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Introduction

Aims and Scope

The European Journal of Policing Studies is a peer-reviewed journal that publishes articles addressing the topic of policing and police studies in the broad sense. EJPS aims to provide insights into contemporary policing debates. It focuses on issues that are of interest to the police and other policing actors, and that shape (the future of) policing.

It offers contributions in a broad domain, including contemporary academic (empirical) research on policing (by the police as well as other actors), phenomena that may be of interest to policing actors, education, policing strategies and styles, accountability and democratic rights, legal and political developments and policing policy and practice.

With its primary aim of disclosing European research into, views on and analyses of policing to the international community, EJPS wants to reach both policing researchers and practitioners. In its ambition to help overcome the language barrier, EJPS aims to disclose research from countries which often remain out of sight in publications and also applauds international comparative research.

The Journal concentrates on contributions from European countries, but contributions from other countries are also welcomed, if they provide added value for the European context. EJPS aspires to have an international reach and the editors aim for inclusion in the Thomson Reuters database (Web of Science). It is published four times a year, aiming for a combination of mixed issues (dealing with several topics, consisting of proactive submissions) and special issues (focused on a specific theme and hosted by one or more guest editor(s)).

EJPS offers quick but thorough review procedures through the expert guidance of an international editorial board and invites authors to submit their articles through the online web application.

As from its fourth issue, EJPS presents ‘Country Updates’, providing readers with the latest news on police, policing and police research in each country or region that is connected to the journal through our board of regional editors.

Current Issue

This issue of the European Journal of Policing Studies is our first special issue, focusing on the central theme ‘Policing European Metropolises’. The issue’s guest editors are Paul Ponsaers (Belgium), Adam Edwards (UK), Amadeu Recasens i Brunet (Portugal) and Antoinette Verhage (Belgium). In the five articles of this special issue, authors analyse the plural policing constellations and complexes in metropolises of five different countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Spain and the UK. This implies that this special issue takes us for a tour through five important European metropolises: Berlin, Sofia, London, Paris and Barcelona. We leave it to
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the editors, in the editors’ introduction, to explain how this remarkable issue came about and which comparative challenge they wanted to undertake.

We strongly believe that plural policing is a topic that should be explored further in policing studies and are therefore thrilled that the first steps toward systematic data gathering on this topic have been taken within the context of the European Journal of Policing Studies, which aims to be a beacon for policing research. We hope that this special issue on policing European metropolises can spark the interest of researchers to take up the challenge of studying the pluralisation of policing.

Besides the five articles of the special issue, country updates are presented for Germany and Norway.

September 2014,
Antoinette Verhage, Editor
Lieselot Bisschop & Wim Hardyns, Assistant Editors
Policing European Metropolises

1. The production process of this special issue

During the month of March 2013, some Belgian and Dutch police researchers gathered to discuss a trajectory for the study of the pluralisation of policing in European metropolises. We observed a significant amount of comparative work on different national police systems, but only a minor comparative focus on the local reality of European metropolises. According to United Nations UN Habitat, the growth of urban population was in 1970 only 37%, while the prospective for 2030 is 60%¹. Benjamin Barber (2013) argues consequently that the future of global governance lies with cities, and the mayors who lead them. Is the concept of the metropolis becoming increasingly important to the detriment of the concept of the national state?

It was the group's understanding that in different local settings throughout Europe policing was indeed transforming, but at the same time there was also the observation that the situation in different metropolises was not systematically

¹ See: http://unhabitat.org/
documented and that such a comparative project lacked basic information. Anglo-Saxon literature was to a large extent dominating the theme of pluralisation and the group members wondered if the study of plural policing in European metropolises shouldn’t be built on more solid empirical ground.

The initiative group agreed upon a few starting points:

1. A list of the biggest metropolises was drawn up to make a selection possible of these cities which were of special interest to be included in this project;

2. Each one of the initiative group contacted a scholar specializing in policing in each of these metropolises with the objective of working together on a diagnostic of the policing system in the metropolis of their choice;

3. A common checklist was developed, taking in different points of interest we considered as important for this setup and we agreed that this list would be used by each of the participants of the project, without considering it as a straightjacket;

4. A first outcome of the project would be presented for publication to the European Journal of Policing Studies.

Throughout this project we used a broad concept of policing to acknowledge the central argument behind the pluralisation of policing thesis, that the state police cannot act alone on complex issues of crime and civil unrest (Jones & Newburn, 2006). Rather, we wanted to concentrate on different forms of social control, present in the European metropolises. In essence we covered different domains of interest in our checklist: (1) a brief portrait of the metropolis itself; (2) the presence of (local/city) police, but also of those components of other police agencies (national/federal/provincial/regional) on the territory of the metropolis; (3) the presence of other public uniformed (‘light blue’) surveillance agencies (e.g. asbo’s, boa’s, guardians, stewards, …); (4) the presence of (specific) public inspectorates; (5) the presence of (specific) private commercial security agencies; (6) the presence of civil non-commercial initiatives (e.g. neighbourhood watch, vigilant groups).

We started from the observation that, as a general tendency in Europe, local (municipal) police were historically embedded in metropolises, while national forces were more present in the rural environment. Our central question in this project was, as a consequence:

• ‘To what extent is a local police still present in European metropolises and how is this reality linked with other actors in the security field’?

Underlying questions were:

• Is there a tendency towards the steering of urban policing at other levels than the city?
• Is there a tendency towards more or less inter-dependence between different policing actors (Edwards & Hughes, 2005; Prins et al., 2012)?
• Is it possible to characterise urban policing in terms of particular state formations (e.g. authoritarian), political rationalities (e.g. neo-liberalism, social democratic) or regimes (e.g. maintenance, developmental, progressive and transformative)?

The already mentioned checklist was used as a guide for gathering comparative information, but also as short outline for analysis. We asked the authors not to use the checklist as a formal straightjacket or a questionnaire that should be completed. We encouraged them to include historical information in their articles, responding to questions as: Where do the services present on the territory of the metropolis come from? What is their actual form? To what extent and in which direction do they evolve? We didn't use a specific time frame for this historical dimension, while we were aware of the fact that this could vary according to each specific local setting. We asked each author to determine which historical information was essential to understand the actual situation in the specific metropolis.

This special issue represents the culmination of this work to date on a venture entitled, ‘The Policing European Metropolises Project (PEMP)’, which we intend to develop further. We have underestimated the language issue during this process. Too evidently English is considered to be the Esperanto of Europe, while often each specific historical and geographical reality in Europe has its own expressions and connotations, which don’t translate easily in English. This is not only a matter of language, but also of meaning. In this respect, the social science of European policing is fundamentally hindered by this language obstacle. Each of the contributors in this issue made a tremendous effort to find their way through this translation process and provide the reader with a readable article, being as faithful as possible to the specific reality of the particular metropolis they have studied.

All the authors are grateful for the constructive criticism of the reviewers of their contributions, which have made a significant contribution to the final draft of the special issue. Nevertheless, it has been a challenging task to relate the conceptual as well as societal differences in thinking about policing in different European localities. Whether a common conceptual framework for comparison can be agreed will be a key question for the next phase of the PEMP. The first phase of contributions represented in this special issue provide more of an agenda setting role in identifying tendencies toward convergence and divergence in both the conceptualisation and experience of urban policing. To this end, the first phase of the Project is best described as inductive, providing the foundation for a common theory-building endeavour (see section 3, below).

2. Some trends in European Metropolises today

The transversal reading of the papers included contributes to a better understanding of what is happening within different European metropolises. With regard to policing, each metropolis has its own organization of policing tasks. Metropolises are specific examples of policing organization, with specialist demands, that are
often leading to very tailor-made configurations of policing. Still, in every case, the way in which police constellations are organized, are to a very large extent linked to policing history in a specific country and the political choices that were made in history and today. The papers show that who controls the police, also controls policy, and decides on important policing issues.

**Police organisations**

Berlin is policed by the Berlin State Police and the central forces of BKA and Bundespolizei. Paris is policed by the police services of the Paris Prefecture of Police (PP) and the municipal police force (in a secondary manner, aimed at prevention). London is policed by two organisations: the City of London Police (financial markets) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). Barcelona is policed by the MME (Mossos d’Esquadra), the Catalan police - an armed force of civil nature -, and municipal police forces (the latter being headed by the mayor, though they have a limited function that is mainly aimed at public security and urban traffic), whereas state police plays a minimal role in policing the city. Sofia has only one National police force (one force, one type).

**Police authority**

In general, the mayor has the most elaborate authority when it comes to policing the metropolises (Verhage & Ponsaers, 2014). However, in two metropolises, this is not the case: in Paris and in Sofia. In both cases, the mayors have some say in administrative aspects, but not with regard to the police tasks and activities. While in London and Berlin, the mayor has a large impact on policing matters (in view of policy, planning and management; in London the elected Police and Crime Commissioner is the Mayor, while in Berlin the mayor is both prime minister of the state and the mayor of the city). Barcelona takes up a different place in this list, as they are the authorities of their own local police forces, but these local police forces have limited powers. In Sofia and Paris, the role of the mayor with regard to policing is relatively limited, as in Sofia there is only one national police force (though the mayor does have a number of indirect instruments at his disposal that allow for some steering on policing matters), and in Paris, the role of the Paris Prefect of Police is overshadowing the mayor’s possibilities to take up authority on policing matters.

**Complexity**

Public-private policing is a reality in every metropolis. Private security has emerged in each city, though its presence differs dramatically. In Sofia, for example, private security has taken up the role of the (non-existing) municipal police, as the mayor is allowed to hire private security for every tasks he or she deems necessary. As the mayor cannot dispose of a local police force that can tackle local problems, the private sector is the solution for a mayor when he wants to have patrols carried
out or checks undertaken. In Paris, where the mayor’s authority in this field is also limited, this picture is not so clear, as the Public Prosecutor takes up the role of local authority, and the national police play a key role in street policing in this city. In London, Berlin and Barcelona, authors make note of the presence of private security, in malls, in shopping centres, as guards etc., but the complementariness is less distinct. Professionalization of private security has improved in the majority of the metropolises in response to increased regulation and control of commercial security.

To add to the complexity, a number of authors also refer to civil servants that are working in relation to policing. The Berlin case presents ‘Ordnungsamten’ in charge of parking spaces and parking violations. In Paris, this task is carried out by Agents de Surveillance [ASP], a unique body in France. In Barcelona, a municipal service (Barcelona de Serveis Municipals) is dedicated to control infractions to parking regulations. This parking-task is a very specific task as in several metropolises a particular function was designed for this activity. This function is mostly not armed, but does wear uniforms and carries out administrative controls.

COP

In certain cases, Community Policing has been clearly abolished as a policing strategy (e.g. Paris, since 2003). In other cases, COP is seen as an ultimate goal, that is to be accomplished, but is far off today (Sofia). In London, Barcelona and Berlin, COP is seen as the general policing strategy.

Planning policing

In general terms, we can recognize an increasing amount of planning with regard to policing tasks. In most metropolises, the police authorities are now expected to set up a security plan. In London, this was instigated by the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), which assumed responsibility for setting the strategic direction of policing in January 2012 and for formulating a Police and Crime Plan for the duration of the four year term of office served by the elected incumbent Mayor. The first Plan covers the period 2013 – 2016. In Barcelona, local security plans were installed in 2003. In Paris, the Prefect of Police decides on security police (though it is not clear whether he can be held accountable in view of a security plan). In Berlin and Sofia on the other hand, there are planning documents on a national level, not at the local level. In Germany, an extensive planning document is formulated and used to hold policy-makers to account. In Sofia, the mayor does propose a policy plan, but security is listed at the bottom of the priorities.

3. Towards a theory concerning Policing European Metropolises

Given the complexity of this comparative project and the problems of translating concepts and experiences across different cultures of control, its first phase has been inductive, seeking to build theoretical insight out of the empirical information and
expertise about urban policing that is currently available. Drawing upon broader developments in the field of comparative urban studies it is, however, possible to identify generic tendencies that can be used to organise the comparative analysis of urban policing and facilitate a more meaningful translation of concepts and experiences. A basic distinction can be made between tendencies toward convergence in the political-economy of global and globalised cities and divergence in the ways urban authorities in particular cities adapt to processes of global change. It is suggested this literature can be productively imported into the comparative study of urban policing in Europe.

Tendencies toward convergence

Research into the emergence and consequences of 'global cities' (King, 1990a; 1990b; Sassen, 2001) draws its inspiration from world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974) to argue that cities and their governance cannot be treated in isolation but must be studied in terms of a ‘world urban system’ into which all cities are integrated. There is an asymmetry to this as some cities, those of ‘global’ standing, have a greater power to project their political, economic and cultural interests. These cities do the globalising, whilst others are globalised. In particular, they generate gross social inequalities within as well as between cities with significant implications for social order and, of particular interest for this special issue, for policing.

In one sense the integration of cities into a world urban system is an historic consequence of imperial projects, from the Classical epoch of the Greek and Roman city states through the era of European colonialism to the present global cities of advanced capitalism (King, 1990b; Kardulias, 1999). It is argued, however, that the distinctiveness of contemporary global cities, such as London, New York and Tokyo, is their role as, ‘highly concentrated command points in the organisation of the world economy … key locations for finance and for specialised service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sectors … sites of production of innovations in these leading industries … and as markets for the products and innovations produced by these leading industries’ (Sassen, 2001, 3-4). The particular significance of this for policing is in the social polarisation and disorder generated by these financial command centres both within cities, between the winners and losers of finance capitalism, especially those ejected from ‘core’ full-time employment into the ‘peripheral’ casualised labour markets of the service sector, and amongst cities compelled into ‘beggar thy neighbour’ competition (Harvey, 1989; Boels et al., 2013).

In these terms it is possible to view urban policing as enmeshed within a global import/export trade in social inequalities, their consequences for conflict and disorder and for various policing ‘solutions’ (Edwards & Matthews, 1996). The latter point has been explored through the concept of ‘global policing’ in which it is argued the experience of policing is local at all points but the origins of policing and its problems are increasingly transnational (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012). Within the emerging ‘transnational state system’ the response to urban conflict converges as policy is transferred, diffused and emulated through transnational policy networks. Exemplars include the export of ‘public order policing’, ‘problem-oriented policing’,
‘intelligence-led policing’ and ‘multi-agency policing’. So, from the perspective of world urban systems theory, there are parallel processes of social and economic change across the cities integrated into this system (Sassen, 2001, 4; Verhage & Shapland, 2013). An implication of this perspective for the Policing European Metropolises Project is the expectation of a convergence both in the problems and policy responses of urban security (Edwards et al., 2013).

Tendencies toward divergence

Others have argued that rather than parallel processes of social and economic change, there is an interplay of global and local processes. This has been expressed by the useful, if inelegant, concept of ‘glocalisation’ (Swyngedouw, 1997) which seeks to capture the idea that phenomena of globalisation can intensify local differences. Cities may be integrated into a world urban system but they retain the political and economic agency to adapt to and, in turn, alter the character of this integration. This idea has been particularly influential in the study of urban governance amongst those who are keen to recognise and facilitate the discretion that is available to city authorities to alter and reform, if not transform, their social and economic conditions whilst nonetheless acknowledging the structural constraints placed upon these authorities and the consequently ‘bounded’ character of the discretion open to them (Mollenkopf, 1994; Mouleart et al., 2007). Urban authorities can make their own history but not in conditions of their own choosing. An instance of this theoretical approach is that of urban regime analysis which characterises governing coalitions and the resources and schemes of co-operation they utilise to ‘maintain’, ‘develop’, ‘progress’ or ‘transform’ policy agendas (Stone, 2005; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001).

In the specific field of urban policing discretion might be exercised by regimes that seek to maintain criminal justice-centred agendas or develop these by augmenting them with policies of risk management including pragmatic, situational, approaches to reducing opportunities for crime and civil unrest. Alternatively, particular cities may progress the policy agenda beyond criminal justice and risk management to more restorative and reintegrative responses to crime and civil unrest. Other cities may seek to transform the agenda by prioritising social and economic policy responses to problems of policing within a broader framework of ‘urban security’ (Edwards & Hughes, 2012; Edwards et al., 2013). An empirical focus for comparisons that seek divergence and particularity is the role of political leadership in cities, particularly amongst elected Mayors with responsibility for setting policing strategies and the governing coalitions of which they are apart (Devroe, 2013). This is certainly an implication of contributions to the first phase of the Policing European Metropolises Project that are reported in this special issue. Of course there are other analytical foci for comparisons of policing but a particular advantage of the focus on governing coalitions is that this places an understanding of policing continuities and change in their broader political and economic environment. Given the increased interest in global policing, how do pressures for change originating outside of particular cities and beyond the immediate influence of urban authorities condition the capacity of these authorities to act? To take a
contemporary concern in Europe, how are ‘austere’ economic policies shaping the
capacity of urban authorities to maintain or develop criminal justice responses?
What are the opportunities for progressive and transformative agendas? How does
the different integration of European cities into a global political-economy shape
problems of and for policing in these cities? What, as a consequence, can urban
authorities from different European cities learn from each other’s experience of
these problems and of policing reforms? These are the key questions provoked by the
inductive first phase of the project which we intend to pursue in its second phase.

4. The future of the project

It is our intention to develop the Policing European Metropolises Project further
in the future. There is still a lot of work to be done.

In the first place we have the objective of deepening discussion on methodological
and theoretical issues in the comparison of urban policing, including a panel at the
14th annual conference of the European Society of Criminology in Prague, under the
umbrella of the Policing Working Group in September 2014. This issue will provide
the basis for debate and, it is hoped, the grounds for further research on this topic.

Furthermore, we are preparing a new issue for a Dutch journal (Orde van de
Dag), focussing on other important European metropolises (Rome, Amsterdam
and Budapest) and broadening the empirical basis for analysis. This issue will be
published in December 2014.

Other initiatives will follow later on. If interested, researchers can participate in
our endeavour. Please contact us in this respect2. In the meanwhile, we hope that this
issue challenges every reader and inspires future projects. Indeed, there is still a lot
of work to be done on the Policing European Metropolises Project. But, as always,
there has to be a starting point. It was this point we have marked in this EJPS issue.

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Policing Berlin
From separation by the ‘iron curtain’ to the new German capital and a globalised city

Abstract
Since the 1990s many authors observe a pluralisation of police functions in Europe. The paper shows that this trend is also recognisable in the city of Berlin. For example, private security companies have gained importance. Their presence may indicate an increasing intensity of formal social control. Prevention in a broad sense has become important for the Berlin State Police. However, policing in this city is also influenced by path-dependencies, going back to the specific situation of a divided city at the frontline of the east-west conflict before 1990 and to the transfer of federal government institutions to the city since the late 1990s. Specific patterns of the German administrative and legal system also influence policing at Berlin. Compared to the period before 1990 with the presence of the allied military forces and the powerful secret service (Staatssicherheit) in the Eastern part of the city, Berlin is probably less securitized today.

Keywords: Berlin Police, comparative research into policing, plural policing, policing globalised cities, path-dependency

1. Introduction
A gradual pluralisation of police functions has been observed for several countries over the past 20 years, e.g., for the British and US-American context (Jones & Newburn, 2006; Stenning, 2009; Crawford, 2006). Against the backdrop of changing societies, policing is evolving rapidly and sometimes radically (Jones & Newburn, 2006). Security has developed from a public good delivered almost exclusively by state agencies to a diversified service with tasks distributed among public and private agencies. Since the 1990s, the neo-liberal turn in public management, that
had started in Britain and in the US in the 1980s gradually became more influential in the continental European countries, including the trend towards new public management (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Public security was not excluded from this trend. The delivery of security tasks was more and more conceived as a market. Private security companies gained importance, and public security agencies in some respects became providers of security services in a competitive market. Only the core elements of the state monopoly to exert legitimate force are exclusively reserved for state agencies today.

The aim of this paper is to investigate how far these trends are recognisable in the specific setting of the urban geographical setting in European metropolises. The case of Berlin is particularly interesting in this context: Berlin is not only, after London, the second biggest city in Europe. The city is also characterised by its recent history at the frontline of the east-west conflict, divided into two parts until 1990. Berlin, therefore, is a particularly interesting empirical site to study the interplay between general (international) trends in policing, and specific local and national path-dependencies.

The main research questions treated in this article are: How are changes in society on the one hand and specific national and local path-dependencies on the other influencing the governance of security in the city and the organisation of the police? Which are the main security problems that the city has to deal with? Can a pluralisation of policing be observed in the city that we have studied, and if so, what is the impact in the local context? Methodologically, this paper is based on approaches of historical institutionalism and the analysis of primary and secondary sources on policing in the case of Berlin.

For comparison with other European metropolises (cf. the other contributions to this issue), the analysis is limited to a selection of aspects relevant to understand policing in this metropolis in a comparative perspective. The paper starts with the specific historical path-dependencies that characterise public security and policing in Berlin’s political and administrative system (1). The following sections take a closer look at the organisation of the police forces present in Berlin (2), other public order officers working in the city (3) and the activities of the police in relation to selected fields of crime (4). Sections 5 and 6 analyse the pluralisation of policing for Berlin. The concluding section (7) situates the policing of Berlin in a comparative context.

2. Policing Berlin – historical path-dependencies and political context

Studies comparing metropolises have shown trends of convergence, but also differences due to path-dependencies created by institutional settings and the specific historic context of the city and the country in which it is located (Röber & Schröter, 2002). These two trends, which are sometimes contradictory, can also be observed for policing in Berlin.

Berlin had 3.33 million inhabitants in 2011 according to the results of a census that also showed previous estimates as being slightly overstated. In recent years, the city has been in a process of expansion with 100.000 additional inhabitants arriving...
between 2005 and 2011 (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2011; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012, 27). Further growth is expected in the coming years. However, the city had its highest number of inhabitants in 1942 (4.48 million). Towards the end of World War II and in the period of division by the Berlin Wall and the ‘iron curtain’, the number of inhabitants decreased.

The driving forces of change since the early 1990s have been the German reunification, the decision to transfer the German parliament (Bundestag) and major parts of the government (Bundesregierung) from Bonn to Berlin and the attractiveness of the city for migrants. Compared to other metropolises, the cost of living remained moderate for a long time, and the city became more and more attractive for artists, students and young professionals from other parts of Germany and from all over the world. In this respect, Berlin has become a globalised metropolis since the 1990s. The city has developed a very dynamic cultural scene, partly based on structures and institutions going back to the western part of Berlin before 1990. Tourism has become a major economic factor for the city. Berlin is located less than 100 kilometres from the Polish-German border. It has therefore become particularly attractive for people from Eastern Europe. Poland’s accession to the EU and to the Schengen area has facilitated travelling to Berlin for the citizens of the neighbouring countries.

Berlin city politics and policies, public security included, are still largely dominated by the consequences of reunification. The need of investment in public infrastructure is still high – for streets and public transport, schools and universities, police buildings and equipment, etc. As in other metropolises, industrial production in Berlin has been in decline for many years (Röber & Schröter, 2002, 320). For Berlin, this effect has been accelerated by two factors: Old East German industries were not prepared for international competition and subsidies for industrial production in the western part of Berlin were reduced after reunification. Tax revenues are low and unemployment rates high compared to other German regions. The city is therefore dependent upon financial transfers from the wealthier regions and from the federal government. Budget restrictions repeatedly raised the question of which kinds of public services the city can afford. The budget of the Berlin Police has been under permanent pressure since the 1990s.

The specific situation of a divided city that has now been reunified, the establishment of federal government institutions in the city and the growing population cause rapid transition 25 years after German reunification. Berlin’s specific history since the 1950s has created a number of path dependencies that influence public policies, including public security and the organisation of policing. These path-dependencies are overlapping with influences of the broader German political and administrative system.

Comparative studies have shown that administrative patterns are interrelated with national politics (Lodge, 2012). This is also the case for policing in Germany. Berlin has three different functions in the German political and administrative system: It is the federal capital (since 1999), one of the 16 autonomous German states (Länder or Bundesländer) and one of the major metropolises in the country – together with Cologne, Hamburg and Munich. Until 1989, the eastern part of Berlin was the
capital of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), while the western part belonged to the Federal Republic of Germany – with a specific status and a territory separated from the rest of the country.

The 16 German Länder are the dominant polity level for security issues (Aden, 2004; Aden, Maguer & Stephenson, 2004; Busch, Funk et al., 1985, 50-114). This is a specific path-dependency created by the situation in Germany when occupied by the Allied Forces after World War II. The Allied Forces took care to prevent Germany from becoming again a centralised authoritarian state as it had been between 1933 and 1945. Therefore, the 16 Länder today enjoy a high level of autonomy in the organisation and steering of their security agencies; the Länder are also the driving force for establishing new security strategies, i.e. local crime prevention initiatives involving different state actors and non-governmental organisations (Aden, 2002).

Berlin is one out of three German City States (Stadtstaat) together with Hamburg and Bremen. In the German federal system the City States are autonomous states with a constitution, a parliament, a government and their own public administrations. At the same time, they have the responsibilities of local authorities that are separated from the state governments in the larger German states such as Bavaria, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia or Saxony. Therefore, in the City States, the mayor has two functions: prime minister of the state (Land) and mayor of the city. Berlin’s mayor therefore carries the title Governing Mayor (Regierender Bürgermeister). The state parliament (in Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus) is elected every five years by the citizens. Since reunification Berlin has always been governed by different constellations of coalitions composed of two parties. The majority of the state parliament elects the Governing Mayor. The Mayor nominates the members of the government (in Berlin: Senat). Security issues are usually bundled in the portfolio of the member of government responsible for the interior (Innensenator). Today, all state police forces, officers in uniform, as well as the criminal police, are bundled in a single administrative structure directed by the President of the Berlin police (Polizeipräsident) who is nominated by the state government (Senat).

The members of the Berlin State Parliament (Abgeordnetenhaus) who are directly elected by the citizens play an active role for the steering of local security, not only when it comes to law-making. The parliament’s committee for the interior, public security and order (Ausschuss für Inneres, Sicherheit und Ordnung) closely follows local security issues. The member of the Berlin government responsible for the interior (Innensenator) and the President of the Berlin Police have to explain their strategies and respond to critiques expressed by the members of parliament on a regular basis. Comprehensive political planning documents for internal security issues exist at the federal level, but not for Berlin.

In 1948, the Berlin Police were separated into two parts: the police of the western sectors of the city and the police of the Soviet sector (Steinborn & Krüger, 1993, 37-87). The police of the Soviet sector became part of the East German People’s Police (Völkspolizei). In parallel, the East German state established a powerful political secret service (Staatssicherheit, Stasi). In view of the east-west conflict, paramilitary tasks characterised the development of the police in the western sectors in the 1950s. Towards the end of the 1960s, in a period of emerging political protest, this kind of
Policing became more and more contested (Steinborn & Krüger 1993, 88-216). In 1974, a major reform promoted a more pluralised concept of policing in which beat officers and problem solving in the interest of the citizens became more important (Hübner, 1998). After German reunification, the East Berlin People’s Police was integrated into the Berlin Police in a long process of cultural adaptation and careful selection of staff qualified to work in a democratic polity (Glaeser, 2000, 125-140; Schertz 1998).

As in other places, a major part of policing in Berlin is dealing with crimes reported to, or discovered by, the police. The official statistics do not necessarily reflect the degree of insecurity in a jurisdiction, but also depend upon the activities developed by the police and the willingness of the citizens to report crimes. International comparison has to take into account differences in criminal law and criminal procedure. The numbers have been relatively stable over the past few years with a slight decline since the early 2000s. According to the official statistics, 14 576 crimes per 100 000 inhabitants were reported or discovered in 2007, all categories included, 14 131 in 2008, 14 467 in 2009, 13 798 in 2010, 14 286 in 2011 and 14 144 in 2012. In 2012, compared to Berlin, the number of reported crimes per 100 000 inhabitants was higher in Frankfurt/Main (16 310), Düsseldorf (14 966) and Cologne (14 590), but lower in Hamburg (12 651). The total number of crimes reported or discovered in Berlin was 495 297 in 2012 – a decline from 563 905 in 2003 (Bundeskriminalamt 2013, 24-25; Polizeipräsident in Berlin, 2013, 15).

The majority of crimes reported in Berlin relate to simple theft (23.2%), aggravated theft (e.g. burglary: 19.8%) and fraud and counterfeiting (19.5%). Simple theft has become more frequent in recent years, especially in the areas attracting tourists. Only a minor share of the crime cases reported in Berlin relates to violence. 185 homicide cases were reported in 2003, 121 in 2008 and 147 in 2012 (Polizeipräsident in Berlin, 2013, 17 and 20). Compared to other metropolises in the world, Berlin is considered to be a relatively safe place.

The new roles of Berlin as the federal capital and as a globalised city attracting tourists and new citizens from all over the world have created new challenges for policing. Xenophobia regularly leads to cases of violence including the establishment of a visible right extremist political scene in the city. 10.8 million tourists visited Berlin in 2012, which generated enhanced opportunities for pickpockets in the city. The number of political demonstrations rose to more than 3.000 per year, mainly due to the presence of the federal government and parliament (Polizeipräsident in Berlin, 2013, 11-12 and 87). In areas formerly inhabited by poorer segments of the population, by students and artists, gentrification has become a major issue. This has repeatedly led to security-related conflicts, e.g. when the Berlin Police is called to support forced evictions.

3. The Berlin Police and the federal police forces present at Berlin

In most countries, policing functions are not bundled in a single administration, but attributed to a ‘policing assemblage’ sharing a broad range of tasks (Briken
This is also the case in Germany. In order to understand policing at Berlin, it is important to have a closer look at the different police forces present in the city and their respective roles in a system of plural policing. Due to the governmental institutions present in the city since the late 1990s, federal police and security forces are more present than in other major German cities. This leads to an enhanced need of coordinated security governance, e.g. for the numerous political demonstrations related to the federal government’s politics and for the security of the representatives of foreign states visiting Berlin or present in the city.

Due to the path-dependencies established after World War II, Germany has a semi-decentralised police system with 16 autonomous state police forces. The federal state has two police forces: the Bundespolizei (Federal Police) and the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office). A number of other state and federal agencies are also involved in security issues, e.g. the federal customs administrations.

The Federal Police is the successor of the former Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz) renamed in 2005 due to the diminishing role of border controls in the Schengen area. By 1992, the former Federal Railway Police had already been integrated into the Federal Border Police. Therefore, the Federal Police is now composed of formed police units and forces specialised in railway and airport security. In Berlin, the Federal Police is mainly present at the railway stations, along the railway lines and at the airport. As all railway stations and the light railway system (S-Bahn) belong to the state-owned Federal Railway Company (Deutsche Bahn) this kind of plural policing is present in the city’s everyday life. Many political demonstrations are related to the presence of federal governmental institutions in the city. Therefore the Federal Police often provide assistance to the formed units of the Berlin Police. The Federal Police headquarters are located at Potsdam – near Berlin in the state of Brandenburg.

The Bundeskriminalamt has its headquarters at Wiesbaden (Hesse), but also maintains a satellite in Berlin where it is involved in the protection of government institutions and coordination with other security agencies, e.g. for anti-terrorism intelligence. The federal parliament has its own small police force (Bundestagspolizei). The authority is limited to the parliament’s buildings.

Local policing outside the railway stations, the airport and the federal parliament is the exclusive task of the Berlin (State) Police (Landespolizei) under the supervision of the state government (Innensenator). Similar to what has been observed for other countries (Crawford, 2008 for the UK), the Berlin Police officers have a broad range of functions including traffic police, general prevention of dangers (Gefahrenabwehr), criminal investigation and prevention. The Berlin Police has approximately 21 000 employees in total (630 per 100 000 inhabitants), including approximately 16 000 police officers (480 per 100 000 inhabitants). The Berlin State Police officers are paid by the City State, while the federal government finances the Federal Police and the Federal Criminal Police Office.

