>
<td>Detection, reduction or disruption of criminal activity or problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected benefit?</td>
<td>Increased efficiency</td>
<td>Increased police legitimacy</td>
<td>Reduced crime &amp; other problems</td>
<td>Reduced crime (sometimes other problems)</td>
<td>Reduced crime &amp; other problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure. Key dimensions of five policing models

The DCAF paper suggests, *inter alia*, that a derivate of ILP can be used as intelligence-led CTHB:

The conceptual approach for intelligence collection, analysis and investigations directed against trafficking in human beings (THB) must reflect the geographical, structural and commercial components that make up the crime of trafficking.

---

60 DCAF. Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with Intelligence-led Operations. 2008. P. 65.
Geographically and structurally, these can be expressed as:

- **Country of origin** – recruitment and export
- **Country of transit** – transportation
- **Country of destination** – reception and exploitation

Within these three divisions, the commercial characteristics inherent in the crime of THB mean that the traffickers are compelled to become involved in one or more of the following activities at any or all of the three geographic phases listed above, irrespective of the nature of the planned exploitation: advertising; renting, buying and use of premises; transportation; communications; financial transactions, etc. The ‘Achilles Heel’ of THB exists in the ‘trail’ of evidence that will be created within these commercial imperatives. THB for any form of exploitation can only function by utilising these processes to some degree, and each one creates evidential opportunities for the investigator. More important, each of these domains affords intelligence-collection opportunities for law enforcement and all other agencies, offices or inspectorates directly or indirectly involved in the fight against THB and smuggling.

Strategic as well as operational or tactical intelligence is needed to effectively fight THB. Such intelligence is data and information on all aspects of THB and smuggling, and on the environment in which these take place, that have been subjected to the intelligence process of collection, evaluation, collation, analysis and dissemination. The purpose of such intelligence is to provide knowledge and understanding upon which strategic and operational or tactical decisions can be made by all agencies which can contribute to counter-trafficking in order to identify, prevent, pre-empt, disrupt, interdict or deter THB. ⁶¹

---

CARICC (Central Asian Regional Information Coordination Centre)

CARICC does not seemingly have public documents on ILP, but their tasks include, *inter alia*, information and intelligence analysis.

According to Article 3 of the CARICC Agreement, CARICC’s tasks are as follows:

The Centre shall be a permanently operating regional information and coordination interstate agency that shall assist in organizing, undertaking and coordinating agreed joint international operations to combat illicit drug trafficking. The Centre shall also ensure the collection, storage, protection, analysis, and exchange of information on trans-border crime associated with illicit drug trafficking;

In this regard, CARICC provides the following services:

- Establishment of mechanisms of cooperation between competent authorities on the regional and international level.

- Introducing secure information exchange channels.

- Establishment in CARICC working groups support joint investigations or to coordinate multilateral international operations, including controlled deliveries.

- Ensuring real-time information exchange between the agencies and countries in the course of operations.

- When and if needed development of dedicated information resources/Work Files (WF) on ongoing operations.

- Providing analytical support for joint operations through intelligence analysis on the basis of data received.

- Producing recommendations based on the outcomes of the investigations or multilateral international operations.

- Collections, storage, protection, analysis and exchange of information in the field of combating illicit drug trafficking

- Maintaining CARICC Database.

- Collection of information regarding drug trafficking and drug related crime to be used by competent agencies of CARICC member-state.
**SELEC (Southeast European Law Enforcement Center)**

SELEC does not seemingly have public documents on ILP, but their tasks include, *inter alia*, information and intelligence analysis.

The tasks of SELEC according to the Convention of SELEC, Article 3:

(a) to support investigations and crime prevention activity in Member States and in accordance with this Convention;

(b) to facilitate the exchange of information and criminal intelligence and requests for operational assistance;

(c) to notify and inform the National Focal Points of Member States of connections between suspects, criminals or crimes related to the SELEC mandate;

(d) to collect, collate, analyze, process and disseminate information and criminal intelligence;

(e) to provide strategic analysis and to produce threat assessments related to the SELEC objective;

(f) to establish, operate and maintain a computerized information system;

(g) to act as a depositary of good practice in law enforcement methods and techniques and to promote the same through multi-national training and conferences for the benefit of Member States;

(h) to undertake other tasks consistent with the objective of this Convention, following a decision by the Council.
LIST OF REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

CARICC


DCAF

DCAF website at http://www.dCAF.ch/


EU


INTERPOL


INTERPOL. Criminal Intelligence Analysis Fact Sheet. COM/FS/2014-05/CAS-01. 

OSCE


OSCE Ministerial Council. Decision on Organized Crime. MC.DEC/5/06. 
http://www.osce.org/pc/23060


OSCE. Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach. 2014. 
http://www.osce.org/atu/111438

SELEC

SELEC website at http://www.selec.org/

SELEC. Convention of the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center. 1999. 
http://www.selec.org/p521/Convention+of+the+Southeast+European+Law+Enforcement+Center+(SELEC)

UN


UNODC. Policing – Police Information and Intelligence Systems. 2006. (Part of the Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit.)