Public management in metropolises is characterised by a permanent tension between centralisation and decentralisation. The geographic setting of a metropolis makes centralised structures attractive for the efficient delivery of services. However,
specific problems and needs of the population in certain areas of a big city often require specific decentralised solutions (Röber & Schröter, 2002, 319). Taking into account this tension, the general structure of the Berlin Police defaults back to the reform of the West Berlin Police in the 1970s; the East Berlin People’s Police was integrated into this structure after 1990 (Steinborn & Krüger, 1993, 217-240; Glaeser, 2000). The Berlin Police is now divided into six local police directorates (Polizeidirektionen). These six local directorates include in total 37 neighbourhood police stations (Polizeiabschnitte). Besides the local directorates, the Berlin Police has a number of centralised services such as the State Criminal Investigation Department (Landeskriminalamt) and the formed police units (Bereitschaftspolizei).

Everyday policing in Berlin is determined by the plural tasks of police work in a metropolis. As the police elsewhere, the Berlin Police must respond to emergency calls, supervise and organise the daily traffic in the streets, investigate criminal cases, accompany political demonstrations, etc. Besides this daily police work, the dialogue between the police forces on the one hand, and citizens and NGOs in the neighbourhoods on the other, has become a relevant issue over the past decades. Berlin police practitioners define a neighbourhood by an area of responsibility for the 37 neighbourhood police stations, independent from the perceptions of the local citizens. In Berlin, the neighbourhoods are known as Kiez in the citizens’ perspective, but the areas defined as a Kiez are for the most part not congruent with the area of responsibility of a Polizeiabschnitt.

Prevention in a broader sense has become an important issue for the neighbourhood police stations as well as for the centralised services of the Berlin Police. The diversification of police work and the trend towards plural policing are most evident in this field. All six local police directorates and 37 neighbourhood police stations today have commissioners specialised in prevention tasks. Prevention includes a broad range of activities, e.g. individual advice to elderly people or house owners, cooperation with local NGOs and schools. The crime prevention activities of the Berlin Police are largely inspired by a community oriented policing model with attention for multi-functionality, partnership and coproduction within the neighbourhood as it has been observed in Chicago and other places (e.g. Skogan & Harnett, 1997; Skogan, 2006; Newburn & Reiner, 2007). However, ‘zero tolerance’ and other strategies of ‘punitive segregation’ (Garland, 2001, 142-145 et passim) as they were promoted in New York and other metropolises in the early 2000s, were less influential in Germany (cf. Leiterer, 2007). Tolerance and openness toward diversity remained predominant patterns of policing, especially in Berlin. Different to other German states, Berlin does not have a central crime prevention council with a broad participation of NGOs. Therefore, the Berlin Police is the main actor organising crime prevention in the city. At the level of the state government, a commission for the prevention of violence (Landeskommission Berlin gegen Gewalt) coordinates the preventive activities in this field.

Beat officers present in the streets of Berlin are mainly Berlin (State) Police officers, while beat officers present at the railway stations, along the railway lines and at the airport belong to the Federal Police. German national or state laws do not require the specific presence of beat officers in public. Only a small minority
of Berlin Police officers are exclusively devoted to the function of beat officers (Kontakbereichsbeamte). In practice, the presence of police officers in public spaces is therefore largely dependent on the other tasks to be fulfilled. If the number of emergency calls is high, or if many police forces are needed for other tasks, e.g. for organising the visit of a foreign head of state, there will be fewer officers present in other public spaces. However, political leadership and strategies internal to the police define specific areas where enhanced police presence is required, e.g. in places where tourists often become victims of thefts.

Different from the police in many other countries, but similar to the other German states, police training has been significantly intensified at Berlin since the 1970s (cf. Steinborn & Krüger, 1993, 223-226; Aden, 1998, 149-160). A major part of the newly recruited Berlin police officers are now trained in an academic bachelor programme. With knowledge in law, psychology, sociology, criminology, political science and other disciplines, police officers are trained to handle conflicts as well as difficult situations in a professional way in which the use of force should only play a minor role.

Maintaining order in a big metropolis and dealing with a changing society and processes like globalisation and computerisation are confronting everyday policing with significant changes. Research on other police forces has shown that the ways in which police officers are carrying out their daily tasks have evolved, but not changed dramatically over the past decades (Verwee, 2009; Bailey, 1994). Police tasks are diverse, and police officers must be prepared to be confronted with multiple situations and problems in their daily work. In Berlin, the specific path-dependencies opened by reunification and the establishment of government institutions in the city contribute to make the situations confronting police officers in their daily work even more diverse. The attractiveness of the globalised city for tourists and migrants, as well as the EU Eastern enlargement, have further accelerated this process. Computer technology is changing police work as well as a number of police tasks. Intensified general police training and individual preparation of police officers for specific tasks such as crime prevention have contributed to make the Berlin Police a much more professionalised police force compared to the 1960s or the 1970s. The old model of a predominantly paramilitary police (Ponsaers, 2001; Steinborn & Krüger, 1993) has been replaced by a police force prepared to carry out a broad range of tasks with high professional standards.

4. Berlin public safety and order officers

Major characteristics of the current German administrative system extend back to the 19th century. In that period, the term Polizei was used as the generic term for all kinds of public administrations dealing with public order, also in fields such as public health or building inspection. Later the term Polizei was more exclusively attributed to the units carrying out general tasks related to public order and crime fighting, while the more specialised units were labelled Ordnungsbehörden (Boldt & Stolleis, 2012, 13-33; Aden, 1998, 35-37). In the Länder with autonomous local
Policing Berlin. From separation by the ‘iron curtain’ to the new German capital and a globalised city

authorities, e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia, the general police are state administrations while the functions of the Ordnungsbehörden are mostly attributed to the local authorities. In all German Länder, not only specific tasks such as public health, but also a number of general public safety and order tasks that do not require officers trained for the functions related to the state monopoly to exert legitimate force, are attributed to specific public order offices (Ordnungsamt). They are usually responsible for various tasks, including parking spaces and sanctions for parking violations.

Berlin as a City State does not have autonomous local authorities. However, the Ordnungsbehörden are organised at a decentralised administrative level in Berlin (since 2001: 12 Bezirke). The Ordnungsamt employees attributed to the surveillance of parking spaces wear uniforms. In Berlin, the Ordnungsamt is also responsible for a number of other tasks, e.g. related to the use of public spaces and to the supervision of trades. As the German administrative system had already established these general administrations responsible for public order tasks in the 1950s, Berlin and most other German cities did not install additional city guards or similar institutions to deal with ‘incivilities’ as it has been observed in other countries (e.g. by Innes, 2003).

The City State of Berlin has to pay for the staff working in these fields. The city government (Senat) defines the priorities of their activities in the framework of the relevant state and federal laws. Complaints and suggestions by the citizens may influence the priorities as well as debates in the local media, e.g. related to ‘incivilities’ observed in certain areas.

The Berlin police also have 1 100 uniformed employees for the protection of specific sites (Zentraler Objektschutz), e.g., embassies, state and federal government buildings and Jewish institutions. These units protected around 580 buildings and sites in 2013. These tasks have become much more important since the federal government institutions moved to Berlin – and with them the embassies of foreign states. The intensity of the protection depends upon an evaluation of the security needs, established by the relevant federal and state agencies and the embassies in coordination with the security forces of the foreign states. The people working in the Objektschutz units are employed by the City State of Berlin, but they are not fully trained police officers. Initial training is only 16 weeks and includes basic legal knowledge and self-defence. These employees are armed, but if a situation requires the legitimate use of force, they usually have to call full Berlin police officers. In this field, budgetary restraints have led to an exception to the general trend towards professionalisation of policing in Germany.

5. Public inspectorates specialised in certain crimes and problems in Berlin

As Jones and Newburn note, policing refers to a number of ‘organised forms of order-maintenance, peace-keeping, rule or law enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of investigation and information-brokering’ (Jones & Newburn, 1998, 18). Due to this, innumerable policing departments, organisations
and strategies are evolving. In complex societies, the police have increasingly developed highly differentiated units for specific tasks (Newburn & Reiner, 2007, 914). In Germany, this is particularly the case for criminal investigation.

The Berlin State Criminal Investigation Department (Landeskriminalamt), one of the central units in the Berlin Police, has specialised sub-divisions (Dezernate) for all kinds of serious crime. For comparison with other European metropolises (cf. the other contributions to this issue), we have limited our analysis to the trade of human beings, counterfeiting and environmental crimes. For all three cases, specialised sub-divisions exist in the Berlin Landeskriminalamt. However, there is no state or federal legal obligation to have such specialised inspectorates. The state police forces are free to define the administrative settings for criminal investigation depending upon the practical relevance of a specific type of crime. If a case is related to other German regions, the relevant State Criminal Investigation Departments have to coordinate their work. For certain types of crime, the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) may coordinate or even take over criminal investigation.

The specialists working on specific types of crime in the Landeskriminalamt are not present in public spaces on a regular basis. Usually, they only intervene outside their office if a case has been detected. They then have the full range of authority that the federal criminal procedure (Strafprozessordnung) attributes to police officers in criminal investigation. They therefore report directly to the public prosecutor’s office (Staatsanwaltschaft). The beat officers in the neighbourhood police stations will often be the first police officers to take notice of a serious crime. If a specialised unit in the Landeskriminalamt exists for the relevant type of crime, this unit will usually take over further criminal investigation.

For preventing the trade of human beings and for supporting the victims, trade unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Berlin-Brandenburg), the International Organisation for Migration and the Berlin state government department for integration, labour and social affairs (Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales) cooperate in a specific partnership (Berliner Bündnis gegen Menschenhandel). The Berlin Police is not directly involved in this initiative.

For environmental issues, a number of other specialised agencies exist, e.g. for nature protection, waste or air pollution. Their mission is predominantly administrative and preventive. However, they also investigate cases (Ordnungswidrigkeiten) that may be sanctioned by administrative fines (Bußgeld). If a case reveals a crime, the specialised units of the local police authorities, or of the State Criminal Investigation Department (Landeskriminalamt), will usually take over criminal investigation.

6. Private commercial security agencies at Berlin

Following from the idea of community safety and influenced by the trend towards new public management, public security and order in Europe and beyond has moved from an exclusive task of public police officers towards shared responsibility of multiple partners, both public and private (Crawford, 2008, 162-168; Manning, 1999). This shift in responsibility has led to two trends: First, private companies have
taken over a part of the public domain, e.g., private guards supervising semi-public shopping malls or the privatisation of car parks. Secondly, a large number of new public safety workers and professions have appeared in the area (De Pauw, 2008).

This trend can also be observed in Berlin. As in other European countries, private security has been a quickly growing business in Germany over the past decades. In Berlin, numerous private security companies are present. In February 2014, 72 security companies were members of the Berlin section of the relevant federal business association, the Bundesverband der Sicherheitswirtschaft (BDSW). However, as membership is not mandatory, the number of private security companies present in Berlin is much higher. Some companies in private or public ownership have their own security service, e.g. the German Federal Railway Company (Deutsche Bahn AG: DB Sicherheit).

In Berlin – as in other German cities – private security companies are exerting preventive surveillance functions in the rising number of semi-public spaces, e.g. in shopping malls that have been built at many places of the city since the 1990s. Many shops and banks are using the services of private companies for the surveillance of their businesses and for night-guard tasks. Generally, according to German law, private companies are free to choose whether they employ security staff themselves or hire a private security company. In the booming city of Berlin, some highly contested experiments have been started with gated communities under surveillance of private security companies, but they are still marginal.

In spaces that are in public ownership, preventive surveillance is mainly the task of the Berlin Police. However, doorkeeper and night guard tasks have been privatised over time for most state and federal buildings in Berlin and other German cities. The big private security companies are the most important players in this business. In these cases, the services of private security companies are paid from public budgets. This outsourcing is mostly motivated by the fact that private security agents are paid less than public employees. This trend had already started several decades before the neo-liberal turn and the debates on privatisation of tasks formerly exerted by state employees. The state owned Berlin public transport company (Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe) also employs private security companies for patrols and even for ticket controls. However, compared to other countries (Garland, 2001, 116-117), the commercialisation of policing and justice has remained moderate in Germany.

In some cases the Berlin police and private companies work together. Running and maintaining camera surveillance (CCTV), for example, can be among the functions exerted by private security companies. However, this task is legally limited to private or semi-private spaces. Private companies are not allowed to run video cameras in public spaces, according to federal and state law. Camera surveillance may be part of the tasks fulfilled by private security companies exerting the doorkeeper and night guard functions in public buildings. In these cases, public authorities will install and run the cameras, but the private agents will have to watch them during their shift.

A smaller number of security companies have specialised in the transport of money requiring specific vehicles. Usually, these companies organise the transport without additional escorts from other security companies. The Berlin Police will only intervene if there is evidence that a transport is in danger, e.g. a planned robbery.
In the federal trade regulation act (\textit{Gewerbeordnung}, § 34a) some basic requirements have been defined for private security companies. For starting a private security business, a permit is required. The state trade supervisory authorities (\textit{Gewerbeaufsichtsämter}) have to check whether the legal requirements are fulfilled. Managers and employees need basic training. People who are heavily indebted or have a criminal record related, for example, to burglary or violence will not be allowed to work in the business. The state trade supervisory authorities can also close down security companies, e.g. if the managers commit a serious crime.

In practice, professionalisation has become an important issue for this business, accelerated by tough competition. Therefore, a number of officially recognised training programmes for private security agents have been established, including professional training (e.g. \textit{Fachkraft für Schutz und Sicherheit} or \textit{Meister für Schutz und Sicherheit}), but also academic bachelor and masters programmes (cf. Olschok, 2004). However, the average level of professionalisation of the staff working for private security companies is still much lower than for the highly trained public police.

Private security agents do not have any specific legal authority in relation to the public. They can only exert the rights granted to anybody, e.g., self-defence, or for the arrest of a criminal until the police arrive (\textit{Jedermann-Rechte}) (cf. Lисken & Denninger, 2012; Mackeben, 2006).

Depending upon the contract with the commissioners of the security services, private security agents in most cases have the task to report to the police a crime that they observe. In 2006, the Berlin Police concluded an agreement with the association of private security companies, mostly related to the exchange of information. The police and private security companies often have to cooperate, e.g. for the security of major events such as fairs, pop concerts or football matches.

In view of the limited legal authority that private security companies have in Germany, most of their work is preventive in a broader sense of dissuasion. Private security agents working in Berlin are mostly employed and paid by private companies. Therefore they are usually not directly responsive to the citizens’ demands. However, their presence may in some cases respond to the fear of crime expressed by the citizens.

7. Civil non-commercial security: abolished in Berlin

Today no officially recognised civil non-commercial security initiatives exist in Berlin. The rising professionalisms of public and private security, related to new and intensified training programmes in both sectors, have contributed to make poorly trained civilian volunteers obsolete in the city’s police system.

The West Berlin volunteer police reserve (\textit{Freiwillige Polizei-Reserve}) that had been established in 1961, the year in which the Berlin Wall was built, was dissolved in 2002. This unit had initially been created as a paramilitary police unit in response to the armed forces in the state owned companies that had been established in the eastern part of Berlin (\textit{Betriebskampfgruppen}) by the East German state. In the
1980s, the West Berlin voluntary units were partly redirected towards supporting daily police work (Wieland, 2000, 31-32; Kutscha, 2004). Cases in which members of the voluntary police reserve were involved in criminal activities (Wieland, 2000, 34-38) contributed to the decision to dissolve the unit in 2002. By contrast, some German states still had civilian voluntary police units in 2013: Bavaria, Hesse, Saxony, and – phasing-out – Bade-Württemberg (Pütter & Kant, 2000 on the evolution of these forces).

Neighbourhood watch initiatives have not played a significant role in Berlin in recent years. More generally, private initiatives for voluntary armed patrols that are not recognised by public authorities are not tolerated by the German states.

8. Conclusion

This paper has shown that specific national and local path-dependencies and international trends in policing overlap when it comes to explain how policing in Berlin has developed over the past decades. Specific path-dependencies have been created by the semi-decentralised German police system and the distribution of labour between the police and other public administrations responsible for specialised public order issues as it has been established in the western parts of Germany since the 1950s. These patterns still characterise policing at Berlin today. Professionalism of police work has evolved in Berlin since the 1970s, in parallel to the other German states. At the same time, policing in Berlin is influenced by a number of international trends that can be labelled as plural policing: Prevention in a broad sense has contributed to a diversification of everyday police work. Private security companies have gained importance. Restrictions in public budgets and the influence of market models and new public management have forced the police to adapt the provision of security tasks to a changing environment.

Besides the security problems that globalised metropolises have in general, often linked to a diverse, multi-cultural population, the Berlin police system has had to deal with a completely new political and administrative context since the 1990s as a consequence of reunification and the transfer of government institutions to the city. The city and its police were ‘divided in unity’ (Glaeser, 2000) in the period of transition after reunification – a process that is still not completely accomplished.

Fragmentation between different actors and institutions is the predominant pattern, despite some efforts for enhanced coordination and cooperation, e.g. expressed by the conclusion of an agreement between the Berlin Police and the association of private security companies mentioned above. The limited legal authority that private security companies have in Germany ensures that the Berlin State Police remains the dominant actor in the security field. The authority of the Federal Police and the Federal Criminal Police Office is limited to specific places like railway stations and railway lines and to government institutions requiring coordination in the surroundings of these places. However, there is no formal hierarchy between federal and state police forces. Due to the specific situation of numerous federal government institutions present in the city, federal and state police agencies share
security tasks. They are formally independent from each other, but they are forced to cooperate in network structures where their tasks overlap. The formal social control in public spaces is predominantly the task of the Berlin State Police, while the Federal Police exerts this function in the railway stations, along the railway lines and at the airport. In semi-public spaces such as shopping malls, but also in public transportation, private security companies have become the dominant security actor. Public-private cooperation is inevitable where private, semi-public and public spaces are interconnected. Uncoordinated action may even create security risks, if the distribution of responsibility is not clear-cut. In cases where private security companies are not allowed to intervene due to their limited legal authority in relation to the public, cooperation with the police is part of the daily routine, not only for the arrest of criminals but also for criminal investigation.

There are no empirical studies from which an increasing overall level of formal social control might be concluded for Berlin in a medium-term perspective. The presence of numerous private security companies may indicate an increasing intensity of formal social control. However, compared to the period before 1990 with the presence of the allied military forces in the city and the powerful secret service (Staatssicherheit, Stasi) in the Eastern part of the city, Berlin is probably less securitized today. In this medium term perspective, Berlin is somewhat different from other European cities, where intensified surveillance and security measures have evolved more steadily (Crawford, 2005).

The further growing number of inhabitants and rising housing prices will probably remain a major issue of contention that will have security-related implications in the upcoming years. The further diversification of the city’s population related to newly arriving inhabitants from all over the world may cause further conflicts. The presence of the federal government institutions will probably continue to make the city the preferred place for political protest in the country. In conclusion, the recent developments of Berlin local security is therefore characterised by a growing professionalism of public and private security staff, but also by new challenges relating to the attractiveness of the city. This will make policing Berlin an interesting case for further comparative studies in the future.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Mr. Adham Charaby, Mr. Christian Matzdorf and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper, Mr. James Basham for editing the text and Mr. Simon Eriskat who has helped to collect the relevant information.

Bibliography


Policing Sofia
From centralisation to decentralisation

Abstract
In this article, which is embedded in the special issue of the Journal which focuses on the comparative research project ‘Policing European Metropolises’, the general aim is to provide an answer to the research question: ‘Are underlying Anglo-American assumptions regarding trends towards plural policing recognisable in European local geographical settings?’ Our underlying question in this article concerns whether or not the local empirical situation in Sofia differs from more general evolutions of policing in Europe. This article will inquire specifically about the (national) influence of a ‘country in transition’ (Bulgaria) on the territory of the city of Sofia. For reasons of feasibility the article is limited to an exploration of the organisation of Bulgarian police. The following main questions are answered in this article: (1) What is the nature of the division between the national police apparatus and local policing bodies?, (2) Are tendencies towards fragmentation and centralisation determined at the same time? and (3) Are tendencies towards private governance present within the public domain? Answering these questions requires an exploration of the historical and contextual background, so that insight into the related Bulgarian realities, particularly those of Sofia, might be gained. This article explores the official arrangements regarding the policing of crime and disorder in Sofia; it is based on desktop research, mostly internal research from the Ministry of the Interior. In the concluding section, the article summarises the different aspects of policing security in Sofia, framing the reality of this city within the article’s theoretical starting points regarding security governance and plural policing.

Keywords: plural policing, governance of crime and disorder, public and private police

1. Introduction
This article is embedded in the special issue of the Journal which focuses on the comparative research project ‘Policing European Metropolises’. The general aim...
of this project is to provide an answer to the following central research question: 
‘Are underlying Anglo-American assumptions regarding trends towards plural polic -
ing recognisable in European local geographical settings?’ As a starting point in this 
comparative research, researchers within the project have been asked to provide an 
overview of the key issues and challenges related to policing European metropolises 
in the early twenty-first century and to place these in their broader institutional 
and historical contexts, particularly for a broad European readership that may be 
unfamiliar with the governing arrangements that structure policing in particular 
cities (Edwards & Prins, in this issue). The aim of the project, in analysing different 
cities, is neither to seek for universality nor for uniqueness, but rather for a critical 
realist method of articulation that recognises the contextual nature of governance and 
of its various objects of control (Edwards & Hughes, 2005, 347). The ambition is to 
deepen understanding of the ‘geo-historical approach’ (Edwards & Hughes, 2005) 
in the course of comparing safety-oriented governance in Europe with empirical 
research data. In spite of a huge amount of research focusing on comparisons among 
countries (Brodeur, 1995; Brogden & Nijhar, 2005; Jones & Newburn, 2006; 
Wisler & Onwudiwe, 2009; Lemieux, 2010; Nelken, 2011; Terpstra, Stokkom & 
Spreeuwers, 2013; Hoogenboom, 1991), comparing the governance of cities is an 
innovative research objective. In order to compare different approaches to policing 
in metropolises within Europe, an extensive standardised checklist was designed 
and submitted to the various authors, so that the empirical data could be collected 
in a structured way.

Our underlying question in this article concerns whether or not the local empirical 
situation in Sofia differs from more general evolutions of policing in Europe. Indeed, 
there exists a huge Anglo-Saxon body of literature on police and policing, but 
literature on policing in Eastern European countries is rather scarce. During the 
1980s police authorities in Central and Eastern European Countries were shrouded 
in secrecy and very little information was published even on basic police apparatus 
features. Any interests from citizens in this issue could have resulted in being 
arrested (Meško, Fields, Lobnikar & Sotlar, 2013). Furthermore, according to Sten- 
nning (2009, 23), ‘Accountability of policing has remained stubbornly polarized between 
research and writing on the governance of ‘the police’ on the one hand, and a largely 
separate (and much smaller) literature mainly bemoaning an alleged lack of adequate 
and effective governance and public accountability of ‘private security’ on the other’. 
More importantly, Stenning (2009, 23) stipulates that ‘The challenge of developing a 
holistic conception of governance and accountability that might be appropriate for the 
‘plural policing’ environment of the 21st century has been largely ignored by policing 
scholars and policy makers alike’. In order to contribute in a modest way to this body 
of knowledge, this article will inquire specifically about the (national) influence of 
a ‘country in transition’ (Bulgaria) on the territory of the city of Sofia. The purpose 
of the project is to contribute to a European multi-layered governance theory on urban 
control of crime and social disorder. Issues exploring the nature of relationships 
within and between partner agencies, with a view to enhancing understanding of contemporary policing culture (O’Neill & Loftus, 2013), can be interesting and 
useful for constructing a network governance theory on urban control.
The Metropolises project aims to grasp the empirical reality of urban security governance. According to Edwards and Hughes (2013), this concept has been used to describe social and economic responses to certain problems of street crime, civil unrest and social cohesion. This article will not explore urban security in such a broad sense, and will, for reasons of feasibility\(^1\), be limited to an exploration of the organisation of Bulgarian police. The following main questions are consequently answered in this article: (1) What is the nature of the division between the national police apparatus and local policing bodies?, (2) Are tendencies towards fragmentation and centralisation determined at the same time? (Edwards & Hughes, 2005; Prins, Cachet, Ponsaers & Hughes, 2012) and (3) Are tendencies towards private governance present within the public domain? (Jones & Newburn, 1999; Hope, 2000; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Hope & Karstedt, 2003; Johnston & Stenning, 2010; Goold, Loader & Thumala, 2010). Answering these questions requires an exploration of their historical and contextual background, so that insight into the related Bulgarian realities, particularly those of Sofia, might be gained.

This article explores the official arrangements regarding the policing of crime and disorder in Sofia; it is based on desktop research, mostly internal research from the Ministry of the Interior. Its main sources of information are quantitative and qualitative data from governmental sources, (national and local) laws and regulations, and studies that were conducted by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) in Bulgaria. Governmental sources of information are mainly formal and legal documents from the Ministry of the Interior, the regulations of which stipulate its activities and main tasks as well as the structures and bodies of governance within the internal administration. In addition to that, we have requested and obtained information from the Metropolitan Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior\(^2\).

The article is structured as follows. In the first (theoretical) section, insight is provided into global governance tendencies within nations, as they are described in the broader context of public sector reform in Western Europe. Elements of the urban sociology theory of security governance are explored in order to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the situation in Sofia. In the second section, the authors provide an overview of the institutional and historical contexts of Bulgaria and Sofia, in order to achieve a greater understanding of the realities of policing security in Sofia. Bulgaria can be called ‘a country in transition’ (Ciobanu, 2010). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolised the beginning of the process of embracing democratic ideas and the initiation of a complex transition process (Mesko, Fields, Lobnikar & Sotlar, 2013). Special subsections are devoted to the substantial urbanisation processes Bulgaria underwent as well as the extremist attacks and disturbances that occurred simultaneously. In the third section, we discuss the Bulgarian constitutional framework of the national police system, the territorially

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\(^1\) Gathering the data was a very time-consuming process. Scholarly work on policing in Sofia is very scarce: most websites are not available in English and special permission to receive information has to be received from the Minister of the Interior. In particular, finding information related to policing on regional and local levels was very difficult.

\(^2\) In order to obtain data, we needed to send official letters from the university. The information we requested was delivered in turn via personal letters.
organised regional police and the municipal police structure that operates in Sofia. In the fourth section, other actors who provide security are discussed, specifically the mayor and private actors who operate within the city. In the concluding section, the article summarises the different aspects of policing security in Sofia, framing the reality of this city within the article’s theoretical starting points regarding security governance and plural policing.

2. Theoretical insights on governance evolutions in Western Europe

‘Policing’ in the title of this article refers to police work in the broadest sense, including that which is done by agencies other than the regular police force (Terpstra; Stokkom & Spreeuwers, 2013). ‘Policing’ can be defined as ‘Intentional action involving the conscious exercise of power or authority (by an individual or organisation) that is directed towards rule enforcement, the promotion of order or assurances of safety’ (Crawford, Lister, Blackburn & Burnett, 2005, 4). As Loader (2000, 324) states, ‘We are living in the midst of a potentially far-reaching transformation in the means by which order and security are maintained in liberal democratic societies, one that is giving rise to the fragmentation and diversification of policing provision, and ushering in a plethora of agencies and agents, each with particular kinds of responsibility for the delivery of policing and security services and technologies. What we might call a shift from police to policing has seen the sovereign state – hitherto considered focal to both provision and accountability in this field – reconfigured as but one node of a broader, more diverse “network of power”’. Steering mechanisms appearing within late modernity that were designed to shift ‘government’ to ‘governance’ have been described by many scholars (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993; Rhodes, 1996; Kooiman, 1999; Newman, 2001; Garland, 2001; Crawford, 2002; 2004; Crawford, Lister & Wall, 2003; Ostrom, 2005; Crawford & Lister, 2006; 2007). Liberal democratic polities became increasingly differentiated as public administration systems expanded to encompass more competencies and as they simultaneously responded to pressures calling for greater intervention in civil society (Rhodes, 1997, in Edwards & Hughes, 2005, 351). Emphasis lay on active citizenship, a concept that redefines citizenship as being about rights and responsibilities (Brannan, John & Stoker, 2006). It insists on the need for local communities and local actors to take up greater shares in and responsibility for the regulation and enforcement of local community life (Lippens, 2008). The dominant idea in this regard was to ‘break away from old bureaucratic modes of integral service provision and [to replace] these by more flexible market and customer-oriented methods of public service delivery’ (van der Meer, 2009, 174). As well: ‘Governance is also regarded as a means of restoring the authority of government agencies by empowering private citizens to participate more directly in their own government’ (Edwards & Hughes, 2009, 354).

As well as promoting citizen participation, the neoliberal approach and the New Public Management led to ‘reinventing government’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993), meaning that ‘governance [was] no longer monopolised by states’, or characterised by ‘rule-at-a-distance’ (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) or ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes, 1994). The classic model of authority was replaced by horizontal forms of
governance in which private (Kempa, Stenning & Wood, 2004; Hope & Sparks, 2000) and public actors seek to co-produce policy (Prins & Cachet, 2011). New concepts, such as risk control, commercial arrangements, cost and benefit analyses, efficiency, effectiveness, customer-oriented practices and output targeting, accompanied this trend (Crawford et al., 2003; Crawford & Lister, 2006; Downes & Van Swaaningen, 2007). The traditional Weberian model of the interfering welfare state no longer provided a solution for the increasingly diverse, complex and dynamic circumstances of late modern society (Devroe, 2013).

The centralised state, with its bureaucratic power mechanisms, lost its ruling position in favour of decentralisation, which distributes authority among lower levels. Public sector reforms pertained to changes in the distribution of power and to the division of central, territorial and functional authority among various decentralised forms of government (Meer, 2009). ‘Forms of control are increasingly inscribed into the fabric of local territorial and spatial interactions’ (Robert, 2002, in Crawford, 2002, 27). Local security policy strove for partnerships and for local preventative strategies (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) developed by networks among police, private security, military and secret intelligence agencies (Reiner, 2000). These networks include ‘all those interactive arrangements in which public as well as private actors participate aimed at solving societal problems, or creating societal opportunities, and attending to the institutions within which these governing activities take place’ (Kooiman, 1999, 70).

The concept of ‘governance of security’ includes responses to criminal events that have already taken place: ‘anticipating and seeking to prevent threats that might occur’ (Johnston & Shearing, 2003, 32). Different actors enter the public space in order to keep public order. More precisely, attention paid to policy regarding a stringent ‘politics of behaviour’ (Field, 2003) and ‘defining deviance down’ (Garland, 2001) was a result of a shifting of the authority of national law enforcement agencies to local partners and citizens, called ‘relocalisation’ (Crawford, 2002) or ‘plural policing’ (Loader, 2000; Crawford, Lister, Blackburn & Burnett, 2005; Jones & Newburn, 2006; Row, 2014). Other concepts used in Anglo-Saxon literature are ‘local multi-agency partnerships’ (Crawford, 1997; MacLaughlin, 2002), ‘multi-agency approach’, ‘community safety policy’ (Crawford, 1999; Brannan et al., 2007), ‘networked governance’, ‘urban governance’ and ‘multi-layered or multilevel governance’ (Loader, 2000).

Local security issues have local expressions, especially in the densely populated urban centres of Europe, but their origins often lie far beyond these cities. Threats to urban security are also associated with the austere economic environment confronting urban populations in Europe as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008 and of the related sovereign debt problems encountered by many EU member states (Edwards & Hughes, 2013). In times of crisis, there would seem to be a risk that police services will be pressured to adopt a very narrow idea of policing (Millie & Bullock, 2013), and that they will as a result try to outsource additional police tasks to private companies. Indeed, since the early 1990s patrolling, guardianship and the enforcement of law and order have no longer been seen as the exclusive tasks of the police (Terpstra et al., 2013). As an alternative to a ‘monopoly of control by the police’, Loader (2000) mentions a complex future in which alliances of public,
parochial and private agencies and interests coexist, sometimes drawn together in intricate networks of policing that seek to provide public reassurance. Local policing is becoming increasingly organised and is being delivered through a multiplicity of purchaser and provider arrangements. New forms of additional policing, referred to as the ‘extended police family’ (Johnston, 2003) have emerged. Though there has been no single police ‘position’ on the governance of plural policing in Britain, an influential model (the police extended family’) (Home Office, 2001) has arisen ‘because of concern in some places that municipal governments might opt to set up their own police forces, thereby posing a threat of ‘Balkanization’ (Blair, 2002, in Johnston, 2003, 185). This ‘family’ includes subcontracted police and community support officers, municipal guards, neighbourhood and street wardens, estate rangers, caretakers and concierges, as well as private security guards and citizen patrols (Zedner, 2003; Crawford & Lister, 2006).

3. Historical evolutions and contexts within Bulgaria

3.1. Bulgaria

Bulgaria is located in the south-eastern portion of Europe; it is the 14th largest country in the entire continent. It is currently home to a total of 7.3 million residents, the majority of these being Christians. ‘Despite certain hesitations and distrust, the period between national independence and the end of the First World War (1878-1918) was generally marked by a strong pro-European orientation of the Bulgarian state’ (Daskalov, 2004, 46). This drastically changed in 1918. As a member of the losing side in the first World War, Bulgaria had to concede to humiliating peace treaties, which were perceived in the country as a national catastrophe (Zhelyazkova, Kosseva & Toleran, 2010). Henceforth, Europe was no longer an attractive and desired role model for the Bulgarian nation. Bulgarian nationalism has been largely a hybrid, containing elements of both German cultural and ethnic nationalism and French civic nationalism. After World War II, Bulgaria became a Communist country and a loyal member of the Soviet bloc. In sharp contrast to its post-independence period (late 19th century), when Bulgaria was struggling to ‘return to Europe’ and when its European identity and heritage were strongly emphasised, the political discourse, literature and social sciences of the post-WWII Bulgaria completely lacked any reference to European identity or European orientation (Zhelyazkova, Kosseva & Toleran, 2010). Instead, Slavic identity was emphasised, highlighting the closeness of Bulgaria and the Soviet/Russian nation in terms of origin and culture. In February 1990 the Communist Party, forced by street protests, gave up its claim on power, and in June 1990 the first free elections since 1931 were held; these were won by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (the new name of the Communist Party). In July 1991 a new constitution was adopted, stipulating a representative elected President as well as a Prime Minister and a Cabinet.

On 1 January 2007, Bulgaria joined the European Union, becoming one of its newest members. Despite being an EU member, Bulgaria’s position in the Union
is still not equal to those of older member states. Bulgaria (along with Romania) is subject to strict monitoring and control exercised by the European Commission over issues of corruption and organised crime (Zhelyazkova, Kosseva & Toleran, 2010). The situation in Bulgaria — one of the least corrupt countries in 2007 — has deteriorated dramatically: in 2010 there was more corruption in the country than there had been before (Ganev, 2013).

‘In the aftermath of Bulgaria’s entry in the EU, competitive rent seeking was supplanted by cronyism. This shift constitutes a turning point in a peculiar evolutionary cycle that began after the collapse of one-party regimes in 1989. During the first decade of post-communism, cronyism was prevalent. One of the arguments that encounter no dissent is that in Bulgaria and Romania assets previously owned by the state were distributed among strategically located members of the communist nomenklatura. In both countries, the former communists retained power and reinvented themselves as capitalists — while successfully keeping local and foreign competitors at bay’ (Ganev, 2013, 29).

With a 12% unemployment rate and a mainly elderly population, Bulgaria holds the tenth place on the list of the top ten ‘most poverty-ridden countries’ in Europe. This list is based on each country’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP), as determined in 2012 by the Central Intelligence Agency fact book. The current minimum wage in Bulgaria is 174 euros per month. The economic changes after 1989 have had serious consequences on the standard of living of the vast majority of the Bulgarian population (Ivanov, 1998). The deep economic crisis faced by the country is more severe in the regions with ethnically mixed communities. The socialist economy created small firms to offer employment to the population, but the industries were new and not well established (Falaris, 2004). The years of transition have led to the failure of these firms as they were not competitive and faced many difficulties in supply of resources (Pickles & Berg, 2000).

Bulgaria is a multicultural country, containing over 15 ethnic communities. The largest group is native Bulgarians (84,8% according to the 2011 census), followed by Turks (8,8%) and Roma (4,9%). A prevailing perception of the country as a mono-national state has resulted in correspondingly prejudicial policies towards the minority groups. They have been accepted as part of Bulgarian society, but at the same time in practice have been highly marginalised (Zhelyazkova, Kosseva &

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4 These numbers were determined by dividing the country’s GDP by the population of the country, thus providing a rough estimate of the income of an individual person within that country.
Policing Sofia. From centralisation to decentralisation

Toleran, 2010). Roma live mostly in segregated settlements at the edges of cities and towns, while the majority of Turks and Pomaks (another minority ethnic group) reside in peripheral rural regions. In this way, they remain largely invisible in the everyday lives of the majority of the population.

State socialist nationalization policies in the 1980s severely impacted the ethnic Turkish and Muslim regions of Bulgaria, while neo-liberal economic strategies have subsequently further deepened their economic crisis. Unemployment among Roma is the highest of all minorities, between 60 and 65 per cent (Gallie, Kostova, Kuchar & Thomlinson, 1996, 63-78). This tendency is confirmed by recent research. The empirical data from a survey on a representative sample of 2,066 people in March 2000 shows that 55 per cent of the Roma and 48 per cent of the Turks are not employed (Kolev, 2000, 10). According to the Roma themselves, unemployment is the basic economic problem for their community. They explain the high rate of unemployment with their low education. There are also a significant number of Roma who tend to think that unemployment is due to ethnic discrimination (Gallie et al. 1996). In Central and Eastern Europe and especially in Southeastern Europe, the vacuum created by the collapse of the communist ideology has often been filled by a nationalist ideology. As a counter reaction, the minorities are demanding greater recognition of their rights. This has led to numerous conflicts in the region. Ethnic groups are officially recognised in the Bulgarian constitution, with official policy aiming at integration.

Bulgaria has an extremely low crime rate compared to other EU countries. According to Nikolay Radulov (2012), the low crime rate registered is a result of the loss of public trust in Bulgarian police. While a 6% decrease is registered yearly (in the period of 2010-2012), the latent crime rate has increased with the same percentage. This could also be due to inadequacies in the system for crime registration (Radulov, 2012). Central and Eastern European countries are characterised by low crime rates, the results of the artificially maintained employment created by policymakers during the rule of Communism. By focusing on maintaining full employment and low prices for basic foods, these reforms tended to reveal the inadequacies of the system instead of helping to develop it. As early as 1982, however, it became clear that the depoliticisation of socialist economies and the partial abandonment of central planning, whether involving minimal or more extensive rationalisations of the managerial apparatuses of state enterprises, would lead to a serious weakening of the legitimacy of states (Ciobanu, 2010).

3.2. Sofia

The largest city in Bulgaria is Sofia, its capital; it is the 15th largest city in the European Union, with a 2013 population of 1,301,683 citizens. Sofia is geographically

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8 The total number of crimes in Bulgaria from 2008 to 2012 was 206,483. This translates to 2,803 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. See the latest version of the European Sourcebook, covering the years 2003-2007: https://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/european-sourcebook-4e-editie.aspx, and Killias and Rau (2000), to compare these rates with those of other EU countries.
situated in western Bulgaria, at the northern foot of Vitosha Mountain, in the ‘Sofia Valley’, which is surrounded by mountains on all sides. The city covers an area of 1344 km. Sofia can be described as a ‘city in transition’: it has expanded culturally, economically, demographically and physically at a very fast pace (Staddon & Mollov, 2000). In 1880, Sofia counted only 19,000 citizens. From that time until 1997, the population in Sofia increased 54 times. This trend has continued during the past ten years\(^9\), due to migrations from smaller cities and villages all over the country\(^10\). Crime rates in Sofia are - as in Bulgaria overall - quite marginal\(^11\), and are not comparable to rates in other big cities in Europe. The total number of crimes reported by the police in Sofia from 2008 to 2012 was 12,640\(^12\). The crime rate was 974.84 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.

3.2.1. Towards a substantial urbanisation

While during the decades preceding 1950 Sofia experienced the most dramatic increases in population in all of Bulgaria, it has long been a symbol of urbanisation in Bulgarian history. Before the liberation, Sofia’s territory expanded by only 2.8 square kilometres, with 75% of its total area covered with building structures and surrounded by security dikes (Vassilev, 2001). The city expanded and gradually urbanised its vicinities in all directions, resulting in a 4.2 square kilometre increase by 1887\(^13\). In the period between 1900 and 1946, migration to Sofia reached its peak, triggering an expansion that increased the city’s population from 68,000 inhabitants in 1900 to half a million inhabitants in 1946. This evolution led to increasing urbanisation. This systematic beginning suffered a setback as a result of the demographic crisis after World War I, which was caused by an unprecedented wave of migrations from Macedonia, Thrace, Dobrudsha and Morava. A key factor in the urbanisation process was the creation of an important railway juncture at the end of the 20th century, which made travel from Western Europe to Istanbul (via Belgrade and Sofia) possible. The building of factories and inns was another important urbanising factor. In 1930, urbanisation expanded towards some of the outlying villages, and Sofia’s territory reached 45 square kilometres. In the late 1970s, an inner city displacement took place, where those who could afford it moved from the centre of the city towards the outskirts (Doytchinov, 2004). The downtown area became less populated, and it gradually shifted into a seat for

\(^9\) From a population of 1,237,891 in 2006, the number of residents in Sofia has steadily risen to 1,240,788 in 2007, 1,247,059 in 2008, 1,249,798 in 2009, 1,259,446 in 2010 and 1,296,615 in 2011 (http://www.sofia.bg/osnovni%20pokazateli.asp). Only in 2012 do we notice a decrease in population, which was due to the negative birth rate (-1.2).


\(^12\) http://www.nsi.bg/otrasal.php?otr=25&a1=839&a2=883&a3=923#cont, last consulted on May, 30 2014.

numerous public and private institutions, including the ones dealing with security. In Communist Bulgaria, as in other Communist countries, urban planning was centralised, technocratic and subordinated to national economic objectives (Hirt, 2005). ‘It proceeded within the institutional and ideological framework of a single-party system; limited local autonomy, which implied that local governments simply channeled down state decisions to the local level; and almost full state ownership of land, property and means of production. The latter meant that the state, through its agencies, was the sole developer of any land beyond the size of a single residential lot’ (Hirt, 2005, 222).

Over the next four decades, Communist leaders developed Sofia into the political, economic and cultural capital of a rapidly industrialising nation. Communist-era plans show quite distinctly the vast areas of planned suburbs that were built to house the rapid influx of factory workers and government officials who answered the siren call of developing socialism (Staddon & Mollov, 2000).

After the Communist period, as Bulgaria became a democratic country, modern building construction started in the ‘transitional’ zone of the capital. This period was marked by widespread changes in social status and increasing differentiation among the poor, middle class and rich, which in turn resulted in building structures differentiated by class. The city is practically surrounded by slums that have sprung up on undeveloped territory. Although the local authorities are now belatedly regulating some of these territories, they are hardly able to get the situation under control (Gigova, 2011). Last, but not least, national conditions and factors assist in providing an understanding of the city’s development. In its entire period as Bulgaria’s capital, Sofia has always been the location boasting the most dynamic development in the country. This fact has an economic, political and social explanation. The extremely important influence of the city on the country’s economic growth is the reason why the regional planning act defines it as a ‘growth area’ (Doytchinov, 2004). Sofia is now clearly entering a brave new phase in its development, a phase signalled by several high-profile consultation and strategic planning exercises. In 1997 the city’s popular mayor, Stefan Sofianski, commissioned the United Nations Development Programme to produce a ‘Human Development Report’ for Sofia, to serve as a marker of Sofia’s strengths, weaknesses, challenges and prospects for the decades to come (Staddon & Mollov, 2000).

3.2.2. Terrorist attacks, protests and Syrian refugees

In this section we describe chronologically the main events that have occurred in Sofia that have had possible implications for its security policy. The terrorist attack at ‘Saint Nedelya’ Church in 1925, the bombardment of the city by the Allied Forces in 1943 and the terrorist attack at the Burgas Airport in 2012 shook Sofia upside down.

On 16th of April, 1925 Sofia becomes a scene of one of the worst terrorist attacks in Bulgarian history and, at that time, in the World. Twenty-five kilograms of explosive were smuggled, thanks to a bribed church employee, in the St. Nedelya Church where the burial of the prominent Bulgarian general Konstantin Georgiev

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was to take place, attended by many prominent government guests. The explosion resulted in the killing of 213 people and nearly 500 were wounded, among them 12 prominent military generals. The ‘Bloody Thursday’ had profound implications for the security in Sofia at that time. It resulted in the announcement of martial law, but the terrorist attack did not achieve its’ goal to bring down the Government.

In December 1941, Bulgaria declared war on the United Kingdom and the United States. The following series of Allied bombing raids on Sofia, which began on the 14th of November 1943 and ended on 17 April 1944, can be called another important event with profound implications for the city’s security (Gigova, 2011). This so-called operation ‘Point Blank’ included 11 sequences of indiscriminate shelling and bombardment of the civilian population of Sofia15. Another incident occurred decades later, in January 1997, when, due to economic hyperinflation, angry protestors started gathering in the square in front of the Bulgarian Parliament16. The situation got out of control when they angrily stormed the Parliament building. After these protests, peaceful protests involving only minor scuffles followed.

We must at least mention a very recent terrorist attack, which had, although the bombing did not take place in Sofia, significant implications and consequences for security at Sofia Airport. On 18 July 2012 a bus transporting Israeli tourists exploded, killing 7 people and injuring 35 at Burgas Airport. A later investigation conducted by the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior and Europol linked Hezbollah to the bombings, naming the incident as ‘the group’s first successful terror attack in Europe since the mid-1980s’17. With the exception of this incident, the recent history of Sofia has not been marked by typical modern-day terrorist attacks. Protests, however, have continued to take place. As a result of high electricity bills, at the end of January 2013, Sofia, among other large Bulgarian cities, again became the site of protests18. An attempt to transport politicians out of the Parliament building by driving a bus through the crowd of protestors resulted in rocks being thrown and clashes with police; at least seven protestors and two officers were injured19. When the government resigned in February 2013, new legislative elections held in May 2013 were supported by 240 European observers. Despite the resignation of the government and the coming to power of a new coalition, in May 2013 protests against the new and allegedly corrupt government became even more intense. What followed were 281 days of protests, along with two occupations of Parliament as well as an occupation of Sofia University20.

15 Nearly 45,265 bombs were dropped, resulting in the deaths of 2,477 people (99% civilians) and the destruction of 12,500 buildings (with damages costing approximately 12 billion euros).
Finally, in order to explore recent developments, we must mention the situation of Syrian refugees in Bulgaria. As a result of the Syrian war (started in 2011), more than 10,000 Syrian refugees have entered Bulgaria since June 2013. Human rights organisations predict that tens of thousands more will enter the country in the coming months21. The refugee influx has sparked security concerns and backlash from the nationalist party ‘Ataka’ and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, opposition of the former government of Boyko Borisov, demanding more effective border control. As a result, on the 16th of October 2013 the government approved the building of a 30 km security fence along the Bulgarian-Turkish border in an area where it had been difficult to detect immigrants entering the country22. Gripped by protests and internal problems, Bulgaria was unable to adequately address the refugee problem, which boosted nationalist sentiment in the country. A Nationalist Party of Bulgaria, including neo-Nazi and skinhead elements, was formed, with a mission of cleansing ‘Bulgaria from the foreign and alien immigrants’. This party established ‘civil patrols’ which very much resemble the patrols of the ‘Golden Dawn’ in Greece23. These ‘civil patrols’ are charged with the task of conducting ‘stop and search’ techniques on migrants. Some activists claim that the government has been complicit in establishing these patrols, which would represent an abdication of the institution in favour of its right-wing faction. After the establishment of the Nationalist Party, a 17-year-old Syrian refugee was stabbed in Sofia near a refugee camp. This was followed in January 2014 by a wave of attacks in Sofia, during which an Iraqi-Bulgarian was attacked in a shopping mall, a Cameroonian mother and child were assaulted by a neo-Nazi group and a Malian boy was beaten by a mob24.

In the following section we explore the police system in Bulgaria, and more specifically the police who operate in Sofia.

4. The national police apparatus

The national police apparatus can be regarded as a heritage from the Communist party. In September 1944, Todor Zhivkov25 became head of the ‘Sofia police force’, which was, as an instrument of the Communist party, restyled as the ‘Narodna Militia’ (‘People’s Militia’). The Ministry of the Interior26 had always been a centralised institution during Communist rule, which ended on 3 April 199027. The Ministry of the Interior is a hierarchical and centralised institution charged with protecting national security, public order and the rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as

21 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bulgarian-golden-dawn-nationalists-launch-attacks-against-syrian-refugees-1431550
23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Dawn_%28political_party%29
24 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bulgarian-golden-dawn-nationalists-launch-attacks-against-syrian-refugees-1431550
26 http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2132580865
27 http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPUEFPUpdfs/EFPUchallengewp4.pdf
fighting against crime. The Ministry of the Interior is headed by the Minister of the Interior, who is the sole and central executive authority within the Ministry. The ‘Law on the Ministry of the Interior’ gives overwhelming supervisory powers over all police components to the Ministry of the Interior. In order to understand plural policing in Sofia, it is necessary to explore the organisational structure of this Ministry, which houses the national police who operate in the city. The Ministry of the Interior finances local police presence.

The following section is based on research of the websites of the Ministry of Interior and legislation related to it, correspondence with the Ministry and a visit to this institution in Sofia.

4.1. The Ministry of the Interior and its centralised police system

All components of the Ministry of the Interior carry out common as well as unique preventative activities with respect to transgressions of the law, and when necessary they issue notices or orders to national agencies, organisations and juridical persons in order to dictate sanctions. The Ministry of the Interior is a central body as well as a decentralised one (as it operates and maintains a presence in each of the different regions of the country). We will describe the different sections of the Ministry shortly, as they are relevant to important security issues in Sofia.

The Ministry of the Interior is divided into three separate administrations: (1) the General Directorate, (2) the Regional Directorates and (3) the Specialised Directorates. The regional directorates are situated in the various regions of Bulgaria, while the General Directorates and the Specialized directorates are situated in Sofia. Very recently (in 2013), major changes were made to this organisational structure. First of all, officers from the General Directorate’s ‘Fight against Organised Crimes’ division began working as part of the recently established National Security Agency. In addition, the Specialised Directorate for Operative and Technical Operations was restructured and renamed the National Agency for Technical Operations. It became the national specialised directorate for secret operational and technical activities that are conducted for the purpose of protecting national and public security as well as the rights and freedoms of citizens. This unit can be regarded as an intelligence service, as it carries out the provision, development and application of special intelligence instruments. The most important consequence of these changes is the fact that both of the above-mentioned directorates are no longer part of the Ministry of the Interior, but belong (since 2013) to the National Security Agency, an intelligence

29 http://www.mvr.bg/Za_MVR/struktura.htm
30 This National Agency for Technical Operations consists of the following Directorates: Internal Security, Migration, Bulgarian Identity Documents, International Projects, Property Control and Social Activities, National System, and Coordination of the Fight against Infringements Affecting the Financial Interests of the European Union.
31 Article 137a, paragraph 1, and further. The agency’s legal competencies can be found under Article 137b; see http://lex.bg/laws/idoc/2135516991.
department that deals with threats to internal security. Reforms to this structure will be effected along with changes to the current Law on the Ministry of the Interior (and the statute for its application); a new bill regarding these matters is scheduled to be voted on in Parliament in September 2014. This bill will restructure the directorates and units within the Ministry of the Interior and will assign new competencies and functions to some of the directorates. The division between the national police who are governed by the Ministry of the Interior and the police officers who operate within the new intelligence services is not clear today, nor are the identities of the agencies or oversight bodies in control of this new National Security Agency. The organisation of this new framework of control and the resulting consequences for democracy are extensively important to any follow-up research that is conducted. Drawing conclusions from these new arrangements, we notice a shift of state police functions towards the intelligence services, so that these functions are no longer operating under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, nor being controlled by this institution.

Last, but not least, the Ministry of the Interior has not lost its grip on the big city. One of the 28 Regional Directorates (named the ‘Metropolitan Directorate’) is centralised (and financed) by the Ministry of the Interior but operates within the city of Sofia. Let us first describe the directorate that steers and organises the national police, namely, the National Police General Directorate (NPGD).

4.2. The National Police General Directorate (NPGD)

The National Police Directorate is located within the first General Directorate. The directors of this administration execute orders that are issued by the Minister of the Interior or by his or her deputy ministers, and are accountable to them. This directorate is a national specialised structure that focuses on information analysis and operational, investigative, preventative, and organisational activity related to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offenses, except in the area of organised crime.

4.2.1. The Specialised Police Forces

Regional offices of this department are called ‘Specialised police departments’ or ‘Specialised Police Forces’, the latter of which is a new name for the (former) ‘Gendarmerie’. These locally and regionally embedded forces exist to protect public order, provide security for mass events, protect critical facilities and strategic and diplomatic buildings, conduct special operations and assist in emergency situations. They are present in the following cities: Sofia, Montana, Pleven, Plovdiv, Burgas, Varna and Kardzali.

33 http://gdnp.mvr.bg/Pravomoshhtia_GDNP/default.htm
4.2.2. The Border Police General Directorate (BPGD)

This Directorate maintains a local presence in all airports as well as in the following cities: Burgas, Dragoman, Elhovo, Kyustendil, Ruse and Smolyan. The BPGD guards the air borders of the Republic of Bulgaria, including those of Sofia’s airspace. It also coordinates border crossing activity within the two terminals of Sofia International Airport\(^\text{34}\).

4.2.3. The Fire Safety and Protection of the Population Metropolitan Directorate (FSPPMD)

Thirdly, the Fire Safety and Protection of the Population Metropolitan Directorate (FSPPMD) is locally present in all main regional cities in Bulgaria. The FSPPMD protects the population of Sofia from fire hazards and, in the absence of such disasters, concentrates on prevention via training and information campaigns\(^\text{35}\).

5. The regional directorates

Besides the national directorates, the Ministry of the Interior maintains regional directorates in all (28) main regional cities in Bulgaria. Regional directorates are led by directors who are subordinate to the Minister and the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior\(^\text{36}\). As the Metropolitan Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior is one of the 28 regional directorates that explicitly operates in Sofia, we will focus in depth on this policing department.

6. The local police apparatus: The Metropolitan Directorate (MDMI)

Mainly safeguarding the population of Sofia, this directorate oversees the territory of Sofia, including three additional cities and 34 villages that are located in the city’s vicinity. The directorate conducts operational, investigative and security activities within the city. The MDMI has a centralised structure; it is governed by the Director General, who is directly subordinate to the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior. The Metropolitan Directorate consists of multiple departments, units and groups, as well as nine city district offices\(^\text{37}\). It includes two main sub-directorates: one that is in charge of the Criminal Police (focusing on criminal investigations) and one that is in charge of the Security Police (focusing on public order and crime prevention). Officers are divided among different units and the total number of officers (on payroll\(^\text{38}\)) in the MDMI is 5,463. Police density in Sofia is 350 public police officers per 100,000 people. The MDMI also integrates public civil servants into...
its staff. Security activity within the MDMI takes place within several specific units, such as the ‘Centre for City Mobility’ department, the Centre for Alcohol Abusers and for Temporary Accommodation of Adults, the Municipal Police and the ‘Metropolitan’ unit. Parts of these units are outsourced, with the following parties playing the roles of providers: the metropolitan municipality of Sofia, Metropolitan Inc. and Sofia Water. In the following subsections, we describe these different units, paying particular attention to the police.

6.1. The ‘Centre for City Mobility’ department

Officers from the ‘Centre for City Mobility’ department can react to infringements of the law perpetrated by road traffic, or they can act according to specific orders from the mayor of Sofia. In both of these cases, they also have the authority to initiate administrative sanctions or to forcefully remove motor vehicles that are hindering traffic or snow removal during events.

6.2. The Centre for Alcohol Abusers and for Temporary Accommodation of Adults

This centre has a purely preventative task: it executes humanitarian activities, especially during the winter season, which are aimed at locating homeless individuals, beggars and individuals who are drunk or in a helpless condition and providing them with shelter in temporary housing centres.

6.3. The Municipal Police and the ‘Metropolitan’ unit

The Municipal Police and the ‘Metropolitan’ unit perform the classical police task of ‘keeping the peace’ (Brodeur, 1998) and can be compared to the administrative public order police of most European countries (Ponsaers, 2001). These local police perform activities related to safeguarding public order, maintaining the security of sites and of municipality properties, ensuring the safety of traffic and assisting with the control and administrative activities of local and self-governing bodies within the metropolitan municipality. Officers also act as security agents for cultural and sporting events, as well as guaranteeing the safety of graveyards, recreation centres for citizens, and other crowded public sites. During the winter season they coordinate snow removal from streets and the removal of ice formations from municipality and national buildings.

This unit is organised across the nine police districts. A total of 84 teams are operational on behalf of all inhabitants of Sofia. Their tasks consist mainly of surveillance and control within the city. Police cars and foot patrols (beat officers) patrol on a daily basis in Sofia. Their numbers vary depending on the operational situation. Therefore, the perimeters of the territories in which these foot and car patrols function, as well as their numbers, vary with each police district. Car patrols vary between 34 and 38 on a daily basis, and foot patrols vary between 8 and 16 pairs of officers who patrol each day.
The Security Police within this unit can provide up to seven additional pairs of patrol officers for complicated operational situations and crisis situations, and in cases where mass riots occur. The Municipal Police possess four units of mounted police (on horses), as well as police officers accompanied by dogs, who are tasked with providing security in parks and during sporting events. Five additional pairs of motorcycle patrols and 14 car patrols are tasked with supplementarily safeguarding sites (residential buildings, trade properties, offices, banks, etc.). Prevention is their main task. Their duties also include safeguarding the metropolitan metro, which is of strategic importance. Security of the metro includes surveillance of the stations and the equipment in them, preventing terrorist attacks and violations of public order, and assisting in cases of civilian accidents. The security police division also performs analogous activities with respect to malicious violations or epidemic outbreaks in the lakes that supply water to Sofia and in the areas around district water treatment stations.

7. Other actors providing security

7.1. The role of the mayor: the local story

In order to explore tendencies towards plural policing in Sofia, we first analyse the legal powers the mayor has to recruit (local) actors other than the (nationally governed) police to provide security in the city. The mayor in Sofia is directly elected by the population for a period of four years. At this moment, Jordanka Asenova Fandakova is the mayor of Sofia; she was elected on 15 November 2009, and again re-elected in 2011. She is the first woman to hold this position. As is the case in most cities within EU countries, the mayor is responsible, on the city level, for executing the security tasks that stem from the Acts of the President of the country and from the Council of the Ministry of the Interior. After Bulgaria became a democracy, different political parties have influenced policymaking in the security domain via the National Parliament. The mayor has executive power over the Acts that are voted on in Parliament, which can be regarded as an indirect instrument of executing security-related policies. The mayor also has access to direct policymaking instruments concerning security, as established in the Law for local self-governance and local administration. The mayor is responsible for organising governance in

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39 Article 38, subparagraph 2 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
40 Article 44, paragraph 8 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
41 Each party influences the agenda of its respective member of Parliament who decides to run in elections for the position of mayor of Sofia.
42 Article 38 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
43 Provisions for direct policymaking instruments can be found in article 44, subparagraph 4, of the Law for local self-governance and local administration, which was installed on 17.09.1991, and very recently amended on 05.03.2014 (http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/lidoc/2132580865).
times of crisis\textsuperscript{44}, and for keeping the peace, health, propriety and security of the city; these objectives are maintained via (written) communal orders.

Overall, Article 20 from the Law of the Ministry of Interior postulates that the directors of the general directorates fulfill orders issued by the Minister of Interior or his or her Deputy Ministers and are accountable to them. Article 29a states that regional directorates are being led by directors subordinate to the Minister of Interior and his or her Main Secretary (Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, 2013). This law gives supervisory authority to the Ministry of Interior of all police components. In contrast, according to Article 44, subparagraph 4 from the Law for Local Self-Governance and Administration ‘the Mayor is responsible for the safeguarding of public peace and security, and for the purpose of it issues written orders, which are compulsory for heads of police bodies to abide by’ (Bulgarian Council of Ministers, 2005). This, however, does not give the Mayor any supervisory powers. According to Article 21, paragraph 5, the Minister of Interior ‘drafts a proposal for the budget for the Ministry of Interior’ (Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, 2013, p. 7) and paragraph 6 states that he ‘allocates the budget of the Ministry of Interior, manages financial and logistical support, and exercises control over the activity of persons responsible for the budget in the structures of the Ministry’ (Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, 2013, p. 7). In addition to that, according to Article 18 paragraph 3, directors of regional and local police offices can appeal the orders from the Mayor in front of the Regional governor, who, in consultation with the Minister of Interior, may revoke the order (Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, 2013). He or she does not, however, decide on the budgets to be spent on security issues within the city. The implementation costs of state functions, such as the municipal police, are financed by the state budget\textsuperscript{45}, which is based on local sources of revenue that are independent of the municipal budget\textsuperscript{46}. The mayor him/herself is responsible for the organisation and implementation of the independent municipal budget\textsuperscript{47}. In this sense, the mayor has no authority over the budget of national police operations within the city\textsuperscript{48}.

These facts — that the mayor is unable to control the budgets of police operations within the city, and that he or she is completely dependent on the coordination and governing activities of the Ministry of the Interior — could create tension between local and national priorities (Devroe, 2012). Therefore, here we detail the options the mayor has for setting local priorities for the control of crime and social disorder within the city.

In the policy plan developed by Mayor Fandakova in 2009, the theme of ‘better public order and security’ appeared as a fourth level priority, after ‘transformation of Sofia into one of the European Union’s cultural centres’ (number one), ‘development and modernisation of engineering and transportation infrastructure’ (number two) and ‘efficient, active and transparent financing of municipal projects and better management of commercial companies with municipal property and municipal participation’ (number

\textsuperscript{44} Article 44, subparagraph 11, of the Law for local self-governance and local administration.
\textsuperscript{45} Article 54, paragraph 2 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
\textsuperscript{46} Article 52, paragraph 1 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
\textsuperscript{47} Article 44, paragraph 5 (Law for local self-governance and local administration).
\textsuperscript{48} http://www.kubrat.bg/bg/localgov/zmsma.pdf
We notice that a Bulgarian political document states that the mayor renewed her priority list in 2011. The theme ‘for a secure city’ fell to the tenth and last priority, superseded by these themes: a ‘competitive and innovative city’ (number 1), a ‘well-planned and organised city’ (number two), a ‘city with modern transport infrastructure’ (number three), a ‘city with new and convenient public transport’ (number four), a ‘clean and green city’ (number five), ‘sport, healthy and active life in the city’ (number six), a ‘friendly city for kids and young people’ (number seven), the ‘European capital of culture’ (number eight) and a ‘city with efficient and high-quality services for citizens and businesses’ (number nine). However, further study of this document reveals that, although security holds the last place on the mayor’s top ten priority list, it is actually interwoven with other issues that are mentioned. The mayor includes plans to ‘increase police patrols and effective surveillance infrastructure in the city’ in priorities two and three. As we were not able to conduct interviews in Sofia, we can’t give the exact reason for this ‘undervaluation’ of security issues in the local policy plan. A rational explanation could be the lack of power, competence and budget wielded by the mayor regarding police matters; why promise a safe city if you are dependent on the goodwill of the Ministry of the Interior to allow police to prioritise safety in the city? Another explanation could lie in the political changes that Mayor Fandakova would like to accomplish, which would stand in contrast to the policies of the former mayor of Sofia, Boyko Borisov, a former policeman who overemphasised security during his time in office.

7.2. Private Security Companies (PSC)

Bulgaria is catching up with other Eastern European countries in terms of privatising police functions. We notice a steady growth since 1990 of private security agencies that operate in public space. For the city of Sofia, national data show an increasing trend towards privatisation. It was impossible to obtain any data on the amount of contracts that have been granted to PSC in Sofia, but as 68% of all PSC in the country are present in Sofia, we believe that many contracts have been provided by the mayor and by citizens. Although the use of legal force remains in the hands of the public police, this privatisation trend provides an answer to our third research question, and has important implications for the study of security-related governance in Sofia. In this section we explore the history, private police densities and tasks of the private security companies.

49 http://sofia-da.eu/about-sofia/priorities-for-development
52 In 2005, for example, public contracts were awarded to private security agencies, which led to 5,816 private security officers (personnel) that protected national and municipal entities in Bulgaria. In 2009, 258 public contracts related to security were announced; in 2010, this number was 284, while in 2011 it was 246 and in 2012 it was 113.
53 Source: the Ministry of the Interior.
7.2.1. History and legislation

Initially, Bulgarian private security companies (PSC) were closely related to organised crime. Since 2008, the Ministry of the Interior claims to have instituted regulations that have significantly decreased the influence of organised crime on these agencies, prevented corruption, and contributed towards their professionalisation\(^55\). This professionalisation has led to the commercial export of PSC services internationally, including to Iraq and other international companies operating in Bulgaria. The first legal provisions regulating the activities of PSC were introduced by the Ministry of the Interior in 1993. A specific article (81) that briefly defined the possible activities of PSC was included in the Law for the Ministry of the Interior. Between 1993 and 2000 several non-licensed commercial companies popped up. In 2000, the Ministry of the Interior introduced the ‘Private Security Act’\(^56\). In 2004, the companies as well as the Ministry of the Interior proclaimed the Act outdated, and a new section was added\(^57\), stipulating mandatory licenses for all PSC; these licenses give them the ability to provide contract services. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for providing these licenses. The National Police Directorate and the regional directorates of the Ministry of the Interior are responsible for supervising the enactment of the Law on Private Security Activity. Private security companies operating in Sofia are supervised by the Metropolitan Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior\(^58\). This control is exercised by means of an ‘Integrated Centre’ for licensing PSC activities\(^59\). As there are no legal requirements for the background checks of employees hired by PSC, there are still concerns that many PSC operate in the private security market without licenses\(^60\). From 2004 on, the Act has not been renewed. The domain of private policing in Bulgaria is not transparent, and relevant information and dates are hard to find.

7.2.2. Private security density

In 2013, there were 2,432 registered PSC in Bulgaria with a license to operate\(^61\). These data only include ‘licensed’ PSC, and so we believe the number to be an underestimation, supposing that a number of non-licensed companies are operating in a grey area of legality. If we explore other geographical levels, we obtain the information that 832 PSC operate on the territory of Bulgaria (including Sofia).

\(^{55}\) Source: documents of the Ministry of the Interior.
\(^{56}\) Law on Private Security Activity 2000 (Decree 1-79), instituted by the Ministry of the Interior.
\(^{57}\) In 2004, section 1-14 was added to the Law on Private Security Activity 2000.
\(^{58}\) Chapter 5, Article 41 of the Law on Private Security Activity.
\(^{59}\) This Centre maintains data on the number of licensed PSC and their activities, guarded sites and the number of security personnel guarding them, and the means/resources that are used to guard the sites (guns, cars, etc.).
\(^{60}\) http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/seesac_salw_and_private_security_companies_in_south_eastern_europe.pdf
\(^{61}\) After several official written demands sent to the Ministry of the Interior, we finally obtained this information from the National Police General Directorate, or, more precisely, the ‘Integrated Centre for Licensing PSC’, in a letter. These data are not public.
and that 50 additional PSC operate within the regional territory of Sofia (including Sofia). Most importantly, 281 private security companies operate exclusively within the city of Sofia. This means that out of the 2,432 licensed PSC in Bulgaria, 68.42% (1,644 PSCs) of them are operating in the city (at least, this is what is officially stated by the Ministry). We assume that a broader amount of PSC are working in Sofia without being registered by the Ministry. This amounts to a private security density of 133.97 PSC per 100,000 citizens in Sofia. However, when it comes to the ratio of PSC personnel to police officers, Bulgaria holds second place in all of Europe (after Hungary), with a ratio of 2 PSC members for each police officer62.

7.2.3. Collaboration with public police

In order to keep a watch on the collaboration between private and public police, the Law on Private Security Activity63 defines an official body whose purpose is to guarantee this collaboration. This ‘Advisory Body for Cooperation on Private Security Activity’ is called, in brief, the ‘Council’, and was installed next to the National Police Directorate. The Council is chaired by the deputy director of the National Police Directorate. Three representatives of PSC and three officers from the National Police Directorate can have a seat in this official body. The Council can outline and propose specific forms of collaboration between police officers and citizens who provide private security services, and it can also report the results of these collaborations64.

7.2.4. Tasks

The tasks of PSC are similar to those of public police, and are oriented mostly towards crime prevention. These private firms obtain their contracts from private citizens as well as from the mayor. Most PSC have commercial websites and contact information and are responsive to citizens’ enquiries and demands. The law stipulates that ‘Private security services shall be fulfilled in accordance with preventative activity based on the circumstances and conditions for transgression of the law in guarded objects’65. If a crime is committed, private security officers are obliged to report it to the prosecutor’s office and to the public police66.

The tasks of PSC cover the following types of services67:

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63 Chapter 4 of the Law on Private Security Activity.
66 Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Law on Private Security Activity.
• Private security for individuals;
• Security for property belonging to individuals or to corporate bodies;
• Security for events;
• Security for precious consignments andfreights;
• Self-defence of property belonging to companies or judicial persons.

Only 15 out of 1,664 PSC operating on the territory of Sofia, work in the domains of private security for individuals (including security for property and belongings and security for precious consignments and freights)\(^{68}\). An overwhelming 660 PSC are licensed to operate only in the domain of security for property\(^ {69}\). Only 37 PSC are licensed to function in all domains (excluding self-defence)\(^{70}\). The Law on Private Security Activity stipulates that private security guards have the right to use physical force and auxiliary tools such as plastic and rubber truncheons and handcuffs\(^ {71}\). We notice a strange note on the use of violence in the Law, where it stipulates that ‘In cases where guards detain individuals, use force, auxiliary tools or guns, they have to hand in a written report to their supervisor, who in turn is obliged to hand it in to the appropriate police agency’\(^ {72}\). Is this a legal contradiction? The Law stipulates that the public police have a monopoly on violence, but, on the other hand, violence (in the form of handcuffs, guns and arrests) can and will be used by private security agencies in public spaces. Do these PSC provide security? A study on crime trends in Bulgaria, conducted by the Centre for the Study of Democracy, shows a positive correlation between decreases in crime against businesses and the presence of PSC\(^ {73}\). This can be explained by the number of businesses that bought alarm systems from PSC between 1999 and 2005. The public police also provided alarm systems, but with lesser success: the study reports that only 18% of businesses in Sofia bought their alarm systems from the police\(^ {74}\).

8. Conclusion

In this article, we contributed to the debate on ‘plural policing’ in Europe, focusing particularly on Bulgaria, a country in transition. Bulgaria, having only very

\(^{68}\) Defined by Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraphs 1, 2 and 4, of the Law on Private Security Activity.

\(^{69}\) Defined by Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2, of the Law on Private Security Activity.

\(^{70}\) According to the official reply from the Ministry of the Interior, only one PSC based in Sofia and functioning within the territory of Bulgaria is licensed to perform in all domains, including self-defence.

\(^{71}\) In the course of using the above-mentioned tools, guards are obliged to protect the health and life of the individuals against whom such tools are used. Guards can use auxiliary tools only after giving a warning (except in cases where they are attacked suddenly). The Law prohibits the use of handcuffs or truncheons on juveniles and pregnant women (Law on Private Security Activity, Article 34, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 5).

\(^{72}\) Article 35 of the Law on Private Security Activity.


recently become a member of the EU Commission, and possessing a very new
democratic government, is still a country in evolution. Based on an extensive
search for information and data on policing in Sofia, we conclude that Bulgaria is
classified by a lack of available scholarly and societal (policy-based) information
on police and security issues. The contrast between the accessibility of sources
focusing on demographical, political, historical and societal topics and the lack of
accessibility of information on the (functioning) of the police couldn’t be greater.
After several attempts at accessing this information, it was provided to us by the
Ministry of the Interior and by the National Police Directorate itself. However,
the fact that these official institutions were our main sources of information leads
us to question whether distortions or overly narrow views of situational realities
were present in the data. This leads us in turn to desire a more in-depth study,
conducted within the city itself, which would include the possibility of visiting
the relevant agencies and interviewing key experts. Anyhow, this article has its
merits, in that it reveals some first insights into policing security in Sofia, and
offers some potentially challenging debate topics. We will first discuss our conclu-
sions regarding the national police force, and then continue with our conclusions
regarding local issues.

8.1. National police force

In Bulgaria, in contrast to other EU countries, security issues have never been very
high on the political agenda. Bulgaria has yet, in 2013, to face mass protests of
dissatisfaction and anger with the governmental system and its corrupt practices.
The national police force is used to quell these manifestations and to keep the
public order. The nature of this police force, stemming as it does from a central-
ised, hierarchical, militarised national police force, has, at first glance, not evolved
dramatically. Further in-depth research is needed to analyse this statement. For the
national police force, which originated historically from a ‘military-bureaucratic
police model’ (Ponsaers, 2001) called the ‘People’s Militia’, and which operated
under the dominion of a Communist regime for 35 years, taking any steps towards
a community-oriented police model (a model that is present in almost all Western
countries) is tremendous. The police system in Bulgaria is still centralised and was,
until very recently (2013), governed and financed by the Ministry of the Interior. The
national force (the National Police General Directorate) operates on the national
level as well as being territorially divided into 28 different regional departments.
One of these regional departments is the Municipal Police unit which operates in
Sofia and continues to execute the regulations and priorities that are established
by the Ministry of the Interior.

We discussed in this article a very important recent trend. While the Law of
the Ministry of the Interior provides this Ministry with overwhelming supervisory
powers over all police components, the Ministry has recently lost these powers
to intelligence services. The above-mentioned directorates are no longer part of
the Ministry of the Interior, but will be supervised and financed from 2014 on by the National Security Agency, an intelligence department charged with protecting the country’s borders and dealing with threats to internal security. These are very challenging evolutions that need to be accompanied by scientific research and transparency in publications. The division between the national police which continue to be governed by the Ministry of the Interior and the police officers who operate within the new intelligence services is not clear, nor are the identities of the controlling agencies or oversight bodies that will have authority over this new National Security Agency. Drawing conclusions from these new arrangements, we notice a shift of state police functions towards an intelligence agency; they are no longer operating under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior nor being controlled by it.

On the other hand, in the course of attempting to answer our research questions, we have noticed a simultaneous evolution towards decentralisation and privatisation, which is more evident at the local level in Sofia.

8.2. Plural policing on the local level

Although we noticed some trends towards decentralisation within regional governments (trends towards greater autonomy of the police forces), the regions are not well organised yet, and we did not notice any visible effects stemming from these trends. On the local level, however, we did notice more marked tendencies towards ‘plural policing’, and in particular towards privatisation. We could offer criticisms of the overlap among public order tasks that are assigned to different units, as well as the overlap between the ‘Metropolitan’ department and the Municipal Police unit, both of which operate within the territory of the city. Although the mayor, who is responsible for peace, order and security in Sofia, can count on the national public police to execute municipal tasks, we also see tensions within this police system. As long as police management, control and budget are determined at the national level, we can’t label this public police force as ‘deconcentrated’. As we have described, the mayor can co-operate and be consulted by public police, but has no hierarchical power to impose police priorities, tasks or activities, abilities which are necessary for good city governance. She has to rely on additional municipal budgets, drawn from revenues provided by the citizens of Sofia, in order to execute his or her own priorities on the city level. Article 18, paragraph 3 from the Law of the Ministry of the Interior also shows that the mayor’s orders with regards to security can be revoked if directors of Regional Police Directorates do not agree with them.

We notice a legal and practical tension here, as the Law for local self-governance and local administration postulates that directors of local law enforcement must abide by the mayor’s orders. Although legally in authority, in practice the
mayor does not have any supervisory powers over the public police, nor does she decide on the budgets that are to be spent on security issues within the city. Tensions between decision making based on the implementation costs of state functions (such as public police in the city who are financed by the state⁷⁷) and decision making based on the municipal budget (drawn from local sources of revenue⁷⁸) can arise. The mayor him/herself is responsible for the organisation and implementation of the independent municipal budget⁷⁹. In this sense, the mayor has no authority over the budgets of local law enforcement agencies⁸⁰, and he or she must rely on their voluntary compliance in order to complete necessary security tasks.

We assume that due to these conflicts of authority, security privatisation emerged in Sofia, manifested by an increasing number of contracts made between the mayor and private security companies on safety issues. Although minimal legislation overseeing these PSC was installed in 2000, without regular controls on licenses and background checks of employees hired by PSC, possible problems of legitimacy can arise. In particular, regarding this last trend, we need more in-depth research, and much more scholarly work, in order to evaluate the plural policing processes within Sofia.

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⁷⁷ Article 54, paragraph 2, of the Law for local self-governance and local administration.
⁷⁸ Article 52, paragraph 1, of the Law for local self-governance and local administration.
⁷⁹ Article 44, paragraph 5, of the Law for local self-governance and local administration.
⁸⁰ http://www.kubrat.bg/bg/localgov/zmsma.pdf


Policing Sofia. From centralisation to decentralisation


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Policing and Crime in Contemporary London

A developmental agenda?

ABSTRACT
In support of the Policing European Metropolises Project and as a starting point for investigating such a complex and challenging subject as policing the global city of London, the article provides an exposition of the current agenda for policing and crime as advanced by the London Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), which assumed responsibility for police governance in January 2012. To justify this focus, the article draws upon distinctions made in urban regime theory about governing arrangements that seek to maintain, develop, reform or transform public policy agendas in the governance of cities. It uses these to question prospects for the MOPAC Policing and Crime Plan for 2013-16 and to provoke questions for further research into the lessons that can be drawn from this case for comparisons of policing in other European metropolises. In this regard, it is argued that the concept of the ‘metropolis’ implies an understanding of contemporary urban phenomena, such as crime and policing, as social products that have an integral relationship to a ‘world urban system’ of political, economic and cultural relations.

Keywords: urban governance, London, Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), metropolis, urban regime theory, world urban system

1. Introduction
Contributors to this special issue of the European Journal of Policing Studies (EJPS) have been asked to consider the analytical value of the concept of the ‘metropolis’ for understanding contemporary policing in Europe’s major cities. In applying this concept to policing in contemporary London this article discusses its relationship to broader arguments about changes to the ‘world urban system’ which, some argue,
are leading to a ‘hollowing out’ of nation state sovereignty as the power to govern is transferred upwards to supranational organisations, outwards to corporations and downwards to the ‘city states’ that are obligatory passage points for the circulation of political, economic and cultural influence within this system. In this regard London is the archetypal metropolis, given its insertion into this system as the principal node in global financial markets, its constitutional-legal status as capital of the UK, its dominant influence over national economic policy and its role in major cultural and sporting events including the Olympic Games held in 2012.

Partly as a consequence of this status, London is a focal point for major political protests, including demonstrations against the foreign and domestic policies of the UK national government, as well as social conflicts arising out of the growing disparities of income and housing in a city which has become a principal site of international finance and real estate speculation. Most notably, in August 2011, London witnessed civil unrest unprecedented for its scale and velocity even in the turbulent history of urban disorders in this city over the past 30 years. It has also experienced a weaponisation of violence against the person with municipal authorities expressing concern over trends in firearms-related and ‘knife’ crime. The city also has an iconic reputation for organised crime, from the racketeering of the renowned Kray and Richardson ‘firms’ of the 1960s through to the alleged ‘transnational organised crime groups’ of the present period. Whether this particular experience is novel or a synecdoche of the problems confronting policing in other European metropolises is a moot point for the kind of comparative urban research for which this special issue is a foundation. Before this comparative research can be undertaken, however, it is necessary to first explore the continued relevance of the metropolis for analyses of urban policing or, as we argue, for the broader problem of ‘urban security regimes’.

Having outlined a ‘city-state’ concept of the metropolis, the article acknowledges arguments that are sceptical about any hollowing out of nation states and which note a resurgence in their sovereign power, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and the major bail outs provided by states to a collapsing global banking system. Subsequently, it is also nation states that have been in the vanguard of imposing ‘austere’ public sector borrowing requirements especially on other states suffering acute sovereign debt crises and which have provoked often violent social protests, notably in the Southern European states of the Eurozone. In turn, this ailing project of economic integration has increased antipathy between the Southern European states subject to austerity and resentful Northern states critical of corruption and feckless government in the South. Allied to the racialised politics of immigration into and around the European Union, this antipathy has been registered in the growing electoral popularity of nationalist parties, in particular their success in the May 2014 election of Members to the European Parliament. It should also be noted that on the Eastern borders of the Union the ‘hard power’ of inter-national conflict is resurgent in the territorial disputes between Ukrainian nationalists, ethnic Russians and their supporters in Russian President Putin’s administration. This conflict provides a particularly visceral example of how disputes over national sovereignty play out on the streets and squares of major cities, such
as Donetsk, Kiev and Sevastopol, in which the police themselves, as symbols of this sovereignty, have been targeted and suborned by both sides.

In this context, arguments over the diminishing significance of nation state power seems exaggerated. Rather, metropolises are located within multiple circuits of power as they coalesce and compete with other cities, with nation state and supranational centres of power and with transnational corporations. These circuits structure the conditions for urban governance in ways that are both enabling for certain policy agendas whilst constraining of others. It is argued here that urban regime theory provides a means of interpreting this complex circuitry and the interplay of the global and the local in the social production of urban policing.

2. Policing European Metropolises?

The concept of the ‘metropolis’, previously used to describe the ‘core’ of imperial regimes, specifically their capitals, and their relations with the ‘peripheral’ centres of power within an empire (King, 1990a), provides a useful, more concrete, idea for thinking about urban policing in the current era of globalisation. It reminds us that cities in European empires were central to the global projection of the political, economic and cultural power of the imperium and that they were, in turn, shaped by the colonial systems of which they were an integral part. As such, the formation of a ‘world urban system’ of interdependent cities is not particular to the current era of global capitalism, even if increased consciousness of it is, but a product of the imperial governing arrangements through which the core exercised authority over the periphery of an empire to secure trading routes and the extraction of human and natural resources (King, 1990a, 1). Policing was, of course, central to these arrangements in terms of the repression of indigenous peoples and anti-colonial struggles but also in terms of the inter-national export of European legal systems and personnel to the dominions.

Whereas the world urban system forged through colonial projects served the imperial ambitions of nation states, and were constitutive of these nation states, it is argued that European metropolises currently inhabit a transnational state system in which the diminishing significance of nation states as ‘power containers’ is rivalled by the increasing power of transnational corporations and their predominance in interdependent ‘city states’, particularly those regarded as ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 2001; Jessop, 2004; Massey, 2007). Again, policing plays a central role in this as local policing struggles to adapt to security threats whose origins are beyond the national, much less the municipal, sphere of influence (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012). London can be understood as the paradigmatic example of the metropolis in both its colonial and city-state formations (King, 1990b; Erturk et al., 2011).

Yet, as noted in the introduction, it is important to emphasise the diminishing not defunct significance of a national frame of reference for understanding the policing of European metropolises. The European Union’s ailing project of economic integration has provoked a resurgence of nationalist politics, both in the wealthy Northern States that have promoted ‘austere’ public expenditure as a response to
the financial crisis of 2008 and in the Southern States which have been the principal
target of this austerity. Social protests against this austerity, often escalating into
major instances of civil unrest and violent confrontation with police forces, have
been focussed on the major cities and seats of national government in Europe. On
the Eastern borders of the EU, the violence between Ukrainian nationals and ethnic
Russians confronting police forces in the cities of Donetsk, Kiev and Sevastopol
exemplifies the resurgence of conflicts over national sovereignty in which urban
police forces have been targeted and enrolled by both sides. In addition, as the
bombing of public transport systems in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005
demonstrated, European metropolises are targeted as a consequence of the foreign
policies adopted by their parent nation states, in this instance the involvement of
the British and Spanish states in conflicts in the Middle East, adding a further layer
of complexity to the challenges of urban policing in these major cities.

Whilst there is, therefore, an incongruity between the idea of the ‘post-national
state’ and these conflicts, it is clear that national frames of reference cannot
adequately capture global pressures on policing nor the social production of new
‘internal security fields’ such as transnational markets and city-states (Bigo, 2000). In
their recent text on Global Policing, Bowling and Sheptycki delineate the contours of
an emerging ‘transnational-state-system’ which, they argue, ‘is profoundly affecting
the jurisdictional sovereignty and functional diversity of policing in a globalised
world’ (2012, 29). A central dynamic of this system is the deregulation of national
border controls on licit markets and the greater mobility of people, goods and
services, particularly within regional trading blocs such as the Single European
Market and the North American Free Trade Association. Such de-regulation has also
enabled a greater mobility of people, goods and services in illicit markets, an argu-
ment that has been central to official narratives about the growth of ‘transnational
organised crime’ (Edwards & Gill, 2002). To control illicit flows of people, goods and
services whilst enabling the circulation of licit capital, the emergent transnational-
state-system produces innovations in policing technologies including networks for
cross-border co-operation between police and judicial officials, intelligence sharing
systems and mechanisms for fast-tracking the extradition of suspects (Bowling &
Sheptycki, 2012, 29-52). Given its unique experiment in producing a supra-national
political-economy, with its own borderless internal market, the European Union has
been in the vanguard of innovations in transnational policing such as the Schengen
Information System and the European Arrest Warrant (ibid., 42-6).

In this context, it is argued that although policing is ‘local at all points’, in that it
is always experienced in particular places and moments (Edwards & Gill, 2002), this
experience is constituted by social forces that are not contained within a particular
locality, a particular city, but which often have their origins elsewhere. In, for
example, the multi-annual programmes for policing and judicial co-operation that
support the European Union’s objective of creating an Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice and which equip security actors with the powers to share intelligence
and extradite suspects across national borders. Insofar as local security actors
are integrated into these transnational circuits of power, it makes little sense to
understand policing as self-contained within localities, particularly metropolises
that are integral to both licit and illicit circuits of global political, economic and cultural relations. Rather, the concept of the metropolis effectively expresses this integration of local governance into circuits of power that operate in a world urban system beyond the municipality as well as the nation state.

The concept of the metropolis is also useful for capturing the asymmetrical qualities of the emerging world urban system and its policing implications. Research on the ‘global city’ identifies London, along with New York and Tokyo, as a particularly powerful node in a world economy that has been transformed, since the 1960s, by the diminishing power of industrial centres in the Global North, particularly in North America, Western Europe and Japan, the accelerated industrialisation of developing countries in the Global South and the rapid internationalisation of the financial services sector (Sassen, 2001, 3). This restructuring, it is argued, has created a new strategic role for major cities such as London as, ‘highly concentrated command points in the organisation of the world economy ... key locations for finance and for specialised service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sectors ... as sites of production of innovations in these leading industries ... and as markets for the products and innovations produced by these leading industries’ (Sassen, 2001, 3-4). As a consequence, global cities project their political, economic and cultural power over other localities and regions as well as nation states. The world economy is substantially influenced by these cities and this, in turn, generates major political tensions between their de facto powers and the sovereignty of nation states that are beholden to global cities yet responsible for the fortunes of other localities in their national jurisdiction. In this regard nation states are confronted with the dilemma of challenging the global cities in their jurisdiction or else subordinating the interests of less powerful localities. As ‘command points’ in the world economy, cities such as London exert considerable influence over the fortunes of other cities in their own countries as well as elsewhere (Massey, 2007). A key implication of this is that social order in global cities and the related challenges for policing and security are inextricably related to their strategic role in the world economy and their particular integration into the evolving world urban system (King, 1990a; b). Specifically, global cities are characterised by increasing social polarisation as middle-income households are replaced by expansion at the high-end of super-remunerated employees in financial services and cognate services (accounting, management consultancy, business analytics etc.) and in the low-wage, precarious and casualised employment sectors supporting these services, ‘The increase in the numbers of expensive restaurants, luxury housing, luxury hotels, gourmet shops, boutiques, French hand laundries, and special cleaners that ornament the new urban landscape illustrates this trend.’ (Sassen, 2001, 9). With the contraction of middle-income households and the accentuation of economic polarisation between the haves and have-nots comes an erosion of social cohesion which, of course, has a direct bearing on policing in these ‘command points’ (ibid.).

From the perspective of much modern criminological thought, this degree of social polarisation is particularly conducive to civil unrest, a growth in illicit markets to compensate for limited access to stable and well-remunerated employment in the official economy, and to increased criminal predation, particularly amongst the
young (Hamnett, 2003, 207-9). However, and notwithstanding the episodic outburst of major incidents of civil unrest, such as the riots across London and other large English cities in August 2011, the official construction of ‘crime and disorder’ in these cities suggests a continuing downward trend that is replicated across Western Europe and in North America (Westfelt & Estrada, 2005). Whether this reflects real world conditions of a genuine ‘crime drop’ or an artefact of official constructs and related reporting and recording practices is an ongoing and fiercely contested debate within social science (Young, 2011). It also reflects the broader point that governance in global cities entails ‘regimes’ that need to be constituted and reproduced and that social science can play a key part in the governmentality of city authorities (Sassen, 2001, 329-344; Stenson, 1998). Such reproduction can include ‘civic boosterism’ by authorities keen to represent their cities as stable, ordered and cohesive places that are attractive to inward investment even while the conditions of social polarisation generated by global cities undermines social integration.

To this end policing occupies a particularly significant position in the constitution and reproduction of urban regimes particularly in those metropolises that generate severe social inequalities and allied conflicts and are sites of major national and international protest as a consequence of their strategic role. It is as a consequence of this role, whether in the international trading networks that constituted various European empires or the transnational state system of the present, that commentators identify how major cities with different histories and cultures have undergone parallel economic and social changes (Sassen, 2001, 4; also King, 1990b, 12-32). An implication of this work is that parallel changes generate common patterns of crime and civil unrest and a convergence in the policing response. Conversely, other commentators concerned with the detailed governance of cities in Europe and North America have emphasised the governing arrangements that equip cities with the capacity to resist and adapt to social and economic change in diverse ways (Stoker & Mossberger, 1994; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Mouleart et al., 2007).

Whereas much of the literature on global cities has emphasised the social and economic determination of their role as ‘command points’, studies of urban governance have emphasised the political mediation of these forces and opportunities for governing otherwise. Advocates of ‘urban regime theory’ note the analytical importance of governing arrangements for explaining how particular cities can pursue alternative trajectories. The classic statement of this is Stone’s (1989) account of how Atlanta bucked the trend of white flight and the loss of economic investment in cities found elsewhere in the southern states of the United States of America following the gains of the civil rights movement in the 1960s and the consequent electoral power that voters in the African American population were able to exercise. Stone argues this was accomplished through the actors, resources and schemes of co-operation that coalesced around a progressive (redistributive) economic policy agenda in that city. Of course there are limits to the redistributive policy agendas pursued by governing coalitions that seek to enrol rather than challenge corporate power through such co-operative schemes. Although the Atlanta study was ultimately pessimistic about the possibilities for accomplishing the more transformative, ‘large purpose’, policy goals of social justice agendas, the broader
analytical significance of urban regime theory is its emphasis on constituting and reproducing governing coalitions through the political agency to negotiate the enrolment of actors representing different electoral constituencies as well as those with the economic ‘power to’ actually deliver governing programmes (see also Mollenkopf, 2010). In this regard, the failure to consolidate any stable regime in conditions where there is no overall control of urban governance is as plausible an outcome as the successful subordination of social justice agendas to the interests of corporate power. Again, policing is a central concern within this broader problematic given the challenges of responding to problems of crime and insecurity in conditions of governing drift. Specifically, urban regime theory provides a suite of middle-range concepts that can inform the investigation of any parallel experiences in the policing of European metropolises and, subsequently, help to build explanations of any significant divergences observed through the Policing European Metropolises Project. In the remainder of the paper, the core concepts of urban regime theory are outlined and then illustrated through reference to the challenges of policing in contemporary London.

3. Policing and Urban Regime Theory

Urban regime theory supports an analytical focus on the governing arrangements that coalesce, reproduce or collapse in particular localities (Stone, 2005). It argues that the struggle over the ‘power to’ govern entails the formation of coalitions of state organisations with electoral mandates to rule and other corporate and non-governmental organisations that can provide the financial, informational and organisational resources to actually deliver on these mandates. As such, regime theory recognises that governing coalitions inhabit economic as well as political environments that can enable as well as constrain their power to govern. A key contribution of regime theory is to recognise this structural dimension whilst acknowledging the agency of governing coalitions, the acumen, guile and leadership of coalitions which can, in turn, inform a comparative understanding of the uneven adaptation of urban governance to global pressures in the political and economic environment (Mouleart et al., 2007). Governing coalitions are thus forged around policy agendas and through various ‘schemes of co-operation’ or bargains between the parties interested in a particular policy agenda. An example of a political-economic bargain taken from urban regime analysis in the United States is the offer of tax concessions to ‘leverage’ corporate investment into a city and to use tax revenues from this investment to fund redistributive social policies (Stone, 2005). If these bargains are sustained, at least over a term of office, they can stabilise into a governing regime, otherwise coalitions may collapse and either be replaced by competing regimes or by a drift into prolonged periods of regime failure. In the extreme, the failure to form and stabilise a regime can result in a governing vacuum in which the delivery of core public services, such as schooling, healthcare and public safety, is degraded for all but those who can access alternative, commercial or voluntary, provision.
Within this analytical focus on the inter-dependencies of state, market and civil society, regime theorists have distinguished four basic types of regime (Stone, 2005). ‘Maintenance regimes’ seek to maintain the status quo of an established policy agenda. Where maintenance regimes encounter crises of rationality and legitimacy\(^1\), however, opportunities for regime change emerge. ‘Developmental regimes’ work with established governing coalitions and their core policy agendas but seek to augment these. Alternatively, ‘progressive regimes’ seek to reform policy agendas and advance alternative core objectives. Finally, it is possible to identify ‘transformative regimes’, which seek to alter the context of major public policy problems as well as advancing alternative core objectives, for example, social justice programmes aimed at reducing the gross social inequalities of wealth and opportunity amongst urban populations which have been identified by some as generators of other social problems such as ill-health, low educational attainment and violence (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009; Dorling & Thomas, 2011).

An initial attempt to apply these analytical distinctions to policing and public safety conceptualises maintenance regimes as those which privilege criminal justice policy agendas (Edwards & Hughes, 2012). What is being maintained is the idea of crime as a problem for specialist modern bureaucracies, ‘the police’, enforcing criminal law and maintaining order in concert with the criminal courts and penal institutions. Whilst they remain predominant, certainly in Europe, the ‘punitive display’ of these regimes has encountered periodic crises of rationality and legitimacy over the past four decades, particularly in those societies where increased investment in state policing and imprisonment resulted in negligible reductions in volume crime and/or in public perceptions of a reduction in such crime (Garland, 2001). The perception has been that ‘nothing works’ (Martinson, 1974) or, more recently, that criminal justice agendas actually generate further crime and civil unrest (Wacquant, 2009). Developmental regimes can be conceptualised as those which seek to maintain this core policy agenda but complement it through innovations in the anticipation and management of groups ‘at risk’ of offending and victimisation. They are characterised by policy agendas that promote reductions in the situational opportunities for commissioning criminal offences, early interventions with individuals and families whose behaviour and lifestyles are believed to be ‘criminogenic’ and prudential inducements to private citizens to take

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\(^1\) One means of building explanations for the conditions under which regime change may occur is through reference to the rationality and legitimacy crises encountered by governing authorities in capitalist liberal democracies (Habermas, 1973; Offe, 1984). Here rationality crisis refers to the ‘persistent difficulties’ encountered by these authorities in reconciling increasing demands on public services forced to shoulder the increasing costs of production and welfare with the conditions for further capital accumulation. In the absence of new circuits of accumulation that can maintain social investment, public confidence in the governing capacity of authorities is undermined generating further demands for provision that, if unmet, can escalate into a broader crisis of the legitimacy for these authorities. The contribution of regime theory is to build explanations of how these unevenly experienced crises can be managed, if not reversed, by the political leadership of governing coalitions. As discussed below, the MOPAC 20:20:20 agenda epitomises the attempt to manage ‘public confidence’ in policing in London in conditions of fiscal crisis.
greater responsibility for their own personal security and possessions (O’Malley, 1992; Clarke, 2004).

Another, globally influential, response to the perceived crises of criminal justice has been the ‘restorative justice’ movement seeking to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders through non-state conflict resolution, diverting offenders from custody and directly negotiating reparations between victims and offenders (Johnstone, 2011). Policy agendas prioritising restorative justice can be conceptualised as progressing beyond, not simply developing, criminal justice agendas (Braithwaite, 1989). It is possible to detect a further, distinctive, policy agenda that has emerged over the past three decades, particularly in Western European countries, that seeks to replace criminal justice with social justice policy goals. Concepts of ‘urban security’, ‘integral security’ and, in the Anglophone world, ‘community safety’ have been used by transformative regimes to locate crime and civil unrest as problems of social and economic policy (European Journal of Criminology, 2013). They have been used to relate crime and civil unrest to the extension of citizens’ entitlements to improved education, training, employment, housing, health, leisure and family support, by improving adult health and safety at work, by targeting corporate and environmental crimes as well as street crimes and by facilitating citizen engagement with government (Croall, 2009; Edwards & Hughes, 2012, 448; Edwards et al., 2013).

The concepts of regime theory are better understood as abstractions aimed at diagnosing the principal orientation of policy responses to crime and civil unrest in cities. In practice, actual urban security regimes are likely to be characterised by admixtures of criminal, restorative and social justice agendas as well as experiments in risk management reflecting the ongoing political competition, premised on the instrumental furtherance of bureaucratic interests as well as ideological motivation, to advance policy agendas and stabilise governing coalitions (Edwards & Hughes, 2005). To reiterate, an outcome of this competition can be the failure to secure a coalition and a coherent policy agenda particularly in turbulent political and economic environments such as the global financial crisis that broke in 2008 and the subsequent prolonged downturn in economic activity characterised by some as the ‘Great Recession’ (Wessell, 2010). For the purposes of this article, the Great Recession provides the broader temporal frame of reference for understanding the contemporary policing of European metropolises. How are urban political authorities responding to an economic environment constraining public expenditure and their financial ‘power to’ govern, particularly in wealthier cities of North Western Europe that are attracting significant inward migration of people and other pressures on their critical infrastructure?

4. Policing London: a developmental agenda?

Using the concepts of urban regime theory it can be argued that policing in London can be characterised as part of a developmental regime that the incumbent Mayor, Boris Johnson, has sought to establish since his election to this office in 2008 and more specifically since January 2012 when he assumed responsibility for setting
the strategic direction of policing in the UK capital. This new role for the elected Mayor of London represents a major shift in the structure of policing governance both in the capital and across England and Wales with the establishment of elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) for each police service area. The PCCs were introduced as a consequence of the first major piece of legislation on policing passed by the Conservative-Liberal Democratic ‘Coalition Government’ formed after the UK national election of May 2010. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 provides for the election of PCCs for four year fixed terms of office and empowers Commissioners with the responsibility for formulating a Police and Crime Plan for their term of office. This plan sets out the strategic priorities that Commissioners have for policing and their use of these to hold chief police officers accountable for their performance. In turn, PCCs are accountable to the electorate in each police service area and are obliged to consult the public about the strategic priorities for policing in their area. In London the role of the PCC is fulfilled by the Mayor. Shortly after assuming this responsibility in January 2012 and establishing the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), Mayor Johnson, established the role of Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime (DMPC) and delegated his responsibilities to his first Deputy, Stephen Greenhalgh, who assumed office in June 2012. This constitutional change shifted political responsibility for policing in London to MOPAC from the Home Secretary of the nationally elected UK government, who previously was responsible for appointing the chief officer, the Commissioner, of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the main policing body for Greater London. A smaller, separate police force, the City of London Police, serves the financial services district of the capital as well as assuming national responsibility for policing frauds. The MOPAC Police and Crime Plan provides a useful analytical starting point for a regime analysis of contemporary policing in Greater London.

Making London a safer city was a central theme of Mayor Johnson’s re-election campaign for his second term of office (2012 – 2016) and in the first annual report of MOPAC he announced that the mission for policing London is to create ‘a metropolis considered the greatest and safest big city on earth’ (MOPAC, 2013b, 12). To this end, Mayor Johnson introduced the ‘20:20:20 Challenge’ as his ‘bold strategic objective’ to be realized in three years and by the end of his second term of office in 2016:

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As a separate organisation primarily concerned with policing the financial services district of London including the vulnerability of these services to international threats such as cybercrime, the City of London Police has its own distinctive governing arrangements that operate outside of the powers provided by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. The City of London Police has no elected PCC and its chief police officers are accountable to the ‘Court of Common Council’ of the City of London which is comprised of elected representatives from the City’s 25 electoral wards, see: http://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/about-us/your-right-to-information/Pages/Police-Authority.aspx, accessed 6th June 2014. The City of London Police has its own Police and Crime Plan for 2014 – 2017. Whilst the predominant focus of this article is on the MOPAC Plan for policing Greater London, issues of policing and crime in the City of London, including issues of currency exchange fraud, have a wider impact on the political-economy of London as a whole.
The policing challenge is to cut seven key, high-volume neighbourhood crimes by 20%, boost public confidence in the police by 20%, and cut costs at the MPS by 20% and save £500 million; and the criminal justice goals to seek swifter justice for victims by reducing delays in the criminal justice system by 20%, achieve surer justice by increasing compliance with community sentences by 20%, and to reduce reoffending by young people leaving custody in London by 20%. (MOPAC, 2013a, 9).

As an agenda-setting statement, the 20:20:20 Challenge encapsulates the strategic dilemma of achieving ambitious targets in the present context of ‘austere’ reductions in public expenditure. Along with the establishment of PCCs, the decision by the national Coalition Government to pursue an aggressive programme of public expenditure cuts, in particular reductions in the core funding that national government provides local government in the UK, has resulted in the other major structural change in the political and economic environment of policing in London. In keeping with the grand narrative of the Coalition Government, the 20:20:20 agenda argues that substantial reductions in public expenditure can act as a catalyst for more effective governance rather than the more intuitive conclusion that they will result in a serious degradation of governing capacity (Edwards & Hughes, 2012). The presumption here is that previous expenditure was inflated by investment in self-serving ‘big government’ and that there is plenty of slack in the budgets of public services, including policing, which can be cut into without any deleterious effect on the quality of service provision. On the contrary, austerity compels ‘smarter’ public services that can deliver more for less. It is in these terms that the 20:20:20 agenda can be characterized as developmental as, for reasons elaborated below, this agenda continues to frame problems of policing and crime in terms of criminal justice whilst augmenting this agenda with allegedly smarter forms of governance and risk management.

Central to this claim is the official construction of crime trends in London and elsewhere in England and Wales, which have registered year-on-year falls during the post-2008 ‘Great Recession’ and despite the substantial post-2010 cutbacks in public expenditure. In welcoming the national figures on reductions in officially recorded crime in July 2013, the head of the UK Coalition Government, Prime Minister Cameron, identified the adoption of ‘smarter policing’, which makes greater use of information technologies to better monitor and target the geographical and temporal distribution of crime, as a key factor behind this apparent success story. The much vaunted ‘crime drop’ is, of course, a broader phenomenon of criminology across Western liberal democracies since the mid-1990s when, according to official registers of crime, the upward trend witnessed for both personal and property crimes from the mid-1950’s leveled off (Westfelt & Estrada, 2005) prior to a sustained downward trend (Young, 2011). Given the centrality of this official

construction to arguments about the benefits of ‘austerity’ for good governance, it is worth exploring the 20:20:20 agenda in greater detail.

The MOPAC Police and Crime Plan was initially formulated through a series of ‘Challenge meetings’ in the Autumn of 2012 during which time the DMPC and other MOPAC officers received expert testimonies on the problems of policing and crime in the capital. The draft Plan was then circulated for public consultation during the first quarter of 2013, involving town hall meetings in each of the 32 boroughs or municipal authorities that constitute local government in Greater London, generating, in turn, a number of often detailed responses, particularly from civil servants and elected councillors in these boroughs. This consultation also involved a survey of 4,222 Londoners conducted in March 2013. An executive summary of headline themes from the public consultation and the response from MOPAC was published in March 2013 along with the final draft Police and Crime Plan for 2013 – 16. This digital archive provides a useful empirical resource for investigating the 20:20:20 agenda and monitoring public debates about its progress throughout Mayor Johnson’s second term of office. At the time of writing, less than a third of the period of the MOPAC Police and Crime Plan had been completed and the renowned limitations of studying the exercise of political power through a focus on decision-making arenas alone needs to be acknowledged. Even so, what is said in the ‘MOPAC arena’ and its associated archive provides a starting-point for a regime analysis and a means of generating better questions for the kind of comparative research aimed at by the Policing European Metropolises Project. Taking each aspect of the 20:20:20 challenge in turn, this archive provides an

4 Verbatim minutes of these meetings are published on the MOPAC website at: http://www.london.gov.uk/priorities/policing-crime/how-we-work/mopac-challenge, accessed on 30th May 2014.
8 In addition to verbatim transcripts of the MOPAC Challenge meetings, these meetings are broadcast live over the internet and copies of these ‘webcasts’ are archived for public view at: http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/mayor/webcasts
9 Notably Bachrach and Baratz (1963) argument that studying decision-making arenas can obscure the importance of ‘non-decisions’ or how political actors can mobilise certain issues and interests off the agenda under observation. In turn Luke’s (1974) ‘third face’ of power notes the importance of how actors can self-censor the assertion of causes, problems and interests whose advocacy is unthinkable in particular political contexts. An example of this in the context of policing and the forty year ‘war on drugs’ in the UK is the self-censoring of politicians interested in the decriminalisation of class A narcotics, such as heroin and cocaine, as part of a harm reduction approach to substance misuse. Of course the investigation of differences between what is decided, not decided and what is actually done in practice requires a more ethnographic immersion in particular political contexts to research governance ‘in action’. Having acknowledged these limitations, however, we think the documentary analysis of this digital archive provides a justifiable starting point for a regime analysis of policing in London and an important means of generating better questions for researching the political-economy of urban policing in the city.
insight into the justification of the proposed reductions in crime and expenditure and measures to improve public confidence.

4.1. Crime reduction

The MOPAC Police and Crime Plan prioritises a 20 percent reduction in seven high volume neighbourhood crime types, the ‘MOPAC 7’ (MOPAC, 2013b, 6):

- Violence with Injury
- Robbery
- Burglary
- Theft of a Motor Vehicle
- Theft From a Motor Vehicle
- Theft From the Person, and;
- Vandalism

At the MOPAC Challenge meeting of 2nd October 2012 at which these priorities were first publicly stated, their selection was justified by the MOPAC Head of Pan-London Policing and Crime Strategy, Siobhan Coldwell:

The crime types that we have selected have been selected because they are fully understood, they are high-volume, have a sizeable impact and are all victim-based offences. (MOPAC, 2012, 2)

In the Summary of headline themes from the Police and Crime Plan consultation 2013 provided by MOPAC, it was noted that:

Respondents felt that it was important that MOPAC and the MPS work closely with boroughs to ensure that targets are appropriate at a local level, and with partners particularly around wider criminal justice system related targets. Although respondents acknowledged the importance of tackling youth reoffending as set out in the plan, they felt that there should also be a focus on work with adults and young adults (i.e. up to the age of 25 years) to prevent further offending.

Some specific issues were raised that respondents felt should be developed in the plan including violence against women and girls, domestic and sexual violence, hate crime, victim and witness care and satisfaction, anti-social behaviour (particularly involving vulnerable victims), drug dealing, street prostitution, gangs, gun and knife crime, cybercrime and theft of bicycles.

Respondents felt that it was also important to consider more qualitative indications of performance rather than simply ‘hard’ target measures, and to ensure the quality of data against which targets are measured. Respondents called for some more information including the evidence base for targets and how work towards them will be carried out at a time of decreasing budgets, clarity around police officer numbers included in the plan and the data against which targets will be baselined. Respondents felt that the plan should be reviewed regularly in consultation with the public, and that MOPAC
and the MPS should keep Londoners up to date with progress towards targets in the plan (MOPAC, 2013c, 2).

In their response to these concerns, MOPAC argued:

The targets in the plan have not changed. The Mayor understands the challenges presented by setting targets including the risk that targets create perverse incentives, and that not setting targets in specific priority areas, gives the impression that an area is no longer a priority.

In relation to the crime targets:
• By setting a target for the 7 priority crime types identified in the plan, the Mayor is signalling his ambition to deliver continued crime reduction in London. He has specifically excluded certain crime types because there is significant under-reporting, or because they are indicators of police activity.
• The Mayor has decided against setting interim targets – he has established the outcome he is seeking, but believes the Commissioner is best placed to decide how the target should be achieved. For this reason he also has no intention of setting borough level targets.
• There is a clear link between the plan and the priorities identified by Londoners. MOPAC and the MPS regularly consult with Londoners on their crime priorities. MOPAC will regularly publish information that demonstrates progress against key aspects of the plan and will produce an annual report in April/May each year.
• On behalf of the Mayor, MOPAC will be working with the MPS to establish a broad performance framework that ensures the Mayor is able to hold the Commissioner to account for delivery across all crime types. Consideration will also be given to user satisfaction, complaints and use of resources in order to gain a rounded view of delivery (MOPAC, 2013c, 2-3).

In addition to this core agenda of reducing high volume neighbourhood crime, the final draft of the MOPAC Police and Crime Plan identified ‘quality of life’ issues, in particular ‘anti-social behaviour’ (ASB), as a priority for the London Crime Reduction Board (LCRB) established by the Mayor to support an evidence-based approach to ‘what works’ (MOPAC, 2013b, 34). It also prioritises other ‘key offences which have a huge impact on victims’ but which ‘currently attract low reporting rates’, particularly ‘domestic violence, rape, other serious sexual offences and hate crime’ (MOPAC, 2013b, 34). As the intention of the Plan is to increase reporting rates whilst also reducing the incidence of these crime types it is argued it is inappropriate to set definite reduction targets (ibid.). Finally, the Plan identifies five other strategic priorities for problems that are high impact if not high volume:

• Tackling gangs and serious youth violence;
• Counter-terrorism;
• Confronting serious and organised crime;
• Taking business crime seriously; and
• Maintaining public order (MOPAC, 2013b, 34-8).
This significant broadening of the urban policing agenda beyond high volume neighbourhood crime reflects the particular challenges confronting London as a global city integrated into a world urban system within which it projects its substantial political, economic and cultural power but, in part as a consequence of this, imports problems of crime and (in)security. For example, commentary on the transition of London’s economy from an industrial city to the ‘command centre’ for global financial services has catalogued the consequences of this for social polarisation in its labour and housing markets, the implications of this for social exclusion, particularly amongst the young, and the relationship of this to patterns of crime and civil unrest (Sassen, 2001, 251-323; Hamnett, 2003, 207-9; Massey, 2007, 71-2).

The relationship between social class composition, (im)mobility in labour and housing markets and patterns of street crime and disorder is a long-standing theme of research into ‘policing the working-class city’ (Cohen, 1979), which documents the major resistance the Metropolitan Police experienced in the initial decades of its existence from male and female, young and older, residents of working class neighbourhoods. Local newspapers regularly reported pitched battles and violent stand-offs between these residents and Metropolitan Police patrols, invariably in response to police attempts to regulate street-life in these neighbourhoods, particularly alcohol consumption, gambling and prize-fighting. Cohen documents how the disciplinary function of the Metropolitan Police altered after the First World War as the working class itself became fractured into ‘respectable’, upwardly mobile, residents more inclined to consent to, if not demand, more policing and a ‘disrespectful’, resistant, residuum of young unemployed or casually employed males. After this time, reports of violent clashes in working class neighbourhoods emphasised the conflict between police patrols and young males, often ‘costermongers’ or ‘barrow boys’ involved in unlicensed street trading. Subsequent research documents the re-composition of this struggle to occupy and regulate street life, in particular its ‘racialisation’ following various waves of immigration from former territories of the British Empire and the establishment of neighbourhood ‘front lines’ on which the young, predominantly male, members of migrant communities confronted the Metropolitan Police (Hall et al., 1978; Keith, 1993). From this longer historical perspective, the MOPAC priority of ‘tackling gangs and serious youth violence’ is but the latest instance of this struggle although there is a vigorous debate over the distinctiveness of contemporary violent street crime in London.

Official accounts, in particular the London Crime Reduction Board’s ‘Anti-Gangs Strategy’, argue the distinctive quality of contemporary street violence arises out of its relationship to the burgeoning and lucrative drugs trade, its organised and premeditated qualities, including turf or ‘postcode’ wars amongst youth gangs, and the lethal weaponisation of conflict amongst gangs and with the MPS (London Crime Reduction Board, 2012). Critics argue that the framing of this problem in terms of ‘guns, gangs and knife’ (‘GGK’) crime entails the naïve import of North American policing concepts which may or may not provide an adequate representation of urban policing problems in American cities but certainly misrepresents the more complex organisation and spontaneity of street violence in London and other British cities (Hallsworth & Young, 2008; Hallsworth & Silverman, 2009).
Of particular importance in this critical literature is the argument that ‘gang talk’ foregrounds enforcement strategies whilst abstracting street violence from its social and economic contexts of poverty, diminishing welfare provision and exclusion from legitimate labour markets, thereby obviating social policy responses to urban violence. This argument is relevant to the characterisation of contemporary policing in London as a developmental, rather than progressive or transformative, regime that augments a core policy agenda of criminal justice responses with stratagems for the targeting and management of ‘at risk’ groups, as epitomised by the work of the MPS ‘Trident Gang Command Units’ 10.

Significantly ‘gang talk’ represents an important epistemological break with previous official constructions of street violence in London, most notably Lord Scarman’s inquiry into the Brixton disorders of April 1981 and subsequent riots in other English cities that year (Scarman, 1981). In this report, Lord Scarman dedicated an entire chapter to the relevance of ‘Social Policy’ responses to address the social and economic foundations of urban violence (Scarman, 1981, 100-112). Thirty years on and in marked contrast, the major outbreak of rioting in London in August 2011, which unlike previous episodes was not contained within a particular neighbourhood but spread rapidly across the capital, warranted only an inquiry into the ‘rules of engagement’, or the capacity of the police to respond to the scale and scope of the violence (HMIC, 2011). Again, this relatively narrow framing of the problem as one for police and other ‘blue-light’ emergency services rather than of urban governance *per se* is a signature of a developmental regime. Rather, it was left to the independent inquiry launched by the Guardian newspaper and by researchers at the London School of Economics and Political Science to re-frame the August 2011 events as problems of social inequality and conflict. The report of this inquiry, *Reading the Riots* (Guardian/LSE, 2011) entails testimonies from participants in the riots and from other key informants in the affected boroughs which suggest the events of August 2011 were an escalation of the mundane, everyday, animosities between MPS patrol officers and ‘suspect’ street populations. The immediate trigger for the disorders was the failure of the MPS to communicate with the family of Mark Duggan a young male suspected of carrying a firearm and of being involved in the North London street drugs trade whom the MPS had apprehended and fatally shot in a stop and search operation. In the tradition of the Scarman Report, the *Reading the Riots* research explains the rapid escalation of the Duggan incident into city-wide riots in terms of the ignition of a tinder of mundane street conflicts that persist in a context of social and economic policy failures that leave the police as the first, antagonistic, and last means of state intervention in civil unrest. Subsequent public debate over the controversial uses of stop and search powers by the MPS, in part informed by the Duggan case, led to an announcement by Coalition Government Home Secretary, Theresa May, that these powers are to be overhauled, in particular the Police and Criminal Evidence

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Act Code of Practice A on what constitutes ‘grounds for reasonable suspicion’\(^\text{11}\). Whether this will make much of a difference to mundane street conflicts remains to be seen but for the purposes of our argument, the reduction of these conflicts to the interactional dynamics of police-public encounters is more evidence of the developmental rather than progressive or transformative character of the MOPAC regime. This characterisation is further evidenced by the understanding of the other three ‘high impact but low incidence’ priorities in the MOPAC Plan.

These priorities emphasise the import of major threats to urban security in London as a consequence of the City’s particular integration into global circuits of political, economic and cultural power. Although the bombing of the transport system on 7\(^{th}\) July 2005 was undertaken by British citizens\(^\text{12}\), they had undertaken this action as a protest against UK foreign policy interventions particularly in the Middle East\(^\text{13}\). In response to this action and the subsequent failed bombing attempt on 21\(^{st}\) July 2005, the incumbent Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that the ‘rules of the game’ for counter-terrorist policing had changed\(^\text{14}\). The subsequent Terrorism Act 2006 extended the period in which suspects of terrorism could be held without charge from 14 to 28 days but more specifically the events of July 2005 provoked an increase in the use of police powers to stop and search suspects with major implicaitons for police-public relations in London. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which enables Chief Constables to designate geographical areas in which police officers may routinely stop and search vehicles, passengers, pedestrians and any articles carried by these which could be used in connection with terrorism without any specific grounds for suspicion, was used to designate the whole of Greater London as an area in which these powers could be used. Critics of this very permissive power, in particular the UK civil liberties organisation ‘Liberty’, argued it has been a key factor in the disproportionate stop and search of black and Asian people which, during the ten years before these powers were repealed and replaced by an amendment to section 47a of the Terrorism Act 2000, failed to produce a single successful apprehension whilst exacerbating tensions between the MPS and black and minority ethnic communities in the city\(^\text{15}\). Section

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\(^{12}\) Three of the suicide bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain were residents from the northern English city of Leeds and their fourth accomplice, Germaine Lindsay was from Aylesbury in the southern English county of Buckinghamshire.

\(^{13}\) In a video statement taped ahead of the suicide bombing, Mohammad Sidique Khan stated, ‘Your democratically-elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security you will be our targets and until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.’


47a now requires stop and search powers to be premised on reasonable suspicion but, as discussed above, such is the controversial use of the ‘sus’ laws that a major review of what constitutes reasonable suspicion was announced by Home Secretary May in April 2014. Even so, these revised powers will be used within the broader national ‘CONTEST’ (Counter Terrorism Strategy) published by the UK Coalition Government in July 2011 and led by the MPS\textsuperscript{16}. CONTEST has four basic objectives, derived from the broader European Union counter-terrorism framework, to:

- \textit{Pursue} suspects to stop terrorist attacks;
- \textit{Prevent} people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- \textit{Protect} the public by strengthening their resilience against terrorist attacks; and
- \textit{Prepare} to mitigate the impact of any terrorist attacks that do occur.

The MOPAC Plan adheres to these objectives which, in our terms, can be characterised as developmental rather than progressive or transformative because they foreground intelligence and enforcement operations augmenting these with investment in crisis management and the targeting of groups ‘at risk’ of ‘radicalisation’. As such, CONTEST frames the problem of terrorism in terms of deviant individuals and outsider groups in need of ‘de-radicalisation’ and other initiatives to correct this deviance. What is obviated by this frame is any sense of public policy, in this instance the strategic foreign and economic policy interests of the UK Government, as itself an active ingredient in the provocation of political violence.

The MOPAC Plan also depicts the problem of confronting serious and organised crime as one of outsider groups whose activities, particularly in London’s vice and narcotics markets, need to be ‘disrupted’ and whose proceeds need to be sequestrated (MOPAC, 2013b: 34). The Plan acknowledges the transnational dimension of these problems and the consequent need for authorities in London to liaise with national policing agencies such as the National Crime Agency and the UK Border Agency. Again, this logic, of disrupting markets, seizing criminal proceeds and reducing organised criminal networks, can be characterised as developmental rather than progressive or transformative. The ‘outsider threat’ narrative in public policy responses to this problem has attracted substantial criticism for its neglect of the social and economic conditions that enable and constrain the organisation of serious crimes, even whilst these responses have developed beyond enforcement to include more nuanced interventions in the routines and networks of criminal organisations (Edwards & Gill, 2003; Edwards & Levi, 2008; van Duyne & Vander Beken, 2008).

The other strategic objective of the MOPAC Plan, ‘taking business crime seriously’, represents one of the clearest expressions of London’s integration into a world urban system of policing and crime. The London Stock Exchange is the pre-eminent node in global financial markets which both exports as well as imports...
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major problems of business crime. An exemplar of this is the ‘Libor-fixing scandal’ in which employees of Barclays Bank colluded with employees in other banks to artificially depress or inflate their returns to the daily London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which is the rate of interest at which banks in London lend to each other, in order to either profit from currency trades or boost their creditworthiness. This scandal has been regarded as emblematic of those under-regulated, if not fraudulent, practices of the financial services sector that contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent economic downturn in Europe. Whilst activities on the London Stock Exchange fall directly under the remit of the City of London Police, the reputational damage of businesses as offenders is of relevance to the broader political-economy of London. In relation to such corporate crime, however, the MOPAC Plan is conspicuously silent. It frames the problem of business crime entirely in terms of businesses as victims of fraud, theft or vandalism, rather than as perpetrators of major crimes themselves (MOPAC, 2013b, 35). By contrast, advocates of a more progressive regime would propose a regulatory system aimed at the ‘shaming’ of corporate criminals until they agree adequate restitution to their victims (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1997). In further contrast, an example of a more transformative approach is the European Union’s proposed introduction of a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) by 1st January 2016. This seeks to transform the conditions in which financial service providers are encouraged to illegally manipulate financial markets for advantage. A key aim of the FTT, nick-named the ‘Tobin tax’, is to penalise the ‘shorting’ of currencies, the short-term speculation on currency exchanges that depress a particular currency’s value and subsequently inflate the interest that governments using that currency have to pay on loans from the international bond market. In turn the FTT proposal has been challenged in the European Court of Justice (ECoJ) by the UK Coalition Government on the grounds that it prejudices the economic interests of the City of London. Following the rejection of this challenge by the ECJ as ‘premature’, Mayor Johnson identified the severity of the threat posed by the FTT to London’s economic wellbeing and the ability of the UK, ‘to safeguard its financial services sector.’

In summary, it is tempting to interpret the MOPAC Plan for crime reduction as simply maintaining the status quo of police and criminal justice policies that

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18 After the Nobel Laureate economist James Tobin, who first proposed the idea of penalising short-term speculation on foreign currency markets.
20 Johnson argued, “This judgement beggars belief. With London’s economy buoyant once more and driving the national recovery, the last thing that we need is a barny tax that will stamp on growth and potentially drive businesses to financial centres outside the EU ...This ruling also raises serious questions about how the UK can safeguard its financial services sector given that we are not in the euro.”, in ‘Boris warns City under threat after European Court dismisses UK Tobin tax challenge’, Daily Telegraph, 30th April 2014, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10797997/Boris-warns-City-under-threat-after-European-Court-dismisses-UK-Tobin-tax-challenge.html#source=refresh, accessed 6th June 2014.
prioritise street crimes whilst under-regulating, if not insulating, forms of corporate crime. However, some development of this agenda has been compelled by its crises of rationality and legitimacy\textsuperscript{21} as epitomised in the other two dimensions of the MOPAC 20:20:20 agenda: expenditure and public confidence.

4.2. Expenditure

The most obvious crisis in the rationality of maintaining a criminal justice agenda in London is its cost, particularly in the context of austere public expenditure budgets. In introducing the proposed objective of a 20 per cent reduction in expenditure, the DMPC, Stephen Greenhalgh stated:

\begin{quote}
We know that times are tough and we have to be more efficient than ever before and, therefore, we need to cut costs and see the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) be able to police London with less money to spend (MOPAC, 2012, 2).
\end{quote}

Pressed about the realistic character of this objective at the October 2012 Challenge Meeting the chief officer of the MPS, Commissioner Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe noted:

\begin{quote}
As the Deputy Mayor has already said, to reduce the resources at the same time as expecting more is always a challenge, but I am confident that we can achieve that. We have made a good start and we have already shown some good progress and we do not know what the next four years will hold, but what we can see, even over the last few weeks and months, even though we have had the Jubilee, the Olympics and the Paralympics, performance has still improved. We will start to see a reduction in resources over the next few years, so that will be where the challenge will kick in but I am confident we can do it (MOPAC, 2012, 3).
\end{quote}

In response to concerns raised about the impact of budget reductions on public safety in London that were raised during the public consultation about its Plan, MOPAC argued that whilst, ‘The grant from the Home Office is reducing ... The cuts being proposed aim to allow MOPAC/MPS to absorb the cuts’ (MOPAC, 2013c, 3). More specifically, this response argued that front-line policing would be protected in acknowledgement of public concerns to see a more visible police presence on the streets, officers that are dedicated to particular neighbourhoods, in particular the ‘Safer Neighbourhood Teams’ (SNTs) and who can maintain high response rates to calls for assistance:

\begin{quote}
The proposals laid out in the Police and Crime plan are aimed at ensuring police numbers are kept high. No changes have been made to numbers or to the model but the plan is more specific about how MOPAC will ensure it is properly implemented.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{21} See footnote 1.
It should be noted for clarity, that the additional numbers are full time officers, not specials (MOPAC, 2013c, 4).

The MOPAC Plan states that the 20% reduction of £500m to the overall MPS budget of £2bn per annum, by 2016 whilst increasing front-line officers involved in a ‘Local Policing Model’ (from 24,000 to 26,000 officers), will be accomplished through savings in ‘back office functions’. Three specific dimensions to this are identified:

- Reducing the number of senior officers of ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) rank by a third and reducing the number of ‘supervisory’ officers (all ranks between sergeant and chief superintendent) by 1,000;
- Releasing under-utilised assets, including the sale of 200 of the 497 buildings owned by the MPS involving fewer but better sited neighbourhood police stations offering more efficient ‘front counter provision’; and
- Reducing overheads through a 5% reduction in the costs of support services including a £60m reduction to the current £200m spent on IT services (MOPAC, 2013b, 44-6).

A more detailed reading of responses to the public consultation on this Plan, particularly those from borough councils with particularly acute problems of neighbourhood crime, reveals some of the key tensions between the centralisation of agenda-setting and resource allocation by MOPAC and the need for more devolved, neighbourhood-specific, policing. For example the Borough of Southwark criticised the MOPAC Plan for obscuring the diversity of policing and crime problems across London and the need to tailor the allocation of resources accordingly:

Southwark has the highest level of knife crime and youth related crime and robbery is significantly on the increase, against a London wide overall reduction. Bearing in mind that the plan sets the target of a 20% reduction in a basket of crime indicators, including violence with injury and robbery, we feel that there should be a much clearer correlation between these targets and the police numbers. The crime levels in Southwark, combined with its high density and footfall demand a much greater allocation of resources.

To this end, Southwark and other boroughs re-emphasised the importance of borough-level Community Safety Partnerships, or multi-agency policing arrangements involving the police working in partnership with local government services, health authorities, offender management services and emergency services, which are more cognisant of the concentration of high-volume and high-impact crimes in particular neighbourhoods. The Southwark response criticises the MOPAC Plan for withdrawing effective support for this element of local governance, particularly

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in a context of the multiple pressures on poorer boroughs in London arising out of austerity budgeting and the increased demand for public services generated by labour market and migration patterns in the City:

…it has long been recognised that effective crime reduction is more effective through a strong partnership approach. The changing dynamics for London through the economic recession, migration, immigration and the changes to welfare reform will have a significant impact on crime and anti social behaviour. Community Safety Partnerships will play a crucial role in establishing long term intervention and preventative plans to reduce the impact of the above, ensuring they inform our priorities and goals. Whilst the importance of partnership working is recognised in the overarching priority to, ‘Ensure that all of London’s public service agencies work together and with communities to prevent crime, seek swift and sure justice for victims, and reduce re-offending.’, this does not appear to be … recognised in the objectives and goals.23

The Southwark response broadens the policing and crime agenda beyond the relatively narrow preoccupation of the MOPAC Plan with police and criminal justice responses to crime problems in London, defining these primarily as issues of social and economic policy. From this perspective, savings in the ‘back office functions’ of the MPS and increased investment in visible police patrols are unlikely to reduce the high-volume and high-impact crime problems that are experienced in particular boroughs but masked by the aggregation of crime data at the city-wide level. The obfuscation of this experience by relatively crude indices of offending and victimisation premised on the problematic police recording of those offences reported to them and, in turn, the aggregation of these indices at spatial scales above the neighbourhood is now a well developed theme in social scientific criticism of official crime data. Innovations in neighbourhood household surveys of victimisation in the 1980s, notably the Islington Crime Survey in North London, revealed the dramatic concentration of personal and property crimes in neighbourhoods also characterised by other indices of multiple deprivation (Jones et al., 1986). Secondary data analyses of the British Crime Survey and the Census of Population in the 1990s also revealed the grossly unequal, ‘Lorenz curve’, distribution of personal and property crime, identifying the concentration of multiple and repeat victimisation in the top decile of high crime neighbourhoods which also scored high on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (Hope, 1996; Trickett et al., 1992). It remains a moot point whether the severity of this unequal distribution of volume crime has altered, even if more recent studies suggest real reductions in the incidence of certain crime types such as household burglary and the theft of and from motor vehicles (Tilley, Tseloni & Farrell, 2011).

These esoteric arguments over the multi-level modelling and measurement of crime at the neighbourhood level now have a major significance beyond the academic research community. The political uses of official crime data by MOPAC and the UK Coalition Government, to suggest that ‘smarter policing’ has accomplished genuine

23 Ibid.
reductions in crime in a context of austere public expenditure cuts, provokes a major public controversy over the trustworthiness of intelligence sources about crime and policing in the capital. The stakes are high given broader political-economic arguments about the necessary, damaging or beneficial consequences of austerity for urban governance. Advocates of austerity, including MOPAC, argue 20% cuts to expenditure are a necessary consequence of the unsustainable budgets passed by previous administrations and, more generally, the contradictions between increased expenditure on public administration and economic growth. It is therefore of high political salience to argue that public sector expenditure and private sector growth can be ‘re-balanced’ without incurring major damage to public services and harm to the most vulnerable communities relying on these services. In this context, the alleged ‘crime drop’ in the capital for all but one of the ‘MOPAC 7’ targets, as registered in the downward trend in MPS recorded crime, is part of an unfolding national political argument about the success of the UK Coalition Government’s austerity policy. Declining crime rates, along with increased employment during Mayor Johnson’s tenure, are cited to discredit political opponents of austerity and the more profound restructuring of relations between state, market and civil society signalled by this policy. In this context, the recent scandal over crime recording in the MPS represents more than a dispute over whether and how particular reports of crime from the public are registered as it calls into question the confidence the public can have in the raw data being used to monitor and justify the MOPAC agenda.

4.3. Public confidence

In announcing the target of increasing public confidence in the MPS, Deputy Mayor Greenhalgh stated:

*It is not enough just cutting crime, we clearly do want to see the 20% boost in public confidence. I was surprised by this but the Metropolitan Police Service is not near the top quartile, it is about 26th out of two forces nationally for public confidence. Clearly*
we would love to see that leap up the table and we have set a very challenging target of 75% (MOPAC, 2012, 2).

In response to the public consultation on this target, MOPAC acknowledged that:

Confidence is measured by the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW). The MPS does not perform well when compared to other forces. The Mayor’s aspiration is that Londoners have high confidence in the MPS and this is reflected in this target. Allied to this, the MPS has the lowest victim satisfaction. Londoners deserve better, so the Mayor has put forward several proposals aimed at improving victim satisfaction (MOPAC, 2013c, 3).

In the final draft of the Police and Crime Plan, MOPAC elaborate on their perception of the key drivers behind low public confidence in the MPS and the need for reforms to the status quo. These capture some of the key acts of commission and omission that can undermine public confidence and clarify the significance of various scandals that have challenged the legitimacy of the MPS. However, the treatment of these by MOPAC also helps to further clarify the characterisation of the 20:20:20 agenda as a developmental rather than maintenance, progressive or transformative regime. The Plan identifies four areas of reform:

- Effectiveness in dealing with crime – responding to emergencies; tackling and preventing crime; supporting victims and witnesses; providing a visible presence; and policing public events.
- Engagement with the community – committed to and engaged with the community; listening, understanding and dealing with their concerns; and delivering on their promises.
- Fair treatment – treat people fairly and respectfully; be helpful, friendly and approachable.
- Alleviating local anti-social behaviour – reducing and being seen to address local disorder. (MOPAC, 2013b, 38).

The Plan acknowledges the need to improve public confidence in being able to report crimes to the police and to this end proposes methods to ease the process for reporting offences known for significant under-reporting, such as sexual assaults, hate crime and crimes against business. These include the use of ‘smart phone applications’ enabling people to report crimes remotely and the use of ‘third parties’, such as Rape Crisis Centres. The Plan also recognises ‘historic failures to record crimes reported the MPS’ and proposes more ‘robust crime recording practices’ in line with recommendations from the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) (MOPAC, 2013b, 39). However, the subsequent report of the Parliamentary Public Administration Select Committee’s (PASC) investigation into crime reporting, published in April 2014, criticised the MPS for failing to recognise the institutional conditions for these historic failures:
40. The disparities between different police forces in the ‘no-crime rates’ for rapes and sexual offences are sufficient in our view to raise serious concerns about the varying approaches taken by police forces to recording and investigating these horrendous crimes. We look forward to the outcome of the research commissioned by the Metropolitan Police examining the force’s ‘no crime’ decisions in respect of sexual offences.

41. The fact that this research is necessary, following the 2008 Independent Police Complaints Commission report into the Sapphire Unit is a damning indictment of police complacency, inertia and lack of leadership.

Consequently, the PASC report recommended a transformation in recording practices:

42. The Home Office must undertake a comprehensive analysis in order to explain the extraordinary disparities in no-crime rates for sexual offences across all police forces. ... This should lead to work to improve the accuracy transparency and reliability of police recorded sexual offences so that a table of no crime rates does not suggest systemic inconsistency in recording practices (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2014, paras. 40-42).

In his evidence to the PASC inquiry, HM Inspector of Constabulary Tom Winsor commented that performance management cultures were a key factor in crime recording practices:

The fact is in anything that gets measured, once those who are being measured, whose performance are being measured, work out how the system works, there’s an incentive, resisted by many, to manipulate the process as to make your own performance look good27.

The MOPAC Plan also identifies a need to improve public confidence through better ‘supporting victims and witnesses’ particularly those suffering repeat victimisation. It proposes an independent and comprehensive analysis of support services across London, a requirement for the Commissioner of the MPS to target programmes aimed at ‘improving the reduction of victimisation in key areas such as anti-social behaviour, hate crime and violence against women and girls’ and to ‘outline plans to ensure that every frontline police officer including responders are trained on how to respond to reports of under-reported and more complex crime types such as violence against women and girls’ (MOPAC, 2013, 40).

Conspicuous by its absence in the MOPAC Plan, however, is reference to the ongoing scandal of the service provided to the family of the murdered teenager Stephen Lawrence and its symbolic importance for the broader politics of ethnicity

and policing in London. The 1998 Macpherson inquiry into the investigation of Lawrence’s murder, following an attack by a group of white youths in South London in April 1993, criticised the MPS for its ‘institutional racism’ arguing that the mishandling of the murder investigation by MPS detectives could not be reduced to the actions of individual officers but were part of a culture of discrimination against victims from black and minority ethnic communities in the city. The damage to relationships between the MPS and these communities by this case was reignited following the publication in March 2014 of The Stephen Lawrence Independent Review into possible corruption and the role of undercover policing in the Lawrence case. The barrister Mark Ellison QC was commissioned by Home Secretary Theresa May to undertake this review following revelations in the Guardian newspaper from an undercover MPS officer, Peter Francis, that he had, as part of his role in the MPS ‘Special Demonstration Squad’ (SDS), been asked by senior officers to find information that could discredit the Lawrence family, Duwayne Brooks (Lawrence’s friend and witness to his murder) and the campaign group established to seek justice for the Lawrence family. As a consequence of the Ellison inquiry, accusations of criminality and misconduct on behalf of the SDS in relation to the Lawrence case have now been included in the remit of the ongoing Operation Herne, established in October 2011 to investigate SDS activities during the 1968 – 2008 period of the SDS’s existence, in which it infiltrated and reported on ‘groups concerned in violent protest’. Findings from the Ellison review, described by Prime Minister Cameron as ‘profoundly shocking’, included ‘clear defects’ in the disclosure of information from the MPS to the Macpherson Inquiry and reasonable grounds for suspecting that one of the MPS detectives in the original investigation had been in the pay of a renowned criminal and father of one of the prime suspects in Lawrence’s murder. A consequence of these revelations was the announcement in June 2014 that the Independent Police Complaints Commission would launch a new inquiry into police corruption in the Lawrence investigation.

For critics of policing in London, the Lawrence case provides evidence that conflict between the MPS and black and minority ethnic communities in the city is driven by policy decisions as much as the interactional dynamics of police-public encounters on the street or during serious criminal investigations (Lea, 2002). In turn this provokes a more profound set of questions about the institutional basis to these conflicts and the need for more transformative policy responses. In this regard

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the deaths of Ian Tomlinson\(^{31}\) and John Charles de Menezes\(^{32}\) can be regarded, along with the scandals of the Lawrence case and the revelations of the Leveson Inquiry\(^{33}\), as symbols of a broader crisis in public confidence in the MPS that is irreducible to particular events considered in isolation from one another. This point was made forcibly by Home Secretary May in her address to the annual conference of the Police Federation in which she linked these scandals in identifying, ‘a time of great difficulty for policing’:

In the last few years, we have seen the Leveson Inquiry. The appalling conclusions of the Hillsborough independent panel. The death of Ian Tomlinson and the sacking of PC Harwood. The ongoing inquiry by an independent panel into the murder of Daniel Morgan. The first sacking of a chief constable for gross misconduct in modern times. The investigation of more than ten senior officers for acts of alleged misconduct and corruption … Allegations of rigged recorded crime statistics. The sacking of PCs Keith Wallis, James Glanville and Gillian Weatherly after ‘Plebgate’. Worrying reports by the inspectorate about stop and search and domestic violence. The Herne Review into the conduct of the Metropolitan Police Special Demonstration Squad. The Ellison Review into allegations of corruption during the investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence. Further allegations that the police sought to smear Stephen’s family. Soon there will be another judge-led public inquiry into policing.\(^{34}\)

The Home Secretary acknowledged the serious damage to public confidence in the police and the legitimacy of the British model of ‘policing by consent’ as a result

\(^{31}\) Ian Tomlinson was a newspaper vendor who collapsed and subsequently died after being struck by an MPS officer whilst making his way home from work during a mass demonstration against a summit of the G20 advanced industrial nations in London in April 2009. The incident was recorded on a smart phone by a bystander and demonstrated that Tomlinson was struck without provocation. After three years of dispute over the responsibility of the MPS officer, PC Harwood, for causing Tomlinson’s death, Harwood was tried for manslaughter, acquitted by the Jury but then dismissed by the MPS for ‘gross misconduct’ who then paid Tomlinson’s family an undisclosed sum in compensation.

\(^{32}\) John Charles de Menezes was shot and killed by MPS firearms officers in Stockwell tube station on 22nd July 2005 having been mistaken for one of the plotters behind the failed bombing attempt on the London transport system the previous day. In turn this provoked public controversy over the alleged ‘shoot to kill’ policy adopted by the MPS in their counter terrorist Operation Kratos. ‘No impunity’ for shoot-to-kill’, BBC on-line news, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4716645.stm, accessed 6th June 2014.

\(^{33}\) Lord Justice Leveson was appointed as chair of an inquiry into the role of the press and the police in the phone-hacking scandal that broke in summer 2011 following revelations that investigative reporters employed by the media group News International had illegally hacked into the phone messages of the murdered teenager Milly Dowler as well as celebrities and public figures in the UK. Part 2 of the Leveson Inquiry has been postponed until criminal proceedings against these employees, informed by Operation Elveden, have completed including allegations that police officers received improper payments for providing intelligence to journalists. ‘Operation Elveden’, Guardian on-line news, at: http://www.theguardian.com/media/operation-elveden, accessed on 6th June 2014.

of these scandals and a consequent need for ‘the police to change’. However, as we have argued throughout this paper, the character of this proposed change in London, as indicated by the MOPAC Plan, represents the development of a core police and criminal justice agenda rather than any progression beyond, much less a transformation of, this agenda.

5. Interpreting the MOPAC Agenda: towards a developmental regime?

This paper has examined the MOPAC Plan for police and crime in London and indicated why it can be identified as a developmental agenda that acknowledges the need to reform core policy objectives of police and criminal justice whilst falling short of the progressive and transformative policy changes identified by other commentaries on policing in the capital. The further development of this analysis, to explain the formation, stabilisation or failure and subsequent replacement of a regime premised on this agenda implies more intensive case study research. This can better access policing governance ‘in action’, including the ‘non-decisions’ and ‘self-censorship’ of policy actors outside of the MOPAC arena. In these terms, regime theory identifies three core questions:

• How are coalitions, typically including both governmental and non-governmental actors, formed around a policy agenda?
• What resources for the pursuit of this agenda are brought to bear by members of the governing coalition? and
• In the absence of a system of command, what are the schemes of co-operation through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing?

In reflecting on these questions and by way of a conclusion, the Policing European Metropolises Project also provides an opportunity for comparative research to establish whether the theoretical propositions of regime theory hold in comparable European cities and, insofar as they do, the lessons that can be drawn from such comparisons for policing policy change.

Given its status as a ‘global city’, problems of crime and policing in London need to be understood in terms of the broader political, economic and cultural environment inhabited by MOPAC. These generate certain dilemmas for the strategic direction of policing in the city, in particular the priority that ought to be accorded to neighbourhood problems that, according to findings from the public consultation around the 20:20:20 agenda, preoccupy the Mayor’s electorate or the prioritisation of the high impact but (relatively) low volume problems that have less political salience, such as organised crime, terrorism, business crime and major incidents of public disorder. The Policing European Metropolises Project provides an opportunity for investigating the existence and qualities of this dilemma in comparable

35 Ibid.
European cities. What is the convergence between the MOPAC agenda and the policies prioritised in other European cities? What, if any, are the key divergences and is there an institutional dimension to this? For example does the party political character of urban governance noticeably alter the definition of policy agendas\(^{36}\), the resources allocated to priorities for policing and crime, and the enrolment of commercial and non-governmental organisations into governing coalitions\(^{37}\)? What bargains are struck between elected leaders, the corporate funding they are reliant upon and the broader electoral coalitions they seek to reproduce? In this way the Policing European Metropolises Project can provide a conceptual framework for comparing policing governance ‘in action’.

**Bibliography**


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\(^{36}\) For an historical overview of party politics and policing agendas in London, prior to the Great Recession and Mayor Johnson’s incumbency, see Fletcher and Stenson (2009).

\(^{37}\) In this regard how will attempts to enrol commercial security providers into a developmental regime affect the rationality and legitimacy of the MOPAC agenda? It is too early to know the outcomes of MOPAC’s trialling of ‘payment by results’ schemes, in which commercial and voluntary organisations are contracted to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders but don’t receive payment if their clients reoffend within set periods of time. However, an early and high profile failure of enrolling commercial security into policing responsibilities in London was the inability of G4S, one of the largest commercial security organisations, to deliver on its contract for providing security at the 2012 London Olympic Games, resulting in the costly, emergency, deployment of the military to fulfil these duties (see also, Jones et al., 2009).


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Policing Paris

‘Out of’ or ‘still in’ Napoleonic Time?

Christian Mouhanna
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ABSTRACT

No scholar, policy-maker or practitioner of policing could be taken seriously who did not acknowledge and take into account the radical transformation which privatization and pluralisation has brought to the field of policing (Jones & Newburn, 2006). Nevertheless, this transformation is largely influenced by the nature of the policing tradition in each nation state. To illustrate this argument a descriptive analysis of plural policing in the metropolis Paris is presented. Being part of the Napoleonic policing tradition in France, Paris takes up a unique political and administrative position which affects its security architecture. It stands out as the most developed example of centralisation and the State’s wish to control its citizens. Despite the observed pluralisation in terms of privatization; Paris is still a ‘state’ in the state. Its Napoleonic tradition largely ‘suppresses’ civil non-commercial initiatives and influences the development of municipal police forces and other public uniformed surveillance agencies in Paris.

Keywords: Paris, plural policing, privatization, policing tradition, security architecture

1. Introduction

Within this special issue on the local reality of policing in European metropolises, Paris cannot be overlooked. Its policing tradition, relying on a high level of State centralization, strongly influences the answer to the central question of this special issue: ‘To what extent is a local police still present in European metropolises and how is this reality linked with other actors in the security field?’ Answering this question implies that we do not concentrate solely on the ‘police apparatus’ but that we need to address a broad ‘policing’ concept which includes formal forms of social
control such as other public uniformed surveillance agencies, private commercial security agencies and civil non-commercial initiatives.

Our descriptive analysis of policing in Paris as a metropolis is inspired by two main concepts which are interrelated: plural policing and citizen participation. Plural policing refers to different actors (such as the army, private security companies, other regulatory authorities, volunteers and citizens) being involved in policing. Crucial in this process is the changing power balance between government, the public police and these other security actors (Bayley & Shearing, 1996; Crawford et al., 2005; Jones & Newburn, 2006). Although the modernity of the concept of plural policing has been relativized (Zedner, 2009), in relation to citizen participation it is a challenge for each nation state. It touches the power relation between citizens and the state, which is rooted in the national police traditions. It brings up the discussion about which role the state can play for citizens who want to take initiative or want to be responsible for their own security. As a result, the manifestations of citizen participation in this category are highly influenced by the legal context of each country.

The main argument of this article is that the nature of the security architecture in Paris these days (in terms of pluralisation and privatisation) is still strongly influenced by the true nature of the policing tradition in France and Paris in particular. The so-called Napoleonic tradition, relying on a strong history of an entrepreneurial state and an instrumental vision on policing, tattoos the current state of plural policing in Paris. Illustrating this does not only implies a geographical or morphological focus but also a historical approach to better understand the impact of the policing tradition on policing Paris today. As a consequence this article has a descriptive nature and relies heavily on documents and published work on policing in Paris. Nevertheless, it should be noted that one of the authors can rely on empirical research in the broad field of policing in the city of Paris (Monjardet & Mouhanna, 2005; Mouhanna, 2002).

We develop our arguments in five parts. In a first part we describe the context of Paris as it is the economic and political centre of France and reflects a diversity in territories, security issues and plural policing. In a second part we describe the political-administrative context of policing Paris and the almightiness of the Police Prefect. Thirdly, we describe the emergence or development of municipal police forces and other public uniformed surveillance agencies in Paris. In a fourth part we pay attention to the position of private commercial security agencies in Paris. Finally, we conclude in relation to our initial question and make some reflections in relation to plural policing and citizen participation in policing Paris.

2. Paris, a French city full of diversity.

Paris is a French commune (town) covering 105 km², with a population of 2.249 million inhabitants in 2011¹, headed by a city Mayor and 20 district Mayors (districts,

¹ Source: Insee http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/bases-de-donnees/recensement/populations-legales/departement.asp?dep=75
or arrondissements, vary considerably both in terms of area and population). The Mayor is elected by the council of Paris, which is elected by the citizens\(^2\). The greater Paris metropolitan area is much more of a ‘mixed bag’, comprising of 10.1 million inhabitants\(^3\), 396 towns of all sizes, each headed by their own mayor with their own authority and duties in matters of security. Socio-demographics differ greatly in Paris. For example, in terms of per capita income, Neuilly-sur-Seine (population of 61,200\(^4\)) is a far cry from Clichy-sous-Bois (population of 30,000\(^5\)), where the 2005 riots originated, with a net annual household income of € 83,835 versus € 15,314\(^6\) respectively. In fact, these 396 communes seem to have very little common ground in terms of wealth, size, or political beliefs. In terms of organisational structure, the city of Paris must be distinguished from the three adjacent, surrounding, 100% built-up ‘départements’ that comprise the so-called ‘petite couronne’, and the four, larger ‘départements’ dubbed ‘grande couronne’, which are undergoing a fast urbanisation process. This whole group makes up the ‘Île-de-France région’ with a population of 11.74 million and a geographical size of 12,000 km\(^2\).

Nowadays, besides security people are worried about economics. A recent survey (2013) shows that the main concerns of people living in Paris are unemployment (56.5%), poverty (26.0%) and crime (13.7%)\(^7\). 15.2% of them (in comparison to 18.5% living in the banlieues) feel that ‘crime is a priority for the government’. Victimization surveys show that people living inside Paris feel more secure although they are more victim of crime than the inhabitants of the banlieues or the limits of the urban area\(^8\). In 2011, 7.2% of the Parisians, 5.7% of the population living in the banlieues and 3.6% of the population living in the limits of the urban area; declared that they had been ‘victim of aggression (theft with violence)’. The figures for ‘theft without violences’ are respectively 15.2%, 7.7% and 5.0%. Nevertheless, 90.9% of the Parisians have found their district ‘safe’ in comparison to 88.3% of the inhabitants of the banlieues. The finding that security is not the only priority in Paris is also reflected in the low votes for the Front National, an extreme right political party which main concern is insecurity and immigration.

**Different ‘territories’**

An important classical subdivision structuring the Paris metropolitan area has to do with the separation between the periphery and downtown. This line separating the city itself from the suburbs used to be in the form of actual walls. Today the physical separation is in the shape of the ‘boulevard périphérique’, a six-lane freeway which

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2 This applies for the District’s mayor as well.
6 Source Insee http://www.insee.fr/fr/bases-de-donnees/esl/comparateur.asp?codgeo=com-93014
8 Id ibid.
surrounds the capital. Furthermore, administrative borders exist in Paris. The city of Paris, enjoying an extremely peculiar status, is itself a ‘département’, distinct from the surrounding ‘petite couronne’ ones (Hauts-de-Seine, Val-de-Marne and Seine-Saint-Denis). Traditionally, suburbs used to be where unwanted populations were relegated (Chevallier, 1958; Merriman, 1994). Throughout the 19th century, new industries built their facilities in the so-called ‘banlieues’ and workers naturally settled there. It gave birth to what would later be dubbed the ‘Red Belt’ as thanks to the working class votes, Socialists and Communists gradually rose to power in the city councils around Paris (Noiriel, 1986). Later on, another type of manpower came from the French colonies to work and settle in the banlieues.

Today, rightly or wrongly, the children and grand-children of these immigrants (of north-African and sub-Saharan extraction mainly) lay at the centre of modern fears (Mucchielli, 2002). To be more precise, the Parisians’ vision is still shaped around the idea of two conflicting worlds: the civilised, pacified city world versus the ‘banlieue’, an unruly place of disorder and confrontation with police forces, filled with idle youths ‘holding up the walls’. In colloquial French, this phrase – tenir les murs – refers to young people hanging out unproductively and typically leaning up against the walls and making a living out of trafficking drugs, stolen goods, stripped-down or even burned-out cars (Kokoreff, 2007). The October-November 2005 riots have but reinforced this view. Beyond the ‘périphérique’ is generally perceived as a ‘ghetto’ (Lapeyronnie, 2008) whose mirror image is Paris as a ‘rich man’s ghetto’ (Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 2008).

This conflict, however, only partially reflects the actual situation, and overlaps with another chasm, just as deep-rooted in history, called social segregation. Social segregation used to be vertical when poorer people had to live in harder-to-access upper floors, turned into horizontal space segregation from 19th century onwards, owing to technical advances such as elevators (Pinol, 2003). Neighbourhoods within Paris then tended to ‘specialise’ socially. Western Paris, more upper class and wealthier, differs from the eastern part of the city, which is traditionally more working class and poorer. While gentrification is undeniably at work in eastern Paris these days, low-income households remain, especially in north-eastern arrondissements where cheap social housing is still available (Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 2004). An administrative euphemism to designate rough urban areas within Paris are the so-called ‘zones urbaines sensibles’ [ZUS]. These zones display similar characteristics as suburban areas such as social housing with a high proportion of immigrants, high unemployment and poverty rates, and various forms of trafficking. The gentrification process stumbles against one major issue. Wealthier families will not send their children to the same schools as ‘such people’ because they are concerned about security and the quality of education (Van Zanten, 2009).

Nevertheless, considering Paris’ banlieues under the prism of poverty alone would be extremely simplistic. Again, drawing an East-West dividing line is a relevant simplification. The north-eastern ‘département’ of Seine Saint Denis can be contrasted to the Hauts de Seine department. The former being the cradle of the 2005 riots while the latter is home to some of the richest communes in France as well as the headquarters of many national and multinational companies.
Inherent to these different ‘territories’ are the movements and large-scale population flows generated by this situation. On a daily basis Paris attracts numerous workers from all adjacent regions. As a European metropolis it is swarming with tourists. Furthermore Paris is home to 5,200 celebrations, sports events, inaugurations, and ceremonies yearly⁹. The dense public transportation network, added to the relative proximity of central Paris from rough suburban areas, leads young people from the latter (‘les jeunes des quartiers’ as they are called) to go to Paris in order to party, or to take advantage of the many events happening there. The central area of Les Halles, a transportation hub where many subway and train lines converge, is particularly spectacular in this respect, but other places are just as crowded on occasion. Demonstrations of all kinds (industrial workers, farmers, civil servants etc.) are frequent in Paris.

These kind of flows are one of the main security challenges for the police. One characterization of the public demand, at least its understanding by the police forces, is to preserve the invisible borders between the different areas (Donzelot, 2008). A ‘small’ riot with people from ethnic minorities in a rich area in the western part of the city (like for example on the 14th of May 2013 in the Trocadero, in front of the Tour Eiffel) is unbearable for the inhabitants and for the police authorities. Groups of youngsters leaning up are tolerated only in ‘their’ areas but under the pressure of police forces if they enter rich preserved zones (Mouhanna, 2002). It reinforces the idea that the main concern of the police is managing the movement of people instead of developing their relationships with people actually living in Paris (which comprises only a small percentage in these flows).

Different security issues

In terms of security the Paris metropolitan area can be described as comprising three types of territories, essentially distributed along the East-West and centre-periphery axes described above, each with its own security issues. The first type are relatively quiet residential areas, where residents mostly fear burglaries and imported crime from neighbouring places. The second type are tourist areas where shopkeepers (who often live elsewhere), foreign travellers and underprivileged suburban dwellers ‘on the town’ mingle – much to the delight of pickpockets, crooks and bag snatchers, not to mention traffickers. The third type are rough social housing areas called ‘les quartiers sensibles’. In this area there is a vital underground economy to sustain a marginally decent way of life. The figure of the ‘young’ male immigrant seems to crystallise all fears. A fourth type could be added. These are changing areas due to gentrification. Their status is rapidly shifting from underprivileged neighbourhood with rather old buildings, to that of a ‘hype’ area, before ultimately becoming yet another residential or tourist district.

Obviously, security and feelings of insecurity vary considerably according to the area mentioned above. ‘Rough areas’ tend to be those with the most problems as far as security, poverty and unemployment are concerned. They also suffer from bad

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relationships between police officers and the local population. They are an extreme example of the systemic difficulties encountered in French police propensity to act. In other words, while they are plagued with the most hardships, yet they do not enjoy an adequate policing response. 42.5% of people living in the banlieues (in comparison to 32.4% of the Parisians) indicate that there are not enough police forces in their district. This lack of appropriate answer from police forces can also be felt, in a more mitigated way, in other types of areas. Unfortunately there are no detailed, comparable figures available in relation to these different areas.

Figures on the level of the City of Paris as a whole indicate that crime against property (66.8 to 35.16/1000 inhabitants), crime against persons (17.5 to 7.52/1000 inhabitants) and financial crime (10.9 to 5.71/1000 inhabitants) are higher than the average in France. Furthermore, crime rates varies from one place to another. In St Denis (north of Paris) the crime ratio for 1000 inhabitants was 166.50 in 2008 and 44.77 in St Cloud (west of Paris). We must be careful with this kind of figures. It is recognized, even by official services, that these figures are subject to many manipulations in order to persuade people that politicians and police chiefs control crime in their area (Matelly & Mouhanna, 2007; Robert & Zaubermann, 2011; Gagneron, 2014).

Diversity in public policing

Within Paris the official police to population ratio is 201 persons per police officer, compounded by the fact that many law enforcement units are based in Paris. These units add up to about 13,000 Riot Control Forces (CRS, Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité), and 17,000 gendarmes which are stationed all over the French territory but never intervene in their own district. According to a long-established principle these forces deal only with geographically distant problems in order to avoid any issues stemming from potential closeness with demonstrators. Hence, many of these gendarmes and public security police often stay in Paris, spending a few weeks there before coming back to their unit. They supplement the permanent staff of police stations. Their presence illustrates the main priority of the police forces: to preserve order, to fight against demonstrators and rioters. It has to be noticed that not only these specialists are embedded in this issue. All police forces in Paris, including the local police stations, are involved in this fight. They spend most of their time on supervising any kind of crowd movement. The districts chiefs

11 Source: Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire-2009.
14 Source: Min. Interior.
15 Source: Gendarmerie nationale. The National Gendarmerie is a military institution in charge of public safety with police duties among the civilian population.
‘les commissaires’) are in charge of the supervision of all police forces in their area (Monjardet & Mouhanna, 2005).

Tourists visiting Paris will notice that in the Airports and in the main railway stations, military officers are patrolling. They are participating to the big surveillance system used to answer the perceived threat of terrorist attacks. Because Paris is the head of the French centralized political administration, all governments are very careful of any event that could affect the city, official buildings and its inhabitants. The concentration of economic, political, and symbolic power in one place makes Paris very sensitive to any kind of ‘attack’ (ranging from political demonstrations to terrorist attacks) directed towards those in power.

Behind this picture lies the idea that the considerable police staffing of inner Paris is justified by the need to protect the city from the threats that lay close at hand. Paris police forces, and for that matter French police forces in general, are a control tool directed against mobs and potential uprisings rather than a public service. In this system, policing levers are pulled and strategic decisions are made at bureaucratic level. In Paris, police bureaucracy is both powerful and omnipresent. In what follows the political-administrative context of Paris is described in order to better understand this current state of policing in this metropolis.

3. The political-administrative context of policing Paris: the almightiness of the Police Prefect

It should be remembered that the Paris uprisings, before and after the French Revolution of 1789 in 1358, 1382, 1413 and 1648 against the great Louis XIV, and in 1830, 1848, and 1871, each of which led to an overthrow of the ruling regime, made a long-lasting impact on both the local and national French political landscape. Since then most governments have considered the control of the Paris population as a priority in their security policies, in order not to allow the capital city’s leadership to become a stronghold of power. Accordingly, they reached several conclusions. Firstly, Paris did not have a mayor at all from 1794 to February 1848, from August 1848 to 1870, and between 1871 and 1977. The State simply assumed direct control during these periods. Secondly, public order was a priority including the protection of public buildings, ministries and congress halls in particular, or the supervision of state visits and the control of demonstrations. This prompted most experts (Monjardet, 1996) to believe that public order policing benefiting the State had ended up replacing policing serving the citizens. Although this is not exclusive to the greater Paris area; it is more explicit given the number of national administrations with headquarters in the capital city.

In terms of security management, Paris is both an exception in the French environment and a paradigmatic example of the issues the French police has to cope with. It is the capital city of a state that remains extremely centralised especially in its policing and security policies. Given its political, economic and demographic prominence, the Paris metropolitan area stands quite apart in the country. Paradoxes can be found all over the city. The greatest concentration of wealth lies right next to
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the largest underprivileged population. Upscale neighbourhoods are but minutes of public transportation away from the poorest areas plagued with hardships, which infamously attracted global media attention during the riots of November-December 2005. The road surrounding Paris along the line of the former city walls, called the ‘boulevard périphérique’ seems to act as a border between the city and the suburbs. Nonetheless, some working class areas remain within Paris itself and not all suburbia is populated by angry workers and immigrants on the verge of revolt. Indeed, some of these banlieues do concentrate a significant part of French wealth. Those various economic and geographic paradoxes entail very complex political and administrative organisational issues. As a result, the Mayor of Paris (the largest city in France) is the least empowered in the whole country when it comes to security policy-making. In Paris, more than anywhere else in France, the State plays an instrumental role in security management policies, through one dedicated organisation: the Paris Prefecture of Police. Created by Napoleon I on February 17, 1800, this organisation is the sole depository of prerogatives that in other cities belong to the mayor, such as security, road safety and maintenance, street sweeping, or peace and quiet. It also somewhat eats into the competencies of the Prefect of Paris who is the official representative of the State (each ‘département’ has one) who is in charge of public order. Police forces as well as fire fighters and hygiene departments report to the Prefect of Police. The Police Prefect is a high-ranking civil servant endowed with enough power to impose his own security policy upon the Paris metropolitan area.

However, the Mayor of Paris (along with his colleagues of the neighbouring towns) cannot help but get thoroughly involved in security issues. This has been an ongoing concern in French politics for the last thirty years at least, both locally and nationally. While the various security bills enacted these last few years did increase their policing prerogatives, mayors haven’t been able to take the ‘upper hand’ in this field, least of all in Paris. In this area local and national authorities are engaged in an ongoing struggle. Mayors are balancing between the will to exact more power in matters of security and the temptation to withdraw entirely, washing their hands in favour of the central State. In Paris, the problem is compounded by the presence of nearly all central state institutions having their headquarters in the area. This makes the structural conflict, pitching the local versus the national, particularly acute. Some observers note that the Paris Prefecture of Police has become to a large extent a ‘state within the State’, insofar as its leadership has considerable means and staff at its disposal (Renaudie, 2008). Historically, this is explained by the fact that the Prefecture of Police is heir to the most ancient national police force in the country, that of Paris. Until 1941 most French cities had a municipal police force, Paris being an exception (Vogel, 1993). The first state owned police force in Paris was created in 1667, prefiguring the Napoleonic Prefecture de Police, which was the model for the national police force in July 1941. Until 1966, the Paris police department enjoyed special status within the national police as it had for instance in-house staff management rules. While this is not the case anymore, the Prefect of Police undeniably remains an autonomous and powerful character, in practice largely independent from the Ministry of Interior.
Headquartered in the Ile de la Cité, at the heart of Paris, a traditional place of power, the prefect operates autonomously. With in-house departments such as criminal police (Direction de la Police Judiciaire), intelligence (Direction du renseignement) and public order & traffic control (Direction de l’ordre public et de la circulation) its organisational structure is almost the same as that of their counterparts at the Ministry. The Paris Prefect of Police is being comfortably staffed and endowed. For example the criminal police for the Paris metropolitan area does reflect its special status as it includes 84 (out of 303) superintendents (Commissaires de Police Judiciaire), 1,142 (out of 2,956) officers (Officiers de Police Judiciaire) and 717 (out of 1,760) rank and file (Gardiens de Police Judiciaire). The Paris Prefect of Police can stand his ground even against the Minister of Interior or the Mayor of Paris. Hence, the Mayor of Paris would stand unfavourably if pitted in a power struggle against the Prefect of Police. Although the city takes a significant part in the funding of the Paris Police Prefect, it lacks significant influence on the process of policy making. For example the Mayor has to negotiate street planning issues, such as one-way streets, car-free zones, or anti-car policies with the Prefect. As a result, his position is lopsided. The Mayor of Paris, whose population is quite sensitive to matters of security, city planning, or traffic, has to actually negotiate with the Prefect of Paris, whose operations are funded by the city council.

On the metropolitan level, the competencies of the Prefecture of Police vary as a function of distance from Paris. Within the city itself, the Prefect of Police concurrently holds important prerogatives. All police forces report directly to him. Until 2009, in the surrounding ‘petite couronne’ départements, only the Criminal Police Force (Police Judiciaire, part of the National Police) and fire fighters report to him. The public security police, i.e. uniformed police stations with several detectives at most, report to the Ministry of Interior and its local representatives. Additional prerogatives pertaining to public roads are completely out of his remit. In the next circle, the ‘grande couronne’ départements, he has no influence since all security matters are dealt with by the ministry’s police agencies. Still, even though the power of the Prefect of Police tends to wane far from Paris — which is not the case of the Minister of Interior, whose authority extends to the whole country — he remains an autonomous player to be reckoned with. In 2009 his prerogatives were further extended, since each and every national police officer within the ‘petite couronne’ now reports to him, a sum total of 26,000 police officers. This decision was taken without the consultation of any mayor, neither in Paris nor in towns included into the new system. It was an agreement between the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Prefect of Police. The new organisation was adopted five years before a law passed to organize the new Paris metropolis political council with 124 towns around the capital city on January 27, 2014. The new police organization includes the police officers working in Paris and in these 124 towns.

16 Source: Ministry of Interior-effectifs de police 2011.
17 14th of March, 2009.
18 Source: Prefecture of Police-2010. Today, the number of police officers depending from the PP is 30 000.
from the banlieues. It does not include the Riot Control Forces (CRS) and mobile gendarmes (the crowd control units of the gendarmerie), which may however occasionally report to him. Several CCTV networks, whose control rooms are centralised at the Prefecture, reinforce this feeling of omnipresence and almightiness.

Important to notice is that since 2003, president Sarkozy has put an end to all attempts to implement a community policing strategy within the French National Police Force (Mouhanna, 2011). This decision has been taken without any local debate. Like the implementation of community policing in Paris in 1999, the change was decided amongst high level civil servants (Monjardet & Mouhanna, 2005). This strategy has a huge influence on the implementation of the philosophy of community oriented policing in France & Paris. It means that for example the police officers working for the French National Police Force are focussed on law and order or zero tolerance strategies and are not at all involved in any kind of prevention. They abandon what they call ‘inconvenient’ missions such as being present at schools’ doors or participating in sports meetings with teenagers. As a result, the local authorities in Paris (and other French cities), experiment with ‘new’ forms of policing. It stimulates the idea of Municipal police forces and all kinds of new services in charge of prevention. A process that leads to a pluralisation in security provision in Paris, called plural policing.

4. The emergence or development of municipal police forces and other public uniformed surveillance agencies in Paris

While today’s budget cuts lead to downsizing national police forces; the question of the emergence or development of municipal police forces, whose staff would report to and be paid by mayors, is being raised throughout the country (Malochet, 2007). As far as the Paris metropolitan area is concerned, the incredibly diverse and dispersed municipal strategies do converge on this particular topic. Rich towns such as Levallois-Perret, where insecurity is not a pressing issue but feelings of insecurity are very high, have long since opted for strong police staffing. New recruits came as an addition to existing national police forces. Hence, 377 municipal police forces, with huge discrepancies in size, cover 407 out of 1,280 communes in the Ile-de-France region, and 75% of the population (Le Goff, 2009). Nevertheless, 200 of them comprise less than 5 police officers. Weaponry and assignments vary from one place to another. Other city councils, however, some of them among the most impacted by insecurity or affected by the riots of 2005, refuse such policies, arguing that they cannot afford them or that they will not take responsibility for what is essentially a mission of the State, on grounds of republican fairness. Some mayors don’t want to be accountable on the issue of safety, even if this position gets less support today. In other words, they will not act as a substitute for the State. Indeed, the build-up of municipal police often entails a withdrawal of State forces in the medium term.

19 The average estimated cost of a municipal police force is €25 per capita (Source: Le GOFF-IAU).
Partisanship seems to have little influence these days on whether a given town will opt in or out of municipal police. While radical left-wing city councils, especially those still held by the Communist party, tend to be less committed in this trend, in the greater Paris area as in many others, the right-left chasm does not mean much when it comes to security (Ferret & Mouhanna, 2005). Thus, the decision of opting for municipal police is based on several factors, ranging from whether or not the commune has a national police station (commissariat) to financial considerations, through political opportunism or insecurity – real or perceived by residents. If some cities like Levallois Perret have developed a consequent police force, with a clear involvement of the mayor in security issues, many others limit their investment in this field.

Up till now, the Socialist mayors\textsuperscript{20} of Paris rejected the idea of a municipal police force. They do not challenge the authority of the Prefect of Police, except marginally (street planning). This topic, however, failed to draw consensus for quite a while, as evidenced by the 2001 city council election campaign debates. The then mayor, fearing defeat (indeed he lost against the left), was actively promoting the idea of such a force. This strategy was consistent with the security themes that were being pushed to the fore at national level during this campaign. Although this campaign for a municipal police force ultimately failed, the city council developed its own operation, which supplemented the Prefecture’s rather than competing with them. The city council campaign of 2014 showed no real differences between left and right parties as far as a local police force is concerned.

Little by little, the Direction de la Prévention et de la Protection [DPP], depending on the mayor, increasingly appeared as an entity which, however embryonic, might eventually replace the Prefecture, should the mayor change track. For now, in addition to headquarters exploiting growing numbers of CCTV cameras, the DPP employs 1,313 surveillance and protection agents,\textsuperscript{21} mainly entrusted with the protection of municipal facilities and patrolling capacities. These are low figures indeed if compared to the staffing of national police, however other city staff do perform security-related assignments. Some of these officers are to be found outside schools, acting as crossing-guards, a task that used to be carried out by national police. Another 573 agents are involved in surveillance in City parks and gardens.

Furthermore, while the city council of Paris substantially foots the bill for the Prefecture de Police, it also directly pays the salaries of the 2,000 Paris Agents de Surveillance [ASP], a unique body in France, which is in charge of traffic and parking policing in the capital city. These officers are under the supervision of the national police stations (police commissariats). However, it is entirely conceivable that they will be transferred to a municipal force, even though the limitations of training do not enable them to substitute for national police. Up till April 2014, the socialist mayor Delanoë has always refused to build a Parisian police force. He defends a ‘national republican vision of policing’ which implies that the State has to run

\textsuperscript{20} It is expected that the new Socialist Mayor Anne Hildago, who took over from Bertrand Delanoë in April 2014, will build on his main ideas in relation to security policy.

\textsuperscript{21} Source: Paris city council-2012.
the police forces and that there should be equal forces all around the territory. An aspiration that does not totally reflect reality.

It is clear that within the city of Paris security matters are driven by politics and not by economic considerations. There are three important players. The State, which remains eager to keep the upper hand on security and public order in the capital. Secondly, the prefect, who remains extremely autonomous, even towards the Ministry of Interior. Thirdly the mayor who prefers to sidestep direct management of security issues for the time being. A balance that brings Paris into a status quo.

Up till now (2014), the local police forces have limited judicial power. They can arrest people committing crime but they are not allowed to do investigations, to execute a ‘stop & search’ operation or to put somebody into custody. In Paris, this is not perceived to be a problem by the Mayor as he wants the municipal police force to be oriented towards prevention. In fact, more and more new units are created to do mediation and prevention. For example, in some very sensitive areas in Paris, the so called ‘correspondants de nuit’ are working between four p.m. and midnight (de Maillard, 2013). These units were created in 2002 and 120 agents are now deployed in 11 areas. They are in charge of the homeless, control of public equipment (lights, road, etc.), prevention of damages and mediation between people in conflict. They insist on their status of not belonging to the police corps as the National Police Officers have a bad image amongst youngsters from ethnic minorities. As they are not using force, these units tends to lack authority in the field however.

5. Private commercial security agencies: supplements or substitutes?

All over the world, a wave of privatisations has swept the field of security (Shearing & Stenning, 1987). Paris is no exception to this rule. Big retailers and department stores, banks, and even ministries resort to private security companies to regulate access to their premises and protect their property. The respective share of the public and private sectors are difficult to assess in matters of security. There is no doubt the state is largely withdrawing from the field, especially from such functions as people and property protection. This trend, initiated long ago, is currently intensified (Ocqueteau, 1997).

The specificity of Paris makes it harder to determine whether private providers tend to substitute for public forces or the development of private security is merely supplementing the current police forces. Indeed, the presence of the national police force remains massive and quite visible. Still its main focus is on public order. Hence, any withdrawal – from school crossing supervision, mall patrols, etc. – will be offset by an increasing demand on the private sector, while the national police force will tend to focus on its core mission while still maintaining a high level of staffing in Paris.

One of the major emerging players in terms of volume these last few years is the ‘Groupement parisien inter-bailleurs de surveillance’ (GPIS). This 45 patrol, 115
man force, created in 2004 upon the initiative of 9 social housing lessors, carries out night patrols in the rough areas of northern Paris, an allegedly risky task. As far as GPIS is concerned, it is legitimate to call upon security privatisation since these patrols substitute for police patrols. They make arrests and intervene when groups of young people threaten peace and quiet. National police unions complain about the competition introduced by this situation. At the same time, they are quite happy to take delivery of GPIS’ arrestees, which improve their success statistics without exposing them to street hazards. However, the public versus private sector clash remains quite limited in this instance, since half the budget of GPIS is funded by the Paris city council, while the other half is provided by social housing lessors, many of which belong to the public sector. Hence, it is less a matter of privatisation than creeping municipalisation of public security.

Other organisations too have decided to create their own security forces, which exist next to the units of the National police doing the same job. For example, the two transportation services, the Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP) for the metro and busses and the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF) for the trains, have developed units in order to fight against crime and fear of crime inside their buildings and vehicles. Although a special branch of the Police Nationale-préfecture de police de Paris is dedicated to this mission, with more or less 1600 officers, transportation authorities are persuaded that it is not enough as many Parisians, whether they use the metro or not, find it the most dangerous place in the city. That explains why the RATP has created its own police force in 1994 called ‘Groupe de protection et de sécurisation des réseaux’ (GPSR). GPSR consists of 1000 agents who are carrying non-lethal weapons (including gaz and Taser) although some are wearing lethal arms. Since the nineties the National Rail company, la SNCF has decided to transform its guards, who were plain clothes agents, in an uniformed force called Surveillance générale (Suge). Suge consists of 2800 agents, among them 1400 in the Paris metropolitan area. Like the municipal police forces, the members of GPSR and Suge have limited powers. They can arrest people doing a crime or refusing to pay their travelling ticket, but they have to refer as soon as possible to a National Police officer, who is the only one who has the right to build a criminal case and to send it to the prosecutor’s office.

In Paris (and France) the privatisation of security appears to be mainstream. Almost all commercial centres have their security service. Their agents are mostly oriented towards the prevention of shoplifting. When they arrest a thief, they are authorized by the prosecutor to impose a fine. In the biggest commercial centres, the private companies agents are patrolling in the alleys, looking for pickpockets but also paying attention to every kind of ‘trouble’. They focus especially on group of youngsters, who are perceived to frighten ‘honest citizens’. Many of these private agents belong to ethnic minorities and/or live in poor areas but they contribute to the protection of ‘the temple of consumption’. Not very well paid, these agents tend to replace the police officers in many places. At the national level, it is said

that the number of private agents is around 200 000, an equivalent to the number of public officers in the field of security.

This in no way rules out the possibility of seeing other forms of private security gather momentum. However, this would have more to do with hybridisation than competition, given the numerous links between the public and the private sector. For example, at night, more and more bars prefer self-regulation and provide their own guards in order to prevent drunk or ‘bad’ people to come in. They are aware of the fact that the intervention of the national police force in case of problems increases the chance of a profound control in their bar on criteria related to noise, maximum numbers allowed in the bar and the age of their customers. Providing their own guards prevents the chance of police forces being around or in their bars, which generates a negative image.

6. Conclusion and reflections

As the capital city of a state that remains extremely centralised – especially in its policing and security policies – and given its political, economic, and demographic prominence, the Paris metropolitan area stands out as the most developed example of centralisation and the State’s wish to control its citizens. The political-administrative context of policing Paris generated a Police Prefect that can be considered as the almighty in the field of security. A strong National Police Force suppresses the development of municipal police forces. Nevertheless, other public uniformed surveillance agencies are present in this metropolis. Together with the private commercial security agents they are contributing to the pluralisation of security provision in Paris.

Despite the observed pluralisation described above, Paris is still a ‘state’ in the state. It is a city in which police forces are mainly built to protect the state. It creates a context in which less space is open for other initiatives. It rather confirms the Napoleonic nature of the police system in which civil non-commercial initiatives are ‘suppressed’ or do simply not ‘survive’. In Paris, organized neighbourhood watch seems not to be welcomed. The self-organized Neighbourhood watch operations that were built in some area – for example in Stalingrad place at the beginning of 2000- were not sustained neither by the Prefecture nor by the city council. All this kind of initiatives in France have to be built under the supervision of the Police Nationale and the ‘watchers’ have to be informants for the police forces. Otherwise, these groups are compromised. They are told to be the defender of selfish interests while the National Police forces represent the public interest. As a consequence, vigilante or self defense initiatives are rare in France, and especially in Paris, where citizens often associate this kind of initiatives with ‘fascism’.

From this Napoleonic non-democratic tradition, citizen participation can only be perceived from an instrumental point of view (Easton & Van Ryckeghem, 2012). It means that citizens can be no more than ‘informants’ for the police or victims that must be protected. Some police officers call the Parisians ‘welfare recipients’ or potentially dangerous people who have to be controlled and managed. They are never considered as partners in building a security strategy for Paris.
On the other hand citizens in Paris tend to feel very comfortable with this situation. They are not claiming any power in the definition of police priorities. The majority of the citizens accept the heavy presence of public police officers whose image is the protection of the State and the Nation (Mouhanna, 2011). It is an example of what has been called the professionalization paradox. This is a process in which the solution of societal problems is assigned to professionals which generates an inability of citizens to address these problems themselves (Arnstein, 1969; Vos & Van Doorn, 2004).

It is clear that despite the fact that Paris, like many other European cities, has gone through a process of pluralisation; the nature of the outcome is still influenced by its Napoleonic tradition.

Bibliography


Policing Barcelona

Amadeu Recasens i Brunet
Paul Ponsaers

Abstract
Many authors observe an increasing pluralisation of the police function. This pluralisation implies a growing dependency between different actors in the security domain, especially on the local level. The current theoretical insights from the sociology of urban governance of security were developed dominantly within an Anglo-American and British context. This article aims to test whether these Anglo-American underlying assumptions are recognisable in European local geographical settings, more precisely in Barcelona.
The underlying question in this article is whether or not the local empirical situation in Barcelona differentiates along the same lines as the general theory suggests. The present article contributes to a European sociology of urban governance of security and our understanding of multi-layered social control theories (in)formalising in public space. The main questions we want to answer are consequently:
• Can a pluralisation of policing be observed in the metropolis of Barcelona and if so, is it a consequence of European trends or because of local changes or both?
• Do these changes suggest a growing attention towards public disorder (‘social disorder’, ‘incivilities’) maintenance, to the detriment of tackling (petty) crime?
• Are certain (so-called ‘anti-social’) behaviours increasingly sanctioned in an exclusively local (more precisely municipal) context? Is this sanctioned administratively by means of ‘by-law’ and no longer by means of traditional penal law?
These questions follow the logic mostly developed in Anglo-American and British context. What is the role of specific socio-political circumstances of the city and its regional and state context in the development of its current police model?

Keywords: plural policing, local security policy, social disorder, incivilities, public space

© 2014 Maklu | ISSN 2034-760X | September 2014

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1. Introduction

Many authors have observed an increasing pluralisation of the police function (identified by the growing use of the notion ‘policing’ as referring to the function of social control instead of ‘police’, as the police apparatus) during the last three decades (Loader, 2000; Crawford, 2006, 2008; Jones & Newburn, 2006) which refers to an increasing complex array of public, private and municipal bodies, including public police forces, engaged in the provision of regulation and security. The underlying assumption is that the security provision can no longer be deduced in terms of what the public police do, but results from the interconnectedness and interdependency of different actors in the security domain, a ‘web of policing’, especially on the local level (police forces, municipal agencies and private commercial enterprises). To date, however, this work has been dominated by Anglo-American and British perspectives (Newburn & Reiner, 2007; Ponsaers et al., 2009). They were generalised without further empirical proof to other (European) environments. This article aims to test whether these Anglo-American underlying assumptions are recognisable in European local geographical settings. More precisely, the focus is on Barcelona (Spain, Catalonia). The underlying question is whether or not the local empirical situation in Barcelona differentiates along the same lines as the theoretical body on ‘pluralisation of policing’ suggests.

We opted for Barcelona because: (1) it is within the European Union, one of the largest cities (11th) with one of the largest metropolitan areas (6th); (2) it is one of the most complex urban policing models; and (3) there are levels of administration (state, regional and local) without organic dependency between them. Barcelona, the capital city of Catalonia and the centre of one of the largest metropolitan areas in Europe, is located between the sea to the east, the mountains (Serra de Collserola) in the west and two rivers, the Bessos in the north and the Llobregat in the south. These geographical obstacles have for a long time determined the possibilities of growth of the city, its population and density. At the heart of a region of more than three million inhabitants, the city has a population of 1.620.943 inhabitants (2012), with a surface of 101,4 km² and a density of 15.993,5 inhabitants/km².

The present article contributes to a European sociology of urban governance of security and our understanding of multi-layered social control theories (in-) formalising in public space. The main questions we want to answer are: (1) Can a pluralisation of policing be observed in the metropolis of Barcelona and if so, is it a consequence of European trends or local changes or both?: (2) Do these changes suggest a growing attention towards public disorder (‘social disorder’, ‘incivilities’) maintenance, to the detriment of tackling (petty) crime (Crawford, 1999; Innes, 2003; Johnston & Shearing, 2003)?; (3) Are certain (so-called ‘anti-social’) behaviours increasingly sanctioned in an exclusively local (more precisely urban [municipal]) context? Is this sanctioned administratively by means of ‘by-law’ and no longer by means of traditional penal law (Hope & Karstedt, 2003; King, 2007)? These questions follow the logic mostly developed in Anglo-American and British context.

In our understanding, the answers to these questions should be based on a better insight in the role of specific socio-political historical circumstances of the city and
Amadeu Recasens i Brunet & Paul Ponsaers

its regional and state context in the development of its current police model? Such insight should result from essential contextual and historical information, which permits to grasp the Spanish reality and that of Barcelona. In the first part, the paper discusses the Spanish constitutional framework and the hybrid police system that resulted out of that. This part is subdivided into: (a) the national layering of power balances, (b) the consequences for the Catalan region and (c) the place of the city of Barcelona within its Metropolitan Area. Neither the city, nor its security model or police, can be understood isolated from its socio-historical context, because its growth and political processes are fundamental for understanding the current reality. The essential elements are brought together in the second part of the paper, discussing the historical development of the security policy and the actual problems the city is confronted with. In the third part, the paper considers how policing gets its shape today in the territory of the metropolis of Barcelona, paying attention to recent developments and pluralisation of policing. In a concluding note, the paper returns to the questions posed at the beginning, elaborating on the Spanish reality of policing pluralisation in the metropolis of Barcelona.

2. The Spanish constitutional framework and the construction of a security model

2.1. Three layers of division of power

The Spanish constitution of 1978 (Constitución Española) marks clearly the 'politically negotiated' end of almost four decades of dictatorship in Spain. The constitution itself is the eclectic and ambiguous result of the power relationships between the heirs of the totalitarian regime and the democratic parties. A state model resulted out of this process with three levels of independent governmental power: (1) the central government (Madrid), (2) the government of 'nationalities and regions' identified as 'autonomous communities' (Comunidades Autónomas), which restored the ancient model of the II Republic (1931–1939), with elected governments and Parliaments and (3) the municipalities, which became democratic, with elected mayors (during the dictatorship they were assigned arbitrarily by central government).

The power distribution of the constitution reflects a willingness to decentralise and some 'federalising' trends (Solé Tura, 1985), although it is also asymmetric. Each of the autonomous communities can choose which competences they want to exercise themselves and which they want to leave in the hands of the central state. The home rules (Estatutos de Autonomía) of each autonomous community establish the judicial-political framework. Catalonia assumed from the start the maximum competences, amongst them the creation of an autonomous police, the Mossos d’Esquadra, and also authority over the prisons located on Catalan territory.

The redefined and democratised municipalities gained a large degree of self-governance. The mayors became the authorities of their own local police forces. They renewed and modernised these forces, whose competences were only to a small extent defined in their new constitutional form. In former days they were
considered as support for the state forces. Many municipalities have renewed their police forces, in particular the bigger cities. There are about 69,000 municipal police officers (within 1,800 municipalities) on Spanish territory.\footnote{This is an estimate, based on the extrapolation by the coordination of the police, which groups different unions. The last official number dates from 2005 and was 61,867 police officers. Different municipalities have created para-police functions and temporary posts, which complicates enormously a final count.}

The state, following Napoleonic tradition, has a national civilian police force (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía), the National Police, with 71,387 officers (2012), and a Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), the Spanish Gendarmerie, with 81,941 officers (2012), which add up to 153,328 members. On a national scale these two state forces represent the majority (2/3) of police officers in Spain. The National Police is mainly responsible for policing urban areas, whilst rural policing is generally the responsibility of the Civil Guard. These forces have to protect and guarantee the fundamental rights and liberties, the security of citizens and also the judiciary police.

It was not until the Organic Law of 1986 - which was too late arriving and inefficiently implemented - before any attempt was made to restore a police model that had exploded in all directions between 1978 and 1986. This was due to the fact that the Spanish government was not eager to develop the constitutional possibilities at an earlier stage. The government feared to contradict the ‘factual powers’ (army, militarised police, reactionary judges, etc.), which still were strongly anchored in the ancient regime. This tripartite model, without any organic or functional hierarchy, had to base itself on reinforced coordination, which was difficult because of the bad regulations in the law of 1986.

For the autonomous communities, they were granted their own police forces, a junta de Seguridad, to coordinate with those of the state on their territory. Thus, there exists one for Catalonia, but this organ has had an eventful existence because of different policies by state and Catalan administrations. A Junta Local de Seguridad was also introduced for the coordination of the local police forces (where they exist) and those of the state and/or the autonomous police forces. The city of Barcelona has such a coordinating local Junta.

The visualisation of this complex Spanish police system (Figure 1) demonstrates that to a large extent ‘pluralisation of policing’ in Spain was already a fact before scholars started to make it a subject of research. This Spanish form of plural policing has to be understood rather as the consequence of legal-constitutional arrangements during the reconstruction of the Spanish state than of local circumstances. Or to phrase it differently, in certain Spanish regions as Catalonia, pluralisation of policing resulted in first instance from the quest for balance between competing local, regional and state levels of power, and only to a small extent as the consequence of the construction of a complex web of complementary bodies engaged in the provision of regulation and security. Essential in a good understanding of the system is that competition between the different forces is not neutral and organisationally driven, but is essentially politically driven.
2.2. The security model of Catalonia

The security model and the police of Barcelona need to be analysed in the Catalan context (Recasens, 2000). In its two successive Catalan home rules of the region, Catalonia restored immediately in 1983 its own regional police, the Mossos d’Esquadra (‘Troopers’, literally ‘Squad Lads’), an armed force of a civil nature, functioning under the supervision of the government of Catalonia, the Generalitat de Catalunya. The new home rules of 2006 defined this as an integral police force, with security, administrative and judicial competencies.

The state police, nevertheless, remained present in Catalonia (3,518 members of the national police and 3,622 members of the Guardia Civil, in other words, 7,140 state police officers in 2012). Their functions are, for example, securing frontiers, airports and big harbours, controlling arms, foreigners, passports and identity documents, fiscal controls, serious and organised crime and information supply. We observe overlap with the Mossos d’Esquadra, e.g., in the domains of drugs and terrorism.

The Mossos d’Esquadra constitutes today the ordinary and integral police of Catalonia. The force (with 17,160 officers, 2012) serves in the entire territory of Catalonia and cooperates with the local forces or substitutes them in small municipalities.
which have no local police. The force represents about 50% of the total police presence in Catalan territory and has the main competences. Outnumbering clearly the national and local forces in Catalonia (Table 1), it is consequently the dominant police reality in the Catalan region.

The constitution and the Catalan home rules give also to the Catalan government the coordinating function of the local police forces (Cuerpos de Policía Local). A law on the coordination of the local police forces of 1991 determines the means of joint action of the local police forces and integrates them in the security system of Catalonia (10,706 police officers in 2012) (IDESCAT, 2014). The Catalan home rules of 2006 give also competences to the Catalan government to authorise, inspect and control private security in Catalan territory.

The dominant position of the Mossos d’Esquadra in terms of capacity in the Catalan region is undeniable. But not only from that point of view. The national forces (the National Police and the Guardia Civil) have specific tasks, while the regional police has a broad generic assignment. At the other end of the local reality, the regional police has a coordinating task for the local police. It is clear that the Mossos d’Esquadra reflects the dominant position of the Catalan government in the region.

2.3. Barcelona within its Metropolitan Area

The city of Barcelona is integrated in its Metropolitan Area. Municipalities like l’Hospitalet (260,000 inhabitants), Santa Coloma de Gramanet (120,000 inhabitants) and Badalona (220,000 inhabitants) are adjacent to Barcelona. From a sociological point of view, these municipalities are part of one important urban reality. The Metropolitan Area integrates 36 municipalities, with a population of 3,239,337 inhabitants (2012), a surface of 636 km2 and a density of 5,060 inhabitants/km2 (2012).

The weight of the city and its area on the whole of Catalonia and even Spain is renowned. Barcelona is the second biggest Spanish city in terms of number of inhabitants, after Madrid. The city represents 3.4% of the population of the state (47,190,493 in 2011). The Metropolitan Area accounts for almost half of the inhabitants of Catalonia (7,539,618 in 2011). The Metropolitan Area has a local police capacity of 2,777 of local officers in Barcelona and the other municipalities in the Area have 2,160 local officers, which amounted to a global capacity of 4,937 local police officers in 2012 (see Table 1).

If we include the 3,041 members of the Mossos d’Esquadra in the city of Barcelona and the 5,390 members of this corps working in the rest of the Metropolitan Area, we observe a global presence of 8,431 Mossos d’Esquadra officers in 2011. This confirms the dominant numeric position of the Mossos d’Esquadra, not only in the Metropolitan Area, but also in the city of Barcelona itself (IDESCAT, 2014) (Table 1).

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2 We don’t include the presence of the two state forces in the territory of Metropolitan Area.
Table 1: Number of police officers in different police forces at different scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>National scale (Spain)</th>
<th>Regional scale (Catalonia)</th>
<th>Metropolitan Area scale</th>
<th>Local scale (Barcelona)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>71,387</td>
<td>3,518</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Guard</td>
<td>81,941</td>
<td>3,622</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad Lads</td>
<td>17,160</td>
<td>8,431</td>
<td>3,041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Police</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>10,706</td>
<td>4,937</td>
<td>2,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Surveillants</td>
<td></td>
<td>390</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbour Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>222,328</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,006</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,368</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,368</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Estimates made by the authors, based on different sources.

3. The modern history of Barcelona, its security problems and security policy

3.1. Three phases of development

3.1.1. 1936–1984: From military occupation to demographic growth

During the nineteenth century Barcelona recovered an important economic and social impulse. The Napoleonic invasion left liberal ideas strongly rooted in the city. Paris became the city of reference. In contrast to the rest of Spain, Catalonia as well as the Basque Country underwent a real industrial revolution (Fontana, 1993). The process of industrialisation, founded on the textile industry (cotton) and metallurgy, awakened a bourgeoisie adherence, late but enthusiastic, to this industrial revolution and an extremely active working class movement.

Military filofascists started a civil war in 1936, which ended with the military occupation of Catalonia. Barcelona was the first big capital bombarded several times by modern aviation. The city was under occupation from 16 January 1939.

The years following the war were difficult. A massive displacement of the population in search of job opportunities in the big cities provoked a significant demographic growth in Barcelona. The city grew from 1,081,175 inhabitants in 1940 to 1,280,179 inhabitants in 1950 and to 1,745,142 inhabitants in 1970 (INE, 2014). The city dealt with massive internal migration (observers estimate the number to be 1,200,000 persons between 1950 and 1970) coming from the south of Spain.

New neighbourhoods appeared in the suburbs of Barcelona, with constructions of low quality housing on the outskirts. These neighbourhoods were plagued by significant corruption within the construction sector, bad communication and a lack
of the most primary services (sewers, schools, medical services, etc.). For example, the neighbourhood of La Mina in Sant Adrià del Besòs became very famous for its criminality. The quarter was intended to accommodate migrants and inhabitants of the suburbs. The land was bought in 1969 and the first 90 houses were ready in 1970. Between 1973 and 1975, 15,000 persons were living on these premises. The majority of the juvenile delinquents, who became mythical and mediatised during the 1970s and 1980s, originated from this neighbourhood. The corruption, which was associated with the dictatorship and its regime, produced economic and financial crime, associated with construction and industry.

Juvenile delinquency and street gangs appeared in Barcelona and its Metropolitan Area during the 1970s and 1980s. The members of an important number of them were from rural migrant families, who lived in the depressing neighbourhoods. Car theft (cars became a real fetish) and armed and violent robberies created social alarm in the media and in films. A surge in of heroin use at the end of the 1970s should be mentioned in this context, resulting in armed robbery in shops and all sorts of crimes connected to drug-trafficking.

The Spanish police in Barcelona was oriented towards political repression during this period. The political criminalisation of sectors of workers and/or Catalan activists of Barcelona remained very harsh until the end of dictatorship. The anarchist Puig Antich was executed in Barcelona on 2 March, 1974. This was the last time the death penalty was enforced. The local police, supporting the state police, had very limited competencies at that time (traffic, administration of the town hall, etc.).


Democratic restoration implied a political and economical boom. Barcelona hosted the Olympic Games in 1992 and the city was profoundly transformed, with new infrastructures, orienting the metropolis towards a tertiary, touristic and cosmopolitan outlook. A new and important wave of migration, this time coming from abroad, increased the population again dramatically. It was mostly the Metropolitan Area which was impacted. The population grew by 6.3% between 1991 and 2012.

On the other hand, the touristic attraction of the city brought an important ‘floating’ population, which risked distorting the demographic composition of the city. In 2012, 16,215,628 people spent a night in Barcelona (city), of which 2,662,406 were Spaniards and 13,553,222 foreigners. This phenomenon resulted in an important degree of non-reported migration. According to the Town Hall, it were these phenomena which absorbed important parts of the workload of the police at that time (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2013).

Security policies developed in Barcelona at the beginning of the 1980s. In an attempt to react to the increasing fear of crime, detected by the first victim surveys (1984), the mayor of Barcelona installed the Urban Council of Security to solve the most important problems in the city, which were: drugs, insecurity among retailers, juvenile violence and problems with migrants (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1994, 10).

In 1988, the mayor of Barcelona also created the Municipal Council for Social Welfare, to promote a culture of well being in the city, developing social policies
and cooperation between involved actors and institutions. The Olympics of 1992 prioritised the ‘hard’ security aspects and the municipal policies focused on other public and social objects (urbanism, tourism, etc.). The report of the Social Services of the Town Hall of Barcelona of 1988-1992 and its proposals for the period 1992-1995 are explicit about this change (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1993). The councils were partially paralysed (Antillano, 2002).

During the last months of 1999, a return to fear of crime could be observed, linked to an increase in petty crime and the degradation of certain neighbourhoods. Security became again a priority, but the response of all the actors was surprisingly different to before (citizen patrols, strong police presence, etc.). The mayor was very clear: the model of the ‘Consell de Seguretat Urbana’ belonged to the past; it was time for other solutions (La Vanguardia newspaper, 12-02-2000). We can observe the disappearance of social aspects in favour of policing the security problems, while the discourse remained nevertheless in support of prevention (Recasens, 2001).3

During the first decade of the twenty first century, the emerging service economy of Barcelona, which was becoming more and more touristic, marked a turning point for the city. New or renewed security problems appeared, amongst others crimes and incivilities associated with tourism, a massive and generalised use of public space, and increasing prostitution and youth gangs made up of Latin American migrants who imported models of the ‘Latin kings’, and the ‘Netas’ or ‘Maras’ (Antunes, 2009). On 24 January, 2006, the city published an (Anti) Social Behaviour Decree ‘of measures to foment and guarantee the civil well being in the public space of Barcelona’, known as the Ordenança de Civisme (otherwise called the ‘Social Behaviour Decree’).

3.1.3. 2009–today: The introduction of local security plans

The law of 2003 concerning the organisation of the public security system of Catalonia required local security plans as an instrument of public security policy. As a consequence, the city of Barcelona elaborated local security plans for two periods until now (2009-2011 and 2012-2015). This should allow to articulate the main issues for the local security policies and its eventual evaluation. This first exercise started from a global diagnosis in 2008. The civil security plan of Barcelona 2009-2011, based on the so-called ‘security model of Barcelona’ (Lahosa, 1997), forecasted a public policy based on the knowledge of the social reality and the public policy of proximity.

We are dealing with a rather schematic and limited plan, which would be enhanced by the second local civil security plan of Barcelona (2012–2015), adopted by the plenary municipal council on 25 July 2012. This plan, which is still in force today, departs from a conceptual frame of contextualisation of the local security policies, establishing elementary theoretical notions concerning conflict, the actors and the factors of delinquency. The plan hesitates, sometimes in a contradictory way, between classical concepts of prevention, theories of ‘broken windows’ and

3 See 3.1.4. The Guardia Urbana de Barcelona and its beat-officers.
situational prevention. In fact, it follows the eclectic line of reasoning started in the 2000s. The plan describes four strategic axes (see Table 2, which contains a comparison with the first plan). We observe a more explicit ‘securing’ tendency, compared with the first plan.

Table 2: Comparison of the latest local security plans of Barcelona

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<td>Perceived fear of crime in the neighbourhoods</td>
<td>More secure neighbourhoods</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responding to the evolution of crime and the tendencies of security</td>
<td>Prevention and reduction of crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevention and administration of conflicts, of pleasant use of public space</td>
<td>Anticipation and administration of conflicts hindering a pleasant use of public space</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reinforcement of the measures which exist already within the public security system of Barcelona</td>
<td>Reinforcement of the local security management</td>
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3.2. The actual situation in Barcelona

The presence of different police forces in Barcelona with complementary functions provoked a dispersal and/or a duplicity of the crime figures, which created serious doubts concerning their reliability. On the other hand, with the implementation of the Catalan Mossos d’Esquadra a new actor had emerged, which had consequences for police work and statistics that makes it difficult to evaluate. An effort of coordination of the registration of crime figures permits us to believe in the greater reliability of police statistics.

The state police only publish provincial figures. They integrate the data from the Mossos d’Esquadra (not of the local forces). At the level of the province, the global number of recorded crime in these figures decreased weakly (0.8%) in 2012 (343,953 known observations) compared with 2011 (346,665). In comparison, serious forms of crime increased dramatically (murders +9.1%, violent crimes +11.5%, violent theft +14.0%) (Ministry of Interior, 2012). In other words, while the frequency was stabilising, most serious forms of crime were visibly increasing.

The Catalan government provides joint figures for Mossos d’Esquadra and the local forces. For 2011, there were, in total, 191,701 crimes; 172,067 were recorded by the Mossos d’Esquadra and 19,634 by the local forces (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2012). It is clear that the most important producer of recorded crime in the Catalan region are the Mossos d’Esquadra, the local forces account only for about 10% of the total number.

In the first instance, we are interested, in the context of this paper, in the number of administrative fines which result from different forms of incivilities or social disorders in the city of Barcelona. Here, we deal essentially with the already announced ‘Social Behaviour Decree’. Additionally, have also to take into account the administrative fines stemming from the national law concerning the protection
of public security. For a relatively short period of five years (2009–2011), and in a very schematic way, we observe an increase in administrative fines for nuisance and misuse of public space. In 2012, we observe 119,680 fines concerning pleasance, in sum 7.4 fines per 100 inhabitants, while in 2008, this ratio was 6.0. In other words, only a small increase can be observed in the practice of administrative fining.

Considering the number of penal (thus not administrative) records concerning petty crime in Barcelona, we observe a stabilising tendency in 2012, compared with the figures for 2008. We count: 11.5/100 inhabitants in 2012, while this ratio was 11.6 in 2008 (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2013). In general, we observe that the proportion of these penal records per 100 inhabitants stays more important than those of the administrative fines mentioned above, which indicates that the practice of administrative fining today is not dominant (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2013).

The annual victim survey of Barcelona provides another kind of measurement (Sabaté, 2005; Recasens, 2008; Lahosa, 2010). This survey contains a victim index per form of crime, which increased during the last five years. The degree of complaints per type of crime shows a decreasing tendency. In the same survey, some results can be found concerning the perception of security, which seems to be rather stable (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2013).

In short, the available fragmented data learn that the frequency of recorded crime is stabilising in the region. The majority of crime is recorded by the Mossos d’Esquadra, local forces account only for a small proportion (10%) of the global figure. The Guardia Urbana de Barcelona in the city of Barcelona engaged more in recording forms of penal crimes than in administrative fines. In other words, the pluralisation of policing in Barcelona is only to a small extent influenced by the introduction of the practice of administrative fines, partially based on the ‘Social Behaviour Decree’.

4. The police system within Barcelona

4.1. The local reality of policing in the city Barcelona

4.1.1. The Spanish state police forces in Barcelona

As described previously, the current police system in the city of Barcelona is composed of three constitutional levels. It seems that the state is increasing the number of officers in Catalonia; 231 officers were sent in 2013 (from the last promotion of the Spanish police academy); and 118 are attached to the Jefatura Superior of Barcelona. These police officers are not visible in the streets and their numeric presence is marginal compared to that of the Mossos d’Esquadra. The secret services have also increased slightly their presence in Barcelona (Lavozdebarcelona.com newspaper, 29-07-2013). According to the director general of the national police, this is due to the fact that the security in Catalonia is a priority for the central Spanish government. He gave as an example that during the last few years half of the jihadi terrorists captured in Spain were on Catalan soil. The growing Catalan independence movement seems
to interest these services too. Without having access to more systematic sources, we deduce that only a rather weak growing presence of national forces in the city of Barcelona is legitimized by the phenomenon of terrorism.

4.1.2. The Mossos d’Esquadra in Barcelona

As mentioned, the Mossos d’Esquadra arrived only on November 1st 2005 in Barcelona; the last territory where they were deployed in Catalonia, because of the complexity of the city. The general structure of the Mossos d’Esquadra in Catalonia is divided into police regions. The city of Barcelona constitutes the metropolitan region of Barcelona. The number of officers in the city is 3,041 (2011), distributed amongst 10 police-stations.

4.1.3. The cooperation between the Mossos d’Esquadra and the Guardia Urbana in the city

A protocol of cooperation and coordination exists between the Generalitat and the City Council of Barcelona, focusing on the relationship between the Guardia Urbana and the Mossos d’Esquadra. The Mossos d’Esquadra carry out foot-patrols in Barcelona, with proximity techniques. Mixed patrols of Guardia Urbana/Mossos d’Esquadra were observed during the last period, in particular specific occasions (Christmas, important holidays, etc.) in Barcelona and other cities in the Metropolitan Area (e.g. l’Hospitalet). Both forces also execute joint judiciary tasks and operations. In this context it has to be reminded that the Mossos d’Esquadra has a coordinating task for the Guardia Urbana.

Various agreements have been signed between both forces, focusing on the development of joint action. The general principle is that of mutual cooperation and ‘obligatory minimal intervention’, which means that every officer (of the Guardia Urbana or the Mossos d’Esquadra) has to respond to every citizen’s demand, in spite of the specific specialisations of each force. Common procedures and instruments are, for example, joint emergency services, joint command centre, unification of computer systems, joint training programmes, etc.). The forces share applications, software and logistics and have compatible systems of radio communication and a permanent common coordination. An assessment of these formal agreements is not available.

Noteworthy nevertheless is that these arrangements demonstrate on the one hand a growing interconnectedness of both forces, without reflecting a real so-called ‘web of police’; while a functional hierarchy exists between both forces on the other hand, the Mossos d’Esquadra taking the lead.

4.1.4. The Guardia Urbana de Barcelona and its beat-officers

The municipal police of Barcelona, the ‘Guardia Urbana de Barcelona’, was founded in 1843. This force includes 2,950 officers (2012), in other words, 1,71 officers per
1,000 inhabitants. It is an armed force of a civil nature, with a municipal range, functioning under the authority of the municipal council. An elected local assignee is politically responsible for the force. The principal functions of the Guardia Urbana are public security and urban traffic. The force has certain criminal functions, but these are limited to car accidents (dangerous driving, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving without a permit and others). They also carry out the first judiciary actions when Guardia Urbana officers start the intervention. In line with the public security policies of the city, the Guardia Urbana is also organised into 10 districts, which are the same as those of the Mossos d’Esquadra.

In 1995, the Guardia Urbana started its community policing (COP) project, based on prevention and problem solving. COP-ideas can be found in many policies of the city council of Barcelona. It is necessary to distinguish between COP as philosophy, as a model and as a technical tool. While the philosophy was always present in security policies, the operational implementation and technical tools were not always developed.

Only in 2007 the city took the initiative to renew COP. During 2008 and 2009, an implementation plan in all neighbourhoods of the city was developed and completed in 2010. The Guardia Urbana was asked to employ 70% of its officers in beat policing. The territory of the city was divided into 40 Operational Police Sectors and the Guardia began to have patrols on foot, bike, motorbike and car. The force was asked to organise beat-meetings with inhabitants of the neighbourhoods (3,521 meetings with civil organisations of the city in 2008). New software was at the disposal of patrol officers. The stated goal of this operation was to diminish fear of crime, and the slogan was: ‘Prevention is always the best security policy’ (News Agency Europa Press, 23-11-2009).

4.1.5. The municipal surveillants of Barcelona

In Barcelona, zones marked with blue or green are for limited parking time against payment. A municipal service (Barcelona de Serveis Municipals) controls the infractions in these zones, with a group of 390 surveillants and 3,300 parking bays (2013). These surveillants are not police officers. They do not carry arms, but they wear a uniform and radio-communication is at their disposal. They are nominated by decree by the municipality and work under the hierarchical guidance of the Guardia Urbana.

Their most important functions are: to enforce the parking regulations, to inform and orient citizens, to signal observed incidents in the public space, to aid in case

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4 This ratio is difficult to determine, while it is deceptive. The fact that we are dealing with a capital city and a number of central services of the state and of Catalonia are located in the territory falsifies the ratio and does not take into account the number of real operational forces within the city. In May 2002, the Catalan Parliament established a desirable index of 4.5 officers/1,000 inhabitants. If we take only the Guardia Urbana and the Mossos d’Esquadra into account, the index is 3.7/1,000 inhabitants in the city, but we should still include the Mossos d’Esquadra in central services and the officers of the state. We can estimate the real index as between 3.5 and 4.0/1,000 inhabitants.
of accident and to inform urgently the *Guardia Urbana*, the *Mossos d’Esquadra*, the firemen, ambulances or other services (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2013).

These surveillants are up to now the only municipal officials outside the police bodies and their tasks are limited to parking surveillance. From this point of view the pluralisation of policing in Barcelona stays predominantly an internal police matter.

4.1.6. The harbour police in Barcelona

The harbour police was the result in 1990 of the transformation of the old force ‘guardamolls’ (wharf guards) of the harbour of Barcelona. The force, which has a history of more than two centuries, has the competence to sanction infractions on the Service, Police and Surveillance Regulations of the Harbour of Barcelona, including the internal traffic within the harbour.

The importance of the harbour police increased after the Olympics of 1992. At that time, the old harbour of the city was reopened. As a consequence, different new public spaces (hotels, restaurants, shopping malls, etc.) were created (*Maremagnum*), where the harbour police exercised authority. In this way, this force, besides its traditional port and nautical functions, is faced with problems in the domain of public security. This evolution meant that it was necessary to invest in training for these officers. An agreement with the police school of Catalonia made it possible for the harbour police to be trained in the same centre as the *Mossos d’Esquadra* and the *Guardia Urbana*. In 2008, there were approximately 160 harbour police officers in Barcelona.

4.2. Private security in the city of Barcelona

The private security sector is essentially composed of uniformed security guards and private detectives. At the level of the Spanish state, the number of uniformed employees was 207,212 in 2012, but only 88,250 seem to be active. The majority (56%) had only basic school training and initial professional training takes 180 hours. They are allowed to carry arms for specific activities. Concerning the firms, 1,492 (2012) are active: 72% had 1 to 19 employees, and only four enterprises with more than 5,000 employees. The total sector charges 3.215 million Euros (2011). Normally, it is the Ministry of Interior that certifies these firms, except for Catalonia and the Basque Country. These regional administrations certify themselves. In December 2007, the *Junta de Seguretat of Catalonia* decided that the government of Catalonia has the exclusive competence to inspect, control and sanction the activities of private security in Catalan territory, as well as security enterprises and private detectives.

Two hundred and seventy enterprises are active in Catalonia, of which 134 are certified by the Catalan government. The whole spectrum can be found here: Catalan enterprises; big multinationals; multi-service enterprises; and Spanish enterprises. Most of these firms have a central office in Barcelona. In 2007, there were about 13,000 private security guards in Catalonia (Aproser, 2012).
There are about 350 private detectives in Catalonia (Collegi Oficial de Detectius Privats de Catalunya, 2013). They are mostly active in the domains of labour (absenteeism, irregularities, etc.), married people (infidelities) and fraud in relation to insurances. By ruling of the Supreme Court (31-01-2012), they do not have the right to carry weapons. They have to obtain a university degree recognised by the Ministry of Interior, to enrol at the General Direction of the Police, and to identify themselves with a professional card. Moreover, they have to be subscribed at the Association of Private Detectives in Catalonia.

The activities of the private security sector are largely carried out in the city of Barcelona or its Metropolitan Area, but it remains very difficult to acquire isolated data concerning the city itself. A real functional relationship between the private sector and the public police agencies is absent.

5. Conclusion

In the first part of this article we considered how Barcelona has grown by successive waves of economic and political transformations. This has had an impact on its security and police model. The Catalan police reality is the consequence of the hybrid Spanish constitutional model. The police model, and its pluralisation, resulted, in the first instance, from a difficult balance of political power between central government, regional (autonomous) power and municipal democratisation, specific to the Spanish history. This reality is to a large extent inspired by the difficult power balance between the different political layers of the constitutional model. While the national forces (Guardia Civil and National Police) on national scale represent 2/3rd of the police officers in Spain, the regional force (Mossos d’Esquadra) represents 50% of the total police presence in Catalan territory and has the main competences, outnumbering clearly the national and local forces in the region. This proportional difference in police capacity at state and regional level demonstrates that this situation mainly results from a power competition than of the composition of a complementary ‘web of police’, as the global theory on pluralisation assumes.

Surprisingly, this also holds true at the local level. The regional police is outnum-bering clearly the municipal police in the city of Barcelona and has a coordinating function for the local force. Even in the city, the Mossos d’Esquadra reflects the dominant position of the Catalan government, in spite of the efforts of the Town Hall to develop its own security policy in the city. This observation is also contradictory to the general theory concerning the ‘pluralisation of policing’, which implies a growing interconnectedness and interdependency between different actors in the security domain, especially on the local level.

This municipal security policy of Barcelona was discussed in the second part of this paper, showing that the city has experienced important phases of internal and external migration. From political repression and demographic and industrial development in the 1970s and 1980s, the city has been transformed into a tertiary and European metropolis, with an international demographic growth. These transformations in criteria and structures also brought about a change in the typology of
conflicts and their management. The growing touristic attraction of the city created specific urban crime problems and increasing fear of crime. These changes resulted in the creation of an Urban Council of Security and a Municipal Council for Social Welfare, initiatives that were preventative in nature and based on social policy. The policy became harder over time during the 1990s. We can observe a strong input in favour of more policing and the reduction of social crime prevention policies. The need to face and to solve new problems, as well as the new political structure and division of powers left much of the security in Barcelona in the hands of sub-state administrations (autonomous community, metropolitan area and municipality). Confronted by the lack of state resources, such as criminal law and the administration of justice, local authorities turned ultimately to administrative rules (anti social behaviour by-laws) over which they had authority.

In 2006, the city published an (Anti) Social Behaviour Decree and started a campaign of administrative fines in its struggle against incivilities. Today, this evolution is consolidated in the elaboration of local security plans as an instrument of public security policy. The actual plan hesitates, sometimes in a contradictory way, between classical concepts of prevention, theories of ‘broken windows’ and situational prevention. A more explicit ‘securing’ and ‘policing’ tendency is present.

A transversal reading of the crime figures of the different police forces reveals the majority of crime in the city is recorded by the Mossos d’Esquadra. The local force accounts only for a small proportion (10%) of the global figure. The Guardia Urbana de Barcelona in the city of Barcelona engaged more in recording forms of penal crimes than in administrative fines. In other words, the pluralisation of policing in Barcelona is only to a small extent influenced by the introduction of the practice of administrative fines, partially based on the ‘Social Behaviour Decree’.

The third part of this paper examined how policing in the territory of the city of Barcelona is pluralising without doubt. First, we observed a weak increase in the presence of the state police, strengthened by the Catalan tendency towards autonomy. Second, we observed a strong presence of the Mossos d’Esquadra, which is largely engaged in supporting the local Guardia Urbana de Barcelona, the capital city of Catalonia. Third, this municipal police is developing, under the guidance of the city hall, towards a Community Policing model, with a growing importance of beat policing and campaigns against anti social behaviour and incivilities. Fourth, the city supports this tendency by investing in municipal surveillants for specific traffic matters, under the guidance of the Guardia Urbana. Fifth, the harbour police of Barcelona have broadened their domain of action in the same policy line. Finally, the private sector has a growing presence in the metropolis. Unlike this observed pluralisation in the city, the dominant position of the regional police, the Mossos d’Esquadra, cannot be denied.

The questions raised in the introduction of this paper can now be answered. As noted already, the pluralisation of policing in Barcelona is more a consequence of the contradictory tensions between central state power and the aspiration for more regional autonomy. The city policy is strongly conditioned by these pressures, overshadowing the pure local (municipal) policy. The tensions between different social, political and corporative forces rendered largely erratic the development and
coordination of the police and further hindered the development of coherent security policies in the city. In other words, local security policy is also locally defined in Barcelona, but is, to a large extent, the expression of national frictions and history. The development of a real European sociology of formal social control should take these realities into account, not generalizing global theories to specific local realities. Global theory is useful, but can also mask important specific characteristics and tensions.

Does the actual redistribution of urban security capacity, and the new division of labour within the security sector in Barcelona, generate growing attention for public disorder (‘social disorder’, ‘incivilities’) maintenance? Yes. But the answer is much more differentiated than the general theory suggests. It is clear that in Barcelona municipal policy has also been directed towards this kind of reality. However, there is more. In the territory of the city, we can observe a firm and complex structure of different actors focussing on serious problems of organised crime at one end of the continuum, with a broad middle field, and some growing attention on petty crime and social disorder at the other end of the continuum. The urban development during the last few years brought about a growth in the private sector and produced new security needs linked to the growing service economy of the city and to tourism. The introduction of the Mossos d’Esquadra modified the balance of power, the division of labour and the forms of cooperation.

Is ‘anti-social’ behaviour increasingly sanctioned in an exclusive local (more precisely urban [municipal]) context? Is this kind of behaviour sanctioned administratively by means of ‘by-law’ and no longer by means of traditional penal law? Yes. But again the answer is much more nuanced than the general theory suggests. It is clear that the so-called ‘social behaviour decree’ of 2006 initiated this local evolution and growth; nevertheless, it is clear that a dominant administrative approach of social disorder is today not the reality in Barcelona. We observe the disappearance of social aspects and a strong input in favour of policing security, while the discourse stays in favour of prevention.

Barcelona, like Janus, shows two faces: the city of tolerance and hospitality, conflict and social problems. There is no reason to think that this situation will change any time soon.

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The German Federal Ministry of the Interior plans to tighten the legislation on asylum. In the future it shall be easier to arrest immigrants who illegally crossed the German borders and destroyed their identification papers in order to establish their origins and expel them from the German national territory. At the same time, restrictions will be eased for immigrants who are legally admitted and consequently have a precarious status in Germany. It shall be easier for these immigrants to achieve a permanent residence permit.

Due to the so called 'Edathy Affaire', the German Minister of Justice proposed a draft law in order to tighten the criminal rules on child pornography. The draft explicitly incriminates naked posing, which implies that a picture is taken of a naked minor in a clearly sex accented position. So far naked posing of minors is not explicitly mentioned in the law. The draft further extends rules of prescription for sexual crimes. It also provides that sexual crimes committed outside the German territory by a German citizen can be tried under German law independently of the legal regulations applicable at the crime site.

The same minister further introduced a draft law which aims at taking a perpetrators attitude into account in order to determine the sentence for offenses which are motivated by inhumane ideas, such as racism or xenophobia. The idea is to encourage courts to prescribe severer sentences for so called 'hate crimes'.

The former president of the Bavarian soccer club 'FC Bayern München', Ulrich Hoeneß, has been condemned to three years of imprisonment by a verdict pronounced on 13\textsuperscript{th} of March 2014. The Court found him guilty of fiscal fraud in seven cases over a sum of 28.2 million Euros in total. It considered that the defendant did not denounce himself effectively before proceedings were launched. A legal remedy has not been inserted and the verdict is now legally binding. Various recently discovered cases of tax fraud committed by famous members of German society have lately started a debate on how to counter tax fraud more effectively in the future. The usefulness of self-denunciation-options to gain exemption from punishment in particular has been debated. The debate on racial profiling is still ongoing. Due to the declared necessity to encounter illegal migration, regular police controls in trains, at stations, and at airports are effectuated, which mostly affect foreign-looking people because selection is made by physical appearance. This leads to the discussion on whether ethnic appearance is a legitimate and effective selection criteria or whether such controls are not compatible with the principle of non-discrimination in a democratic society.

Recent crime statistics of the Ministry for Interior indicate a raise of 40\% of far-left motivated criminal offenses. However, registered offenses mainly concern damages of property and offenses related to demonstrations, such as violent blockades.
Policing demonstrations in Oslo: a total change of approach

The police approach to political demonstrators in Oslo has undergone a total transformation during the last two decades. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the police had a rather repressive approach, using heavy force and large resources to control demonstrators. Lack of confidence and even hatred of the police was widespread among political activists, on the left in particular.

A new police chief in 1994 took an important first step away from this confrontational strategy. An even more significant turning point came in 2002, when the World Bank had a conference in Oslo. In the aftermath of very violent anti-globalisation demonstrations in Seattle, Genova and Gothenburg, there were great fears of riots and havoc in the streets of Oslo. The police prepared for the worst, mobilizing large police forces with heavy riot equipment, but developed an alternative strategy as the primary approach: establishing dialogue with the organisers of the planned demonstrations. If these organisers took the task of keeping order and stopping trouble-makers, the police would stay in the background. This strategy of dialogue and self-policing worked out even better than expected and the demonstration took place without any violence or confrontations at all.

This success became the starting point for a new strategy of policing demonstrations. It also led to much improved relations between the police and political activists in Oslo. For the demonstrators, the police response became predictable: If someone made trouble during a demonstration, the security guards of the demonstration will be the first to respond. If they are unable to stop trouble-makers, the police dialogue team will approach the persons in question. If they fail as well, the police will order the demonstration to break up, and if necessary, move in with police forces in riot gear. It rarely ends up there. Most demonstrations now take place with the police in a facilitating role, and with only a few police officers present.

The dialogue unit of the Oslo police now enjoys very constructive relations with almost all political activist groups in the capital. It is generally accepted that the role of the police is to ensure that they get their right to express their opinions, but in ways which does not jeopardize public safety.

Similar dialogue units are now also to be found in many European police forces. A unique feature of the dialogue unit of the Oslo police is that they are also a public order intelligence unit, consisting of three analysts and four dialogue officers. They are open about their intelligence role with the activists, but also that they collect intelligence by open communication only and not by using infiltrators or secret surveillance. Their role is to provide reliable information and risk assessments to the police leadership, enabling sound decisions about how much police manpower is needed for each demonstration – which in most cases is only a few. This saves considerable police resources, making the dialogue unit highly regarded with the police leadership